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Erschienen in:
2005 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Padding Oracle Attacks on CBC-Mode Encryption with Secret and Random IVs
verfasst von : Arnold K. L. Yau, Kenneth G. Paterson, Chris J. Mitchell
Erschienen in: Fast Software Encryption
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In [8], Paterson and Yau presented padding oracle attacks against a committee draft version of a revision of the ISO CBC-mode encryption standard [3]. Some of the attacks in [8] require knowledge and manipulation of the initialisation vector (IV). The latest draft of the revision of the standard [4] recommends the use of IVs that are secret and random. This obviates most of the attacks of [8]. In this paper we consider the security of CBC-mode encryption against padding oracle attacks in this secret, random IV setting. We present new attacks showing that several ISO padding methods are still weak in this situation.