Abstract
The inductive realist model of theory generation (Hunt, AMS Review, 3(2), 61–73, 2013) proposes a process model of theory generation that links discovery and justification. This article further explicates the inductive realist model of theory generation by addressing the major issues that marketing academics have raised. Specifically, this article provides answers to six of the most commonly asked questions. (1) Why is the model called “inductive realist”? (2) Is the real world of theory generation as linear as the model depicts? (3) Is the model positive or normative? (4) How does the model relate to the “theory-in-use” approach? (5) Is the model a testable, causal model? (6) Does all “problem recognition” start with “current disciplinary knowledge”?
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The author thanks the many doctoral students and faculty who have raised intriguing questions concerning the inductive realist model of theory generation. The author also thanks the editor and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on a draft of this article.
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Hunt, S.D. Explicating the inductive realist model of theory generation. AMS Rev 5, 20–27 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13162-015-0064-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13162-015-0064-x