Reflexivity, Reality, and Relationality. The Inadequacy of Bourdieu’s Critique of the Phenomenological Tradition in Sociology

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Bourdieu’s criticism of what he calls “subjectivism,” that is, the tradition of phenomenologically based sociology, especially in the works of Schutz, Garfinkel and Goffman, as well as their followers. This critique can be summarized by six points, two of which will be discussed here: Bourdieu’s criticism of this tradition (i) as based on an inadequate conception of reflexivity and (ii)as a form of naive realism. In responding to these two aspects of his critique, not only the differences between Bourdieu’s and Schutz’s views become clear, but also the remarkable continuity between phenomenology and Bourdieu’s “theory of practice” can be shown. Focusing the discussion on three meta-theoretical notions, i.e. reflexivity, reality, and relationality, this discussion presents some aspects relevant for clarifying the term “social construction.” Popularized by Berger/Luckmann in their “The Social Construction of Reality,” this concept has since then become a “dead metaphor” (Hacking). Thus,expounding several misreadings in Bourdieu’s criticism of phenomenology, the paper will demonstrate that there are still systematic reasons for bringing so called “subjectivism” back into contemporary social theory discourse.

I am indebeted to Hisashi Nasu and George Psathas for helpful comments.