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Socioeconomic stratification and stereotyping: lab-in-the-field evidence from Colombia

  • Research Article
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Abstract

In this study, we test the hypothesis that the Colombian system of socioeconomic stratification (SES), which ranks dwellings from one to six to calculate utility (public services) rates, may induce discrimination. To this end, a field experiment with around 1000 participants from Bogotá is carried out. The design includes a combination of a trust game and a dictator game and SES-contingent decisions. Results exclude the presence of pure preferences for discrimination, yet they confirm that low strata are associated with stereotypes of low trustworthiness. We also observe significant prosocial behavior in the low-income population, and most strikingly, we do not observe any difference in trustworthiness across different income levels.

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Notes

  1. With our design, we cannot distinguish on the content of the preferences for, or the belief over, different SES. In practice, this group effect may be due to simple labelling, income differences, or other taste based grouping. To do this we should generate alternative numbering in the lab and test the effect. A recent study on the lab with students does precisely that (Blanco and Guerra 2017). Interestingly, the results are in line with ours although the subject pool is very different.

  2. Burke et al. (2003) explored a design in which participants are randomized across three conditions: single-role trust game, two-role trust game without anticipating the change of roles, and two-role trust game knowing in advance that there will be a change of role. They show that sender decisions do not change from the first to the second condition. The second condition is identical to the one we have followed.

  3. The beliefs of the sender are very important, but we sought to avoid this elicitation for two reasons: (a) We would have had to elicit three different beliefs, for the sender decision is contingent on the SES of the receiver; (b) there is a significant difference between eliciting beliefs in the field and in the laboratory, for in the former environment, and especially with participants with low levels of educational attainment, the concept of belief is complicated and tends to be confused with aspirations or wishful thinking. As a result, we feared that four different beliefs would be cognitively demanding and could bias the responses to other decisions.

  4. In the original version (Berg et al. 1995), both sender and receiver had an initial endowment. Based on previous work (Bogliacino et al. 2016, 2017) and after piloting, we found our protocol much easier to understand from participants’ perspective. We sought to avoid any comprehension-related difficulties because educational attainment levels are different across SES. Furthermore, we sought to avoid any confounding factors.

  5. In the literature, there is an open debate whether the dictator decision is in fact altruism (Bardsley 2008). Nevertheless, for our investigation, the interest was limited to capturing the difference between a distributive decision such as this one and a strategic one involving trustworthiness regarding the other party. Please note that we use the term altruism for the sake of coherence with the literature. Moreover, even though some sort of demand effect is present, it goes in the same direction for both the dictator and trustor decisions, thereby still allowing for recovery of the treatment effect.

  6. We also performed an in-group regression of the three trust decisions using an in-group dummy equal to one when the trustor was matched with a trustee from the same SES. The fixed-effect transformation eliminated unobserved heterogeneity, which did not change across decisions. The absence of in-group bias is not rejected (t = 0.95; p = 0.34).

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Acknowledgements

We appreciate the comments made by Ariel Carrero, María Esperanza Corredor, Adriana Alejandra García Sierra, Jorge Iván Gonzales, and Manuel Muñoz in the various phases of the development of the project in which we collected these data. We thank various participants in seminars at the Universidad Nacional, Universidad Central, and FLACSO-Ecuador for their comments on previous versions. We thank Sonia Baquero, David Bossa, Rafael Combita, Camilo Gómez, Juan David Jaramillo, Margarida Borrero, Ricardo Navarrete, and Sandra Ortega for their assistance with fieldwork. We thank three anonymous referees for their comments, and we thank Joseph Wager for proofreading the text. The usual disclaimer applies.

Funding

Financial support for this project was provided by the Convenio Interadministrativo (in English: Interadministrative Agreement) 168/2014 between the Universidad Nacional and the Secretaría Distrital de Planeación of Bogotá (Colombia). The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be regarded as representative of the Secretaría Distrital de Planeación’s official position.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Carrera 30, No 45-03, Bogotá, Colombia

    Francesco Bogliacino, Laura Jiménez Lozano & Daniel Reyes

Authors
  1. Francesco Bogliacino
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  2. Laura Jiménez Lozano
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  3. Daniel Reyes
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Francesco Bogliacino.

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Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

Appendices

Appendix: the protocol

Parts in underlined italic must not be read. The rest of the text must be strictly followed. Maintained a neutral behavior, never speak loudly, and do not play jokes.

Never, under any situation use the words “experiments”, “games”, or other emotionally or morally charged words, like “trust”, “segregation”, “discrimination”, “share”, “altruism”, “dictator”, etc.

Do not reveal the treatments (There are two different games), or the aim of the study.

For any doubts about any word, take a note and ask to the Project Director. If accidentally you say one wrong word when you are answering a question, please take a note of the word, to use it every time you answer the same question.

If you are asked particular questions, take a note of the expressions you used, to use them again.

1.1 Checklist

(1) Answer sheet, (2) informed consent, (3) Cardboard, (4) Money for payments and for instructions, (5) Smartphone, (6) printed MASTER GUIDE, (7) payment receipts, (8) envelopes, (9) pens, (10) urn, (11) notebook.

Reminder before starting: (a) check that the cardboard is ready, (b) all the material with sensitive data are saved, (c) the MASTER GUIDE has the four labels for each one of the conditions, (d) you have read the MASTER GUIDE once before beginning, (e) the smartphone is ready.

The participants arrive to the session and they will be received individually. The room where the experiments are being executed must be secure (for example, closed) to ensure confidentiality. The participants that are waiting for the experiment should not go into the room under any condition.

All the assistants use a table to show the cardboard and explain the instructions. If there is more than one assistant, the tables should be distant enough to avoid distracting the participants.

Do not allow the participants to see the MASTER GUIDE.

If this is not the first person of the day, before beginning check carefully the data of the previous participants are correctly recorded in the answers sheet.

Good morning/evening, thanks for attending this session. My name is Name. Today activity is part of a project about individuals’ choices. Depending on the choices you make today, you will earn a certain amount of money; thus, it is important for you to pay attention to these instructions. The funds for this research belong to the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and the other institutions. I am available for any further question.

If they ask for the other institutions, it is better not to name the District because naming political authorities may create a bias. Take note in case you have to. You can always answer that you are just an assistant of the project, and for more information they can call the project director.

You may wonder why we give money in this exercise. We use real money because the exercise involves economic decisions, that is, choices with consequences for the pocket, as occurs in reality. You will not lose money under any situation.

For your participation you will earn $10.000 (COP), in addition you will get the amount of money you earn as consequence of your decisions, and the decisions of the people you will interact with. This last part of your earnings will be delivered in a date after the end of the session, in the date and time you choose. At the end, we will write down your contact data. If you don’t have your ID (original or copy), you cannot participate in the exercise.

Check

You will not know the identity of the person who is interacting with you, nor will the other person know yours, so you can feel more comfortable at the moment of making your decision.

It’s important to know that you can abandon the activity in any moment; however, only if you complete the exercise and answer the questions, you will get the amount of money you earn for your choices.

In order to participate, you must sign the informed consent. This document is the only one (with the payment receipt) where you declare personal data; all your other answers are absolutely anonymous. We will ask you your phone number for the payment. The informed consent includes the data of the director of the project, if you want to communicate with them to solve any doubt after the session.

If they wonder whether they can write down the data of the project managers, answer affirmatively. At the end, write the data down in a white sheet. You never have to give your personal data, explain that you are only a research assistant.

If it is difficult for you to read, I can do it for you. If you cannot sign, you just have to tell me your ID number, and write a mark or a sign that certifies you want to participate.

The assistant gives the informed consent and read it if it is necessary. Once signed, double the sheet and put it inside the proper envelope. While they are signing the informed consent, prepare the bag with the codes.

Take the codes bag, and let them draw a number. The assistant writes the number in the answers sheet, so the PC can match the data. Explain them this is to guarantee the confidentiality.

Explain them it is better to indicate their self phone number.

Each assistant must respect the following random sequence, created through a lottery without replacement, allowing randomization and the quota per condition. On the next day, the assistant must begin with the following condition. When the ten conditions are done, the assistant can start over.

  1. 1.

    Receiver (Dictator).

  2. 2.

    Sender (Dictator).

  3. 3.

    Trust, first decision Sender.

  4. 4.

    Receiver (Dictator).

  5. 5.

    Receiver (Dictator).

  6. 6.

    Trust first decision Receiver.

  7. 7.

    Sender (Dictator).

  8. 8.

    Sender (Dictator).

  9. 9.

    Trust first decision Receiver.

  10. 10.

    Trust first decision Sender.

Never delete a data point. If the participant decides to leave the exercise, write down in the “Notes” column, that the participant did not finish the application of the test.

Before starting, we would like you to answer the following questions. Type the answers.

Never ask for the gender. Read carefully and exactly the question about the SES.

(Q1):

Gender:

(Q2):

Age:

(Q3):

What is your marital status?

(Q4):

According to your utility bills, what is the SES of the dwelling you are living?

According with the experimental condition, go to the following page:

  1. I.

    Trust first decision Sender.

  2. II.

    Trust first decision Receiver.

  3. III.

    Sender (Dictator).

  4. IV.

    Receiver (Dictator).

Trust, first choice sender

You will interact with another person. You will not know the identity of the other person. It is someone among the other participants. The matching will occur through a draw. You will take two decisions and then, at the end, you will draw if we will pay you the first or second decision. Therefore, take each decision, as if it would be paid. This will be your first decision of the day. Now let’s see together the cardboard.

Show the cardboard

You represent the Participant #1, at this side of the cardboard. The other participant will be called Participant #2.

  • There are two stages in this decision.

  • This is the first stage. You receive $50,000 pesos. At this moment, the Participant #2 does not receive any money. We ask to you as Participant #1 to send some amount of money to the Participant #2. It could be zero, $10,000, $20,000, $30000, $40,000, or $50,000. Show how the money moves from Participant #1 to Participant #2, on the cardboard.

  • Any amount of money that you send will be tripled, because the researchers will put the additional money. For example, if you send $10.000, now the Participant #2 receives $30.000. Or, for example, if you send $30.000, now the Participant #2 receives $90.000. Show on the cardboard.

  • Now at the second stage the Participant #2 makes his/her decision. The Participant #2 may decide to send you zero, a part or all of the money that owns at the end of the first stage (any multiple of $10,000). In this case, the amount is not tripled. For example, if you sent $10,000 and the Participant #2 owns $30,000, he/she may decide to send you $20,000. This will be the final sums. Or, for example, if you decided to send $30,000, the Participant #2 owns $90,000, he/she may decide to send you $60,000. This will be the final sums. Declare the final sums.

Now I will show some examples.

Example one: A transfer of 20,000 without any transfer back.

Example two: A transfer of $40,000 with Participant #2 sending back one half. Always indicating the final sums. Try to use the same words to explain the examples.

Now, before making your decision, I will ask some questions to make sure that you understood. Write down the number of mistakes in the answer sheet (minimum cero, maximum four) and show each situation on the cardboard, asking to the person to personally move the money on the cardboard. If they make a mistake, explain them the correct answer but record the mistake.

  1. (1)

    If you as Participant #1 send $0 to the Participant #2, how much would the final sum be for Participant #1?

  2. (2)

    And the final sum for Participant #2?

  3. (3)

    If you as the Participant #1 send $50.000 to the Participant #2. How much would the final sum be for Participant #1?

  4. (4)

    And the final sum for Participant #2?

Now it’s time for the first decision. Actually we are going to ask you to take three times the decision, depending on the socioeconomic stratum (SES) of the counterpart. We know the SES of the counterpart because we asked him, as we did with you. Then, depending on your choice, we will send him/her the chosen amount.

Take notes of the decisions on the answer’s sheet. When the participant make the choice do not say “ready, ok, perfect, it’s ok”. If you fell the need to say something, repeat the decision of the participant. Write down 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the answer sheet.

  1. (1)

    If the Participant #2 belongs to SES 1 or 2, how much would you be willing to send?

  2. (2)

    If the Participant #2 belongs to SES 3 or 4, how much would you be willing to send?

  3. (3)

    If the Participant #2 belongs to SES 5 or 6, how much would you be willing to send?

Now it’s time to take the second decision. The second decision follows the same rules as before but now you will act as the Participant #2. Your Participant #1 will be drawn, but for sure it will not be the same counterpart as before. You have to tell us what you want to do for any possible amount sent by Participant #1.

Take notes of the decisions in the answers sheet. When the participant take a decision do not say “ready, ok, perfect, it’s ok”. If you fell the need to say something, repeat the decision of the participant. Write down 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the answer sheet.

  1. (1)

    If the Participant #1 sent $10,000, and now you own $30,000, how much would you be willing to send to Participant #1?

  2. (2)

    If the Participant #1 sent $20,000, and now you own $60,000, how much would you be willing to send to Participant #1?

  3. (3)

    If the Participant #1 sent $30,000, and now you own $90,000, how much would you be willing to send to Participant #1?

  4. (4)

    If the Participant #1 sent $40,000, and now you own $120,000. How much would you be willing to send to Participant #1?

  5. (5)

    If the Participant #1 sent $50,000, and now you own $150,000. How much would you be willing to send to Participant #1?

Now we will give you the opportunity to earn some more money. We ask you to tell us how many COPs you think Participant #1 sent to you. If your answer is correct, you will win $10,000 more. How much do you believe Participant #1 sent to you? $0, $10,000, $20,000, $30,000, $40,000, or $50,000?

Type the answer in the answers sheet

Now we will draw if we are going to pay you decision number one or two. In this bag, there are two little cubes, one has the number 1 and the other the number 2. If you draw the one that says 1, we will pay you the first decision; on the other case, we will pay you the second decision. Please verify the bag.

Let the participant the draw.

Go to the final questionnaire.

1.2 TPDD

You will interact with another person. You will not know who the opposite participant is. It is someone from all the participants. The pairing will happen through a raffle. You will take two decisions, and then, at the end, you will draw if we will pay you by the first or second decision. Therefore, take each decision as it would be paid. This will be your first decision of the day. Now let’s see together the next cardboard.

Show the big cardboard

You represent the Participant #2, at this side of the cardboard. The other participant will be called Participant #1.

  • There are two stages in this decision.

  • This is the first stage. The Participant #1 receives $50.000 pesos. You, as Participant #2 does not have money for the time being. We ask to the Participant #1 to send any amount of money to you as Participant #2. Participant #1 may send zero, $10.000, $20.000, $30.000, $40.000, or $50.000. Show how the money moves from Participant #1 to Participant #2, on the cardboard.

  • Any amount of money that Participant #1 sends will be tripled, because the investigators will add the additional money. For example, if Participant #1 sends $10.000, now you as Participant 2 have $30,000. Or for example, if Participant #1 sends $30,000, now you as Participant 2 have $90,000. Show on the top of the cardboard.

  • Now on the second stage, you have to take the decision as Participant #2. The Participant #2 can decide to send zero, a part or all of the money that has at the end of the first stage (any multiple of $10.000). In this case, the amount is not tripled. For example, if the Participant #1 sent $10.000, now you have $30.000, you may decide to send $20.000. This will be the final profit. Or, for example, if the Participant #1 decided to send $30.000, now you have $90.000, you may decide to send $60.000. This will be the final profit. Tell them how much the profit is.

Now I will show some examples.

Example one: A transfer of 20.000 with Participant #2 transferring nothing. Example two: A transfer of $40.000 with Participant #2 transferring one half. Always indicating the final profit. Trying to use the same words to explain the examples.

Now, before taking the decision I will make some questions to make sure that you understood. Write down the number of mistakes in the answer sheet (minimum cero, maximum four) and show each situation on the cardboard, asking to the person to really move the money on the cardboard. If they make a mistake, explain them the correct answer although it should be written down as a mistake.

  1. (1)

    If you as Participant 1 send $0 to the Participant #2, how much would it be the final profit of Participant 1?

  2. (2)

    And the final profit for Participant #2?

  3. (3)

    If you as the Participant 1 send $50,000 to the Participant 2. How much would be the final profit of the Participant 1?

  4. (4)

    And the final profit of the Participant 2?

Now we have arrived to your first decision. We asked to Participant #1 to send any amount of money to you as Participant #2, according to the Participant #2’s SES (You). We know the SES because we asked you before beginning. Therefore, we will transfer what Participant #1 has decided to send to a person of your SES.

You have to tell us what you would do for any amount of money that Participant #1 has sent to you.

Take notes of the decisions on the answer’s sheet. When the participant make the election do not say “ready, ok, perfect, it’s ok”. If you fell the need to say something, repeat the decision of the participant. Write down 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in between the algorithm.

  1. (1)

    If the Participant #1 sent $10.000, and now you have $30.000. How much would you be willing to send to the Participant #1?

  2. (2)

    If the Participant #1 sent $20.000, and now you have $60.000. How much would you be willing to send to the Participant #1?

  3. (3)

    If the Participant #1 sent $30.000, and now you have $90.000. How much would you be willing to send to the Participant #1?

  4. (4)

    If the Participant #1 sent $40.000, and now you have $120.000. How much would you be willing to send to the Participant #1?

  5. (5)

    If the Participant #1 sent $50.000, and now you have $150.000. How much would you be willing to send to the Participant #1?

Now we will give you the chance to win to some more money. We ask you to tell us how many pesos you believe Participant #1 sent to you. If your prediction is correct, you will win $10.000 more. How much do you believe Participant #1 sent to you? $0, $10.000, $20.000, $30.000, $40.000, $50.000?

Take notes of the decisions on the answer’s sheet. When the participant make the election do not say “ready, ok, perfect, it’s ok”. If you fell the need to say something, repeat the decision of the participant. Write down 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the algorithm.

Ready, now we have gotten to the second decision. The second decision follows the same rules as before, but now you will act as the Participant #1. Your Participant #2 will be drawn, but it is so possible it will not be the same opposite participant as before.

We are going to ask you to take three times the decision, depending on the SES whom the opposite participant belongs. We know the SES of the opposite participant because we asked him, as well as we did with you. Later on, depending on what you said to us, we will send the respective amount.

Take notes of the decisions on the answer’s sheet. When the participant make the election do not say “ready, ok, perfect, it’s ok”. If you fell the need to say something, repeat the decision of the participant. Write down 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the algorithm.

  1. (1)

    If the Participant 2 is in between status 1 and 2. How much would you be willing to send?

  2. (2)

    If the Participant 2 is in between status 3 and 4. How much would you be willing to send?

  3. (3)

    If the Participant 2 is in between status 5 and 6. How much would you be willing to send?

Now we will draw if we are going to pay you the decision one or two. In this bag, there are two little cubes, one says 1 and the other says 2. If you draw the one that says 1, we will pay you the first decision, on the contrary, we will pay you the second. Please check that there are not be anything else on the bag.

Allow the participant to do the draw.

Go to the final questionnaire.

1.3 SD

You will interact with another person. You will not know who the opposite participant is. It is someone from all the participants. The pairing will happen through a raffle. This is going to be your decision of the day. Let’s see together the next cardboard.

Show the cardboard

You represent the Participant # 1, on this side of the cardboard. The other person will represent Participant # 2.

  • You receive $50.000. The Participant #2 does not have money for now. We ask you to send any amount of money to the Participant #2. You may send zero, $10.000, $20.000, $30.000, $40.000, or $50.000. Show how the money moves from Participant #1 to Participant #2, on the cardboard.

  • Any amount of money that you send will be tripled, because the investigators will add the additional money. For example, if you send $10.000, now the Participant 2 has $30.000. This will be the final profit. Or, for example, if you send $30.000, now the Participant 2 has $90,000. This will be the final profit. Show on the top of the card board.

Now I will show some examples.

Example one: A transfer of 20,000. Example two: A transfer of $40,000. Always indicating the final profit. Trying to use the same words to explain the examples.

Now, before taking the decision I will make some questions to make sure that you understood. Write down the number of mistakes in the answer sheet (minimum cero, maximum four) and show each situation on the cardboard, asking to the person to really move the money on the cardboard. If they make a mistake, explain them the correct answer although it should be written down as a mistake.

  1. (1)

    If you as Participant 1 send $0 to the Participant 2, how much would it be the final profit of Participant 1?

  2. (2)

    And the final profit for Participant 2?

  3. (3)

    If you as the Participant 1 send $50,000 to the Participant 2. How much would be the final profit of the Participant 1?

  4. (4)

    And the final profit of the Participant 2?

Now we have gotten to your second decision to your decision. Actually we are going to ask you to take three times the decision, depending on the SES whom the opposite participant belongs. We know the SES of the opposite participant because we asked him, as well as we did with you. Later on, depending on what you said to us, we will send the respective amount.

Take notes of the decisions on the answer’s sheet. When the participant make the election do not say “ready, ok, perfect, it’s ok”. If you fell the need to say something, repeat the decision of the participant. Write down 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the algorithm.

  1. (1)

    If the Participant 2 is in between status 1 and 2. How much would you be willing to send?

  2. (2)

    If the Participant 2 is in between status 3 and 4. How much would you be willing to send?

  3. (3)

    If the Participant 2 is in between status 5 and 6. How much would you be willing to send?

Go to the final questionnaire.

1.4 RD

You will interact with another person. You will not know who the opposite participant is. It is someone from all the participants. The pairing will happen through a raffle. This is going to be your decision of the day. Let’s see together the next cardboard.

Show the cardboard

You represent the Participant # 2, in this side of the cardboard. The other person will represent Participant # 1.

  • Participant #1 receives $50.000. You, as Participant #2, does not have money for the time being. We ask Participant #1 to send any amount of money to you as Participant #2. Participant #1 may send zero, $10.000, $20.000, $30.000, $40.000, or $50.000. Show how the money moves from Participant #1 to Participant #2, on the cardboard.

  • Any amount of money that Participant #1 sent will be tripled, because the investigators will add the additional money. For example, if Participant #1 sends $10.000, now you as Participant #2 have $30.000. This will be your final profit. Or, for example, if Participant #1 sends $30.000, now you as Participant #2 have $90.000. This will be your final profit. Show on the cardboard.

Now I will show some examples.

Example one: A transfer of 20,000. Example two: A transfer of $40,000. Always indicating the final profit. Trying to use the same words to explain the examples.

Now, before taking the decision I will make some questions to make sure that you understood. Write down the number of mistakes in the answer sheet (minimum cero, maximum four) and show each situation on the cardboard, asking to the person to really move the money on the cardboard. If they make a mistake, explain them the correct answer although it should be written down as a mistake.

  1. (1)

    If Participant 1 sends $0 to you as Participant 2, how much would it be the final profit of Participant 1?

  2. (2)

    And your final profit (Participant 2)?

  3. (3)

    If Participant 1 sends $50.000 to you as Participant 2. How much would be the final profit of the Participant 1?

  4. (4)

    And your final profit (Participant 2)?

We asked to Participant #1 to send some amount of money to Participant #2, according to Participant 1’s SES (you). We know the SES because we asked you before beginning. Therefore, we will transfer what Participant #1 has decided to send to a person of your SES.

Now it is your turn to take a decision. We will ask you to tell us, please, how much you believe Participant #1 sent to you. If your prediction is correct, you will win $10.000 additionally (to the amount Participant #1 sent to you). How much do you believe Participant #1 sent to you? $0, $10.000, $20.000, $30.000, $40.000, $50.000?

Take notes of the decisions on the answer’s sheet. When the participant make the election do not say “ready, ok, perfect, it’s ok”. If you feel the need to say something, repeat the decision of the participant. Write down 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the algorithm.

Go to the final questionnaire.

Regardless of the Experimental Condition, all Participants should answer the following questions.

Questionnaire

figure a

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Bogliacino, F., Jiménez Lozano, L. & Reyes, D. Socioeconomic stratification and stereotyping: lab-in-the-field evidence from Colombia. Int Rev Econ 65, 77–118 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-017-0285-4

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