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2004 | Buch

Handbook of Utility Theory

Volume 2 Extensions

herausgegeben von: Salvador Barberà, Peter J. Hammond, Christian Seidl

Verlag: Springer US

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The standard rationality hypothesis is that behaviour can be represented as the maximization of a suitably restricted utility function. This hypothesis lies at the heart of a large body of recent work in economics, of course, but also in political science, ethics, and other major branches of the social sciences. Though this hypothesis of utility maximization deserves our continued respect, finding further refinements and developing new critiques remain areas of active research. In fact, many fundamental conceptual problems remain unsettled. Where others have been resolved, their resolutions may be too recent to have achieved widespread understanding among social scientists. Last but not least, a growing number of papers attempt to challenge the rationality hypothesis head on, at least in its more orthodox formulation. The main purpose of this Handbook is to make more widely available some recent developments in the area. Yet we are well aware that the final chapter of a handbook like this can never be written as long as the area of research remains active, as is certainly the case with utility theory. The editors originally selected a list of topics that seemed ripe enough at the time that the book was planned. Then they invited contributions from researchers whose work had come to their attention. So the list of topics and contributors is largely the editors' responsibility, although some potential con­ tributors did decline our invitation. Each chapter has also been refereed, and often significantly revised in the light of the referees' remarks.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
14. Alternatives to Expected Utility: Foundations
Abstract
In the last twenty-five years, an enormous amount of work has been done to develop new decision theories which can accommodate patterns of choice that contravene expected utility theory. This chapter surveys some of the main approaches that have been taken by these alternatives to expected utility theory.
Robert Sugden
15. Alternatives to Expected Utility: Formal Theories
Abstract
The first attempts to develop a utility theory for choice situations under risk were undertaken by Cramer (1728) and Bernoulli (1738). Considering the famous St. Petersburg Paradox1 — a lottery with an infinite expected monetary value — Bernoulli (1738, p. 209) observed that most people would not spend a significant amount of money to engage in that gamble. To account for this observation, Bernoulli (1738, pp. 199–201) proposed that the expected monetary value has to be replaced by the expected utility (“moral expectation”) as the relevant criterion for decision making under risk. However, Bernoulli’s argument and particularly his choice of a logarithmic utility function2 seem to be rather arbitrary since they are based entirely on intuitively appealing examples.3
Ulrich Schmidt
16. State-Dependent Utility and Decision Theory
Abstract
Section 1 gives a technical summary of the paper. Section 2 gives a more extensive and more intuitive summary. Readers may skip either (or both!) at first reading. Readers having skipped Section 1 may still find it useful as a final summary.
Jacques H. Drèze, Aldo Rustichini
17. Ranking Sets of Objects
Abstract
This chapter focuses on criteria and methods for ranking subsets of a set of objects. There are many situations in which rankings of individual objects suffice for classification or decision making purposes, but many other situations call for rankings that involve subsets of two or more objects. The chapter identifies contexts in which subset rankings are important and discusses a number of ways in which such rankings might be obtained.
Salvador Barberà, Walter Bossert, Prasanta K. Pattanaik
18. Expected Utility in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Abstract
The theory of equilibrium in general non-cooperative games was initially developed for two-person “zero-sum” games by Borei (1921, 1924), von Neumann (1928) and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).1 It was then extended to general n-person games with finite strategy sets by Nash (1950, 1951). This classical theory allows different players to choose stochastically independent “mixed” strategies in the form of objective probability distributions. In this connection, Aumann (1987b, p. 466) gives a very clear and concise account of the role played by objectively expected utility theory in the classical theory of games with independent mixed strategies. A recent extension of classical non-cooperative game theory due to Aumann (1974, 1987a) allows different players to correlate their mixed strategies through some form of correlation device.2
Peter J. Hammond
19. Utility Theories in Cooperative Games
Abstract
Cooperative game theory begins with descriptions of coalitional behavior. For every permissible coalition, a subset of the players of the game, there is a given set of feasible outcomes for its members. Each outcome is presupposed to arise from cooperative behavior by the members of the coalition; specific individual actions are secondary.1 Cooperative games take several forms—games with side payments, games without side payments, partition function form games, and others, including, for example, bargaining games. In this paper we focus on games with and without side payments.
Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna H. Wooders
20. Utility in Social Choice
Abstract
In Arrovian [Arrow (1951, 1963)] social choice theory, the objective is to construct a social welfare function—a mapping which assigns a social preference ordering to each admissible profile of individual preferences—satisfying several a priori appealing conditions. Arrow showed that the only social welfare functions satisfying his axioms are dictatorial in the sense that there exists an individual whose strict preference over any two social alternatives is always replicated in the social ordering, no matter what the preferences of the remaining members of society happen to be. This negative result has initiated a series of contributions which attempt to avoid Arrow’s impossibility theorem by weakening one or more of his original axioms. The results in this literature are, on the whole, rather negative as well.
Walter Bossert, John A. Weymark
21. Interpersonally Comparable Utility
Abstract
Over many years, interpersonal comparisons of utility have had a significant role to play in economics. Utility began as a basic concept on which Prances Hutcheson, Cesare Beccarla, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick sought to build a general ethical theory that is simple yet profound. The resulting classical utilitarian theory relied on interpersonal comparisons because it required a common unit with which to measure each person’s pleasure or happiness, before adding to arrive at a measure of total happiness. According to the standard reading of Bentham, one should then proceed to subtract each person’s pain or misery, also measured in the same common unit, in order to arrive at a measure of total utility.1
Marc Fleurbaey, Peter J. Hammond
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Handbook of Utility Theory
herausgegeben von
Salvador Barberà
Peter J. Hammond
Christian Seidl
Copyright-Jahr
2004
Verlag
Springer US
Electronic ISBN
978-1-4020-7964-1
Print ISBN
978-1-4419-5417-6
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7964-1