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On Coincidence of Feedback Nash Equilibria and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

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Abstract

The scope of the applicability of the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. First, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium and the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium are given in terms of the instantaneous payoff functions of the players and the state equations of the game. Second, a class of differential games representing the underlying structure of a good number of economic applications of differential games is defined; for this class of differential games, it is shown that the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium. The conclusion is that the feedback Stackelberg solution is generally not useful to investigate leadership in the framework of a differential game, at least for a good number of economic applications

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economic Analysis, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain

    S. J. Rubio

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  1. S. J. Rubio
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Additional information

Communicated by G. Feichtinger

This paper was presented at the 8th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games, and Nonlinear Dynamics: Theory and Applications in Economics and OR/MS, Vienna, Austria, May 14–16, 2003, at the Seminar of the Instituto Complutense de Analisis Economico, Madrid, Spain, June 20, 2003, and at the Sevilla Workshop on Dynamic Economics and the Environment, Sevilla, Spain, July 2–3, 2003. The author is grateful to the participants in these sessions, in particular F.J. Andre and J. Ruiz, for their comments. Five referees provided particularly helpful suggestions. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia under Grant BEC2000-1432 is gratefully acknowledged.

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Rubio, S.J. On Coincidence of Feedback Nash Equilibria and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games. J Optim Theory Appl 128, 203–220 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-005-7565-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-005-7565-y

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