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Erschienen in:
2005 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Enforcing Truthful Strategies in Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanisms
verfasst von : Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
Erschienen in: Internet and Network Economics
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We commonly use the experience of others when taking decisions. Reputation mechanisms aggregate in a formal way the feedback collected from peers and compute the
reputation
of products, services, or providers. The success of reputation mechanisms is however conditioned on obtaining true feedback. Side-payments (i.e. agents get paid for submitting feedback) can make honest reporting rational (i.e. Nash equilibrium). Unfortunately, known schemes also have other Nash equilibria that imply lying. In this paper we analyze the equilibria of two incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms and investigate how undesired equilibrium points can be eliminated by using trusted reports.