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2000 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Efficient Receipt-Free Voting Based on Homomorphic Encryption

verfasst von : Martin Hirt, Kazue Sako

Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2000

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Voting schemes that provide receipt-freeness prevent voters from proving their cast vote, and hence thwart vote-buying and coercion. We analyze the security of the multi-authority voting protocol of Benaloh and Tuinstra and demonstrate that this protocol is not receipt-free, opposed to what was claimed in the paper and was believed before. Furthermore, we propose the first practicable receipt-free voting scheme. Its only physical assumption is the existence of secret one-way communication channels from the authorities to the voters, and due to the public verifiability of the tally, voters only join a single stage of the protocol, realizing the “vote-and-go” concept. The protocol combines the advantages of the receipt-free protocol of Sako and Kilian and of the very efficient protocol of Cramer, Gennaro, and Schoenmakers, with help of designated-verifier proofs of Jakobsson, Sako, and Impagliazzo. Compared to the receipt-free protocol of Sako and Kilian for security parameter ℓ (the number of repetitions in the non-interactive cut-and-choose proofs), the protocol described in this paper realizes an improvement of the total bit complexity by a factor ℓ.

Metadaten
Titel
Efficient Receipt-Free Voting Based on Homomorphic Encryption
verfasst von
Martin Hirt
Kazue Sako
Copyright-Jahr
2000
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45539-6_38