Abstract
Corporatism may be seen as variety of capitalism in which specific structural prerequisites such as unionization, centralization, and strong states combined with bargaining and concertation produce certain economic outputs. Corporatism may also be seen as a variety of democracy in which interest groups are integrated in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies. Departing in the last position, we measure the strength of Scandinavian corporatism by the involvement of interest groups in public committees, councils, and commissions. Corporatism in relation to the preparation of policy has gone down in all three Scandinavian countries whereas corporatism in implementation processes are more varied among the three countries.
Résumé
Le corporatisme peut être envisagé comme une forme de capitalisme, dans lequel des conditions préalables structurelles spécifiques, comme le syndicalisme, la centralisation, et des Etats forts, associés à la négociation et à la concertation produisent certains résultats économiques. Le corporatisme peut également être vu comme une forme de démocratie, dans laquelle des groupes d’intérêts forment un ensemble cohérent pour la préparation et la mise en œuvre des politiques publiques. Partant de cette dernière considération, nous mesurons la force du corporatisme existant en Scandinavie, par l’engagement des groupes d’intérêt dans les comités publiques, les conseils et les commissions. Le corporatisme dans le cadre de la préparation des politiques a été retenu dans les trois pays scandinaves, tandis que les procédés de mise du corporatisme recouvrent une variété plus étendue dans ces trois pays.
Zusammenfassung
Korporatismus könnte als eine Form des Kapitalismus angesehen werden, in der bestimmte strukturelle Vorraussetzungen wie gewerkschaftliche Organisierung, Zentralisierung und ein starker Staat kombiniert mit Tarifverhandlungen and Konzertierung bestimmte ökonomische Ergebnisse bewirken. Korporatismus könnte auch als eine Form von Demokratie angesehen werden, in der Interessengruppen in die Vorbereitung und/oder Implementierung von politischen Maßnahmen integriert sind. Ausgehend von der letzteren Position haben wir die Stärke des skandinavischen Korporatismus anhand der Involvierung von Interessengruppen in öffentlichen Ausschüssen, Gremien und Kommissionen bewertet. Korporatismus in Verbindung mit der Vorbereitung von Maßnahmen hat in allen drei skandinavischen Ländern abgenommen, während Korporatismus in Implementierungsprozessen in den drei Ländern vielfältiger geworden ist.
Resumen
El corporativismo puede verse como una variedad del capitalismo en la que determinados requisitos previos estructurales, como la unionización, la centralización y los estados fuertes combinados con la negociación y la concertación, producen determinados resultados económicos. El corporativismo también puede verse como una variedad de democracia, en la cual se integran grupos de interés para la preparación o la aplicación de políticas públicas. Partiendo de la última postura, evaluamos la fuerza del corporativismo escandinavo mediante la participación de grupos de interés en comités públicos, consejos y comisiones. El corporativismo relacionado con la preparación política ha descendido en los tres países escandinavos, mientras que el corporativismo en los procesos de aplicación presenta más variedad entre los tres.
摘要
可以将社团主义视为资本主义的变种,在这种资本主义中,它的具体结构前提,如联合、集权化和通过讨价还价与商谈实现强国联合的现象,产生一定程度的经济效果。也可以将社团主义视为民主制度的变种,由于这种民主,利益集团在制订和/或执行公共政策的过程中实现了统一。从最后一个观点出发,我们通过利益集团参与各种公共委员会的情况来衡量斯堪的纳维亚社团主义的力量。与制订策略有关的社团主义在斯堪的纳维亚三国中已呈颓势,但是执行过程中的社团主义在上述国家中却呈现出多样化。
ملخص
سيطرة الشركات يمكن أن ينظر إليها على إنها مجموعة متنوعة من الرأسمالية محددة الشروط الهيكلية ، مثل النقابات ، والمركزية ، والدول القوية تم دمجها بالتفاوض والإتفاق لإنتاج بعض النواتج الاقتصادية. أيضاً سيطرة الشركات يمكن أن ينظر إليها على أنها مجموعة متنوعة من الديمقراطية في جماعات المصالح التي هي متكاملة في إعداد و/أو تنفيذ السياسات العامة. في موقف المغادره الأخير نقيس قوة سيطرة الشركات الإسكندنافية عن طريق مشاركة جماعات المصالح في اللجان العامة والمجالس والوكالات. سيطرة الشركات فيما يتعلق بإعداد السياسة قد إنخفضت في جميع الدول الإسكندنافية الثلاث في حين أن سيطرة الشركات في تنفيذ العمليات أكثر تنوعاً بين الدول الثلاث.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Early Norwegian figures cannot be separated into preparation and implementation committees. The correlation between our two measures for corporatism from 1983 and onwards with the aggregated data for all committees with interest organization representation for the same period is very high (Pearson’s R of .907 for preparation corporatism and .982 for implementation corporatism). If we extrapolate data backwards based on these high correlations and the total number of committees in earlier periods, both preparation and implementation corporatism peaked in the early 1980s in Norway.
For each country we provide the figures for committees with at least one member from an interest organization. We also calculated the number of committees with at least three interest organizations as members. The correlations (Pearson’s R) between the figures with one and with three or more interest organizations are: .989 in Denmark, .921 in Norway and .797 in Sweden. Thus, most corporatist committees in fact have more organizational representatives as members.
The correlations between the number of committees/agency boards with at least one and at least three members are not as high for implementing bodies as for preparation bodies (Denmark: .737, Norway: .565, Sweden: .773). Thus, sometimes you have one-legged implementation corporatism with only one organizational member, e.g., in agriculture.
References
Almond, G. A. (1983). Corporatism, pluralism, and professional memory. World Politics, 35, 245–260.
Armingeon, K. (2002a). Interest intermediation: The cases of consociational democracy and corporatism. In H. Keman (Ed.), Comparative democratic politics. London: Sage.
Armingeon, K. (2002b). The effects of negotiation democracy: A comparative analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 41, 81–105.
Binderkrantz, A. (2005). Interest group strategies: Navigating between privileged access and strategies of pressure. Political Studies, 53, 694–715.
Blom-Hansen, J. (2000). Still corporatism in scandinavia? A survey of recent empirical findings. Scandinavian Political Studies, 23, 157–181.
Blom-Hansen, J. (2001). Organized interests and the state. A disintegrating relationship? Evidence from Denmark. European Journal of Political Research, 39, 391–416.
Blom-Hansen, J., & Daugbjerg, C. (Eds.). (1999). Magtens organisering. Stat og interesseorganisationer i Danmark. Aarhus: Systime.
Bonoli, G. (2001). Political institutions, veto points, and the process of welfare state adaptation. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The new politics of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buksti, J., & Nørby Johansen, L. (1979). Variations in organizational participation in government: The case of Denmark. Scandinavian Political Studies, 2, 197–220.
Cawson, A. (1985). Introduction. Varieties of corporatism: The importance of the meso-level of interest intermediation. In A. Cawson (Ed.), Organized interests and the state. Studies in meso-corporatism. London: Sage.
Cawson, A. (1986). Corporatism and political theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Christensen, J. G. (2006). Delegation and administrative organization: An overview of Danish Regulatory Administration 1950–2000. Unpublished, Aarhus University.
Christiansen, P. M., & Nørgaard, A. S. (2006). Whose agents? Non-governmental organizations in policy-proposing commissions: Agents of government or opposition parties? In D. Braun & F. Gilardi (Eds.), Delegation in contemporary democracies. London: Routledge.
Christiansen, P. M., Nørgaard, A. S., & Sidenius, N. C. (2004). Hvem skriver lovene? Interesseorganisationer og politiske beslutninger. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Christiansen, P. M., & og Nørgaard, A. S. (2003). Faste forhold, flygtige forbindelser: Stat og interesseorganisationer i det 20. århundrede. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Christiansen, P. M., & Rommetvedt, H. (1999). From corporatism to lobbyism? Parliaments, executives, and organized interests in Denmark and Norway. Scandinavian Political Studies, 22, 195–220.
Christiansen, P. M., & Sidenius, N. C. (1999). Venner for altid? Samspillet mellem central administration og interesseorganisationer. In J. Blom-Hansen & C. Daugbjerg (Eds.), Magtens organisering: Stat og interesseorganisationer i Danmark. Aarhus: Systime.
Compston, H. (1998). The end of national policy concertation? Western Europe since the Single European Act. Journal of European Public Policy, 5, 507–526.
Crepaz, M. L. (1992). Corporatism in decline? An empirical analysis of the impact of corporatism on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes in 18 industrialized democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 25, 139–168.
Downes, D. (1996). Neo-corporatism and environmental policy. Australian Journal of Political Science, 31(2), 175–190.
Ebinghaus, B., & Hassel, A. (2000). Striking deals: Concertation in the reform of continental European welfare states. Journal of European Public Policy, 7, 44–62.
Farsund, A. A., & Rommetvedt, H. (1996). Miljøpolitikk i møtet mellom organisasjonene, Stortinget og forvaltningen. In J. E. Klausen & H. Rommetvedt (Eds.), Miljøpolitikk. Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug.
Gerring, J., Thacker, S. G., & Moreno, C. (2005). Centripetal democratic governance: A theory and global inquiry. American Political Science Review, 99, 567–581.
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of capitalism: Institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hermansson, J. (1993). Politik som intressekamp. Parlamentariskt beslutsfattande och organiserade intressen i Sverige. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.
Hermansson, J., Svensson, T., & Öberg, P. (1997). Vad blev det av den svenske korporativismen? Politica, 29, 365–384.
Hermansson, J., Svensson, T., & Öberg, P. (1999). Avkorporativisering och lobbyism. Stockholm: SOU p. 121.
Jensen, L. (1999). Boligpolitik: Den organiserede boligbevægelse og institutionaliseringen af den boligpolitiske forestilling. In J. Blom-Hansen & C. Daugbjerg (Eds.), Magtens organisering. Stat og interesseorganisationer i Danmark. Aarhus: Systime.
Johansen, L. N., & Kristensen, O. P. (1978). Dataarkiv indeholdende oplysninger om offentlige udvalg 1946–1975, Rapporter og dokumentation nr. 1/1978. Odense: Department of Political Science.
Johansen, L. N., & Kristensen, O. P. (1982). Corporatist traits in Denmark, 1946–1976. In G. Lehmbruch & P. C. Schmitter (Eds.), Patterns of corporatist policy-making. London & Beverly Hills: Sage.
Johansson, J. (2005). Undermining corporatism. In P. Öberg & T. Svensson (Eds.), Power and institutions in industrial relation regimes. Uppsala: National Institute for Working Life.
Klausen, J. E., & Rommetvedt, H. (Eds.). (1996). Miljøpolitikk, Organisasjonene, Stortinget og forvaltningen. Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug.
Knudsen, T., & Rothstein, B. (1994). State building in scandinavia. Comparative Politics, 26, 203–220.
Lehmbruch, G. (1979). Liberal corporatism and party government. In P. C. Schmitter & G. Lehmbruch (Eds.), Trends towards corporatist intermediation. London: Sage.
Lembruch, G. (1984). Concertation and the structure of corporatist networks. In J. H. Goldthorpe (Ed.), Order and conflict in contemporary capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lijphart, A. (2002). Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations. European Journal of Political Research, 41, 107–113.
Lijphart, A., & Crepaz, M. M. L. (1991). Corporatism and consensus democracy in eighteen countries: Conceptual and empirical linkages. British Journal of Political Science, 21, 235–256.
Martin, C. J., & Swank, D. (2004). Does the organization of capital matter? Employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm levels. American Political Science Review, 98, 593–611.
McCubbins, M., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Structure and process, politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies. Virginia Law Review, 75, 431–482.
Meijer, H. (1969). Bureaucracy and policy formulation in Sweden. Scandinavian Political Studies, 4(1), 103–116.
Minnich, D. J. (2003). Corporatism and income equality in the global economy: A panel study of 17 OECD countries. European Journal of Political Research, 42, 23–53.
Moe, T. (1990). The politics of structural choice: Toward a theory of public bureaucracy. In O. E. Williamson (Ed.), Organization theory. From Chester Barnard to the present and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press.
Molina, O., & Rhodes, M. (2002). Corporatism: The past, present and future of a concept. Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 305–331.
Nordby, T. (1994). Korporatisme på norsk. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Nørgaard, A. S. (1997). The politics of institutional control: Corporatism in Danish occupational safety and health regulation and unemployment insurance, 1870–1995. Aarhus: Politica.
Öberg, P. (2002). Does administrative corporatism promote trust and deliberation? Governance, 15, 455–475.
Pallesen, T. (2006). Scandinavian corporatism in a trans-Atlantic comparative perspective. Scandinavian Political Studies, 29, 131–145.
Regini, M. (2000). Between deregulation and social pacts: The responses of European economies to globalization. Politics and Society, 28, 5–33.
Reutter, W., & Rütters, P. (Eds.). (2001). Verbände und Verbandssysteme in Westeuropa. Opladen: Leske+Budrich
Rokkan, S. (1966). Norway: Numerical democracy and corporate pluralism. In R. A. Dahl (Ed.), Political opposition in Western democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rommetvedt, H. (2000). Private and public power at the national level. In H. Goverde, P. G. Cerny, M. Haugaard, & H. Lentner (Eds.), Power in contemporary politics. London: Sage.
Rommetvedt, H. (2003). The rise of the Norwegian Parliament. London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
Rommetvedt, H. (2005). Norway: Resources count, but votes decide? From neo-corporatist representation to neo-pluralist parliamentarism. West European Politics, 28, 740–763.
Rothstein, B. (1992). Den korporativa staten. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semi-Sovereign People: A realist view of democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston.
Schmitter, P. C. (1974). Still in the century of corporatism. Review of Politics, 36, 85–131.
Schmitter, P. C. (1982). Reflections on where the theory of neo-corporatism has gone and where the praxis of neo-corporatism may be going. In G. Lehmbruch & P. Schmitter (Eds.), Patterns of corporatist policy making. London: Sage.
Siaroff, A. (1999). Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement. European Journal of Political Research, 36, 175–205.
Swank, D. (2001). Political institutions and welfare state restructuring: The impact of institutions on social policy change in developed democracies. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The new politics of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Truman, D. B. (1960) [1951]. The governmental process: Political interests and the public opinion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Wallerstein, M., Golden, M., & Lange, P. (1997). Unions, employers’ associations and wage-setting institutions in Northern and Central Europe, 1950–1992. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50, 379–401.
Williamson, P. (1985). Varieties of corporatism: Theory and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix: Data
Appendix: Data
Denmark
Data on committees have been collected over several years. The years 1946–1975 are documented in Johansen and Kristensen (1978). Data for 1980–2000 is documented in Christiansen and Nørgaard (2003). The 2005 data are collected by the authors using the same method as in the previous years. The committees selected are all national, i.e., committees with local or regional responsibilities are excluded. Working groups are excluded if they have only members from one ministry. In Tables 1 and 2, we do not include committees that have only advisory tasks, unless they directly deal with the preparation of policy proposals.
Norway
Data on committees are based on official registrations of all boards, councils and committees appointed by the Government and its ministries. Data from 1983 to 1997 were provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, while the 2005-data were provided by the Government Administration Service and GAN Media. In Tables 1 and 2, we do not include committees that have only advisory tasks, unless they directly deal with the preparation of policy proposals. Committees with only a regional responsibility are excluded. Furthermore, a clear-cut distinction cannot be made between advisory bodies and bodies with decision-making authority.
Sweden
Data on the Swedish policy preparation boards and on the Swedish agency boards for 1960–1997 is documented in Hermansson et al. (1997). Data for the remaining period is collected by the authors using the same method as in the previous years. Data on the Swedish committees in Table 2 have kindly been provided by Christensen (2006). They only cover Swedish regulatory administration. Omitted are the parts of the administration taking care of public provision of services, intergovernmental coordination, and government research institutions. Still, what is left represent some of the policy areas in which interest organizations are heavily involved such as trade, industry, commerce, agriculture and fishery, labour market, environmental policy, and consumer protection.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Christiansen, P.M., Nørgaard, A.S., Rommetvedt, H. et al. Varieties of Democracy: Interest Groups and Corporatist Committees in Scandinavian Policy Making. Voluntas 21, 22–40 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-009-9105-0
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-009-9105-0