Power Analysis Attacks

Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards

verfasst von: Stefan Mangard, Elisabeth Oswald, Thomas Popp

Verlag: Springer US

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

Power analysis attacks allow the extraction of secret information from smart cards. Smart cards are used in many applications including banking, mobile communications, pay TV, and electronic signatures. In all these applications, the security of the smart cards is of crucial importance.

Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards is the first comprehensive treatment of power analysis attacks and countermeasures. Based on the principle that the only way to defend against power analysis attacks is to understand them, this book explains how power analysis attacks work. Using many examples, it discusses simple and differential power analysis as well as advanced techniques like template attacks. Furthermore, the authors provide an extensive discussion of countermeasures like shuffling, masking, and DPA-resistant logic styles. By analyzing the pros and cons of the different countermeasures, this volume allows practitioners to decide how to protect smart cards.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Introduction

Abstract

Smart cards are frequently used as cryptographic devices to provide strong authentication of users and to store secret information securely. Smart cards are among the most critical components of modern security systems.

Chapter 2. Cryptographic Devices

Abstract

For the discussion of power analysis attacks and countermeasures, it is helpful to have some basic knowledge about cryptographic devices. In particular, it is helpful to have a basic understanding of how they are built. This chapter provides this information in compact form. It is intended for readers without a background in hardware design.

Chapter 3. Power Consumption

Abstract

Digital circuits consume power whenever they perform computations. They draw current from a power supply and then dissipate the received energy as heat. The power consumption of digital circuits is a very important topic. The power consumption determines whether a chip needs to be cooled or not, it determines which kind of power supply is necessary and, in case of cryptographic devices, it determines whether a device can be attacked or not. Obviously, this is the most important property of the power consumption in the context of this book.

Chapter 4. Statistical Characteristics of Power Traces

Abstract

After having discussed different measurement setups and their most important quality criteria in Chapter 3, we now analyze power traces from a statistical point of view. Power traces are vectors of voltage values that have been recorded with a digital sampling oscilloscope. The measured voltage values are proportional to the power consumption of a cryptographic device because the oscilloscope is connected to an appropriate measurement circuit or EM probe. The settings of the oscilloscope determine the length of the power traces and the number of points that are recorded per second.

Chapter 5. Simple Power Analysis

Abstract

Simple power analysis (SPA) attacks are characterized by Kocher et al. in [KJJ99] in the following way: “SPA is a technique that involves directly interpreting power consumption measurements collected during cryptographic operations.” In other words, the attacker tries to derive the key more or less directly from a given trace. This can make SPA attacks quite challenging in practice. Often, they require detailed knowledge about the implementation of the cryptographic algorithm that is executed by the device under attack. Furthermore, if only one power trace is available, usually complex statistical methods have to be used in order to extract the signal.

Chapter 6. Differential Power Analysis

Abstract

Differential power analysis (DPA) attacks are the most popular type of power analysis attacks. This is due to the fact that DPA attacks do not require detailed knowledge about the attacked device. Furthermore, they can reveal the secret key of a device even if the recorded power traces are extremely noisy.

Chapter 7. Hiding

Abstract

Power analysis attacks work because the power consumption of cryptographic devices depends on intermediate values of the executed cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, the goal of countermeasures is to avoid or at least to reduce these dependencies. In case of hiding, this is done by breaking the link between the power consumption of the devices and the processed data values. Hence, cryptographic devices that are protected by hiding execute cryptographic algorithms in the same way as unprotected devices. In particular, they calculate the same intermediate values. Yet, the hiding countermeasures make it difficult for an attacker to find exploitable information in power traces.

Chapter 8. Attacks on Hiding

Abstract

The goal of hiding countermeasures is to make the power consumption of cryptographic devices independent of the performed operations and the processed values. However, in practice this goal can only be achieved to a certain degree, see Chapter 7. Attacks on protected devices are therefore still possible. In most cases though, these attacks require significantly more effort than attacks on unprotected devices.

Chapter 9. Masking

Abstract

The goal of every countermeasure is to make the power consumption of a cryptographic device independent of the intermediate values of the cryptographic algorithm. Masking achieves this by randomizing the intermediate values that are processed by the cryptographic device. An advantage of this approach is that it can be implemented at the algorithm level without changing the power consumption characteristics of the cryptographic device. In other words, masking allows making the power consumption independent of the intermediate values, even if the device has a data-dependent power consumption. Masking is one of the countermeasures that has been extensively discussed in the scientific community. Numerous articles have been published that explain different types of masking schemes. Even security proofs have been delivered for some of the schemes. Recently, masking has also been applied to the cell level.

Chapter 10. Attacks on Masking

Abstract

The use of masking schemes to counteract power analysis attacks is popular for several reasons. For instance, masking can be implemented in software on processors without altering their power consumption characteristics. Probably because of their popularity, many researchers have studied the security of masking schemes and their implementations. It has turned out that virtually every masking scheme can be attacked.

Chapter 11. Conclusions

Abstract

When we started writing this book, we thought that the final manuscript would have about 200 pages. However, after having finished the first couple of chapters, we realized that the final manuscript would get significantly longer. Power analysis attacks are a very interdisciplinary topic. Hence, these attacks have attracted the attention of people with very different backgrounds. This has lead to a large number and a great variety of publications that discuss power analysis attacks from many different points of view.

Backmatter

Titel: Power Analysis Attacks
verfasst von: Stefan Mangard
Elisabeth Oswald
Thomas Popp
Verlag: Springer US
Electronic ISBN: 978-0-387-38162-6
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-30857-9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-38162-6