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Erschienen in:
2003 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
The EM Side—Channel(s)
verfasst von : Dakshi Agrawal, Bruce Archambeault, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi
Erschienen in: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2002
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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We present results of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via electromagnetic (EM) emanations from CMOS devices. These emanations are shown to consist of a multiplicity of signals, each leaking somewhat different information about the underlying computation. We show that not only can EM emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power side-channel is unavailable, they can even be used to break power analysis countermeasures.