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2010 | Buch

Encryption for Digital Content

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Cryptography is an area that traditionally focused on secure communication, authentication and integrity. In recent times though, there is a wealth of novel fine-tuned cryptographic techniques that sprung up as cryptographers focused on the specialised problems that arise in digital content distribution. These include fingerprinting codes, traitor tracing, broadcast encryption and others. This book is an introduction to this new generation of cryptographic mechanisms as well as an attempt to provide a cohesive presentation of these techniques.

Encryption for Digital Content details the subset cover framework (currently used in the AACS encryption of Blu-Ray disks), fingerprinting codes, traitor tracing schemes as well as related security models and attacks. It provides an extensive treatment of the complexity of the revocation problem for multi-receiver (subscriber) encryption mechanisms, as well as the complexity of the traceability problem. Pirate evolution type of attacks are covered in depth. This volume also illustrates the manner that attacks affect parameter selection, and how this impacts implementations. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0447808.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
1. Fingerprinting Codes
Abstract
In the context of digital content distribution, an important problem is tracking the origin of an observed signal to one out of many possible sources. We are particularly interested in settings where no other help is available for achieving this tracking operation except the mere access to the signal itself. We take a quite liberal interpretation of the notion of a signal : it may correspond to data transmission or even to a content related functionality. For instance, it might correspond to the decryption function of a decoder owned by a user where the population of users is defined by the keys they have access to. In another setting, it might be the retransmission of a certain content stream where the copies licensed to each user have the capacity to uniquely identify them.
Aggelos Kiayias, Serdar Pehlivanoglu
2. Broadcast Encryption
Abstract
A broadcast channel enables a sender to reach many receivers in a very effective way. Broadcasting, due to its very nature, leaves little room for controlling the list of recipients N —once a message is put on the channel any listening party can obtain it. This may very well be against the objectives of the sender. In such case, encryption comes in mind as a potential way to solve the problem: it can be employed to deny eavesdroppers free access to the content that is broadcasted. Nevertheless, the use of encryption raises the issue of how to do key management. Enabled receivers should be capable of descrambling the message while eavesdroppers should just perceive it as noise. It follows that receivers that are enabled for reception should have access to the decryption key, while any other party should not. The major problem that springs up in this scenario is that receivers might get corrupted and thus become cooperative with the adversary. As a result one cannot hope that a party that owns a key will not use it to the fullest extend possible, i.e., for as long as such key allows descrambling which can be the moment that a global rekey operation takes place. Moreover, such a key can even be shared with more than a single listening party and thus enable the reception of the transmission for a multitude of rogue receivers. If a traditional encryption scheme is used then a single corrupted receiver is enough to bring forth such undesired effects. The subject of this chapter, broadcast encryption deals with solving the above problem in an effective way.
Aggelos Kiayias, Serdar Pehlivanoglu
3. Traitor Tracing
Abstract
A three word description for what traitor tracing aims to achieve is key leakage deterrence. Arguably the single most important problem in the application of cryptography is key management. Keys that are lost imply loss of data and keys that are exposed imply loss of privacy. In the context of digital content distribution the problem is heavily exacerbated by the fact that cryptographic keys reside within a possibly adversarial environment.
Aggelos Kiayias, Serdar Pehlivanoglu
4. Trace and Revoke Schemes
Abstract
Broadcast encryption of Chapter 2 deals with the problem of revocation for stateless receivers; the general context is a “sender to many receivers” transmission system that offers the ability for the sender to exclude a subset of the receivers from a certain transmission on demand. The statelessness of the receivers refers to the fact that receivers need not maintain state from one transmission to the next (and this enables them to go arbitrarily off-line without loosing their reception capability in the long run).
Aggelos Kiayias, Serdar Pehlivanoglu
5. Pirate Evolution
Abstract
In Chapter 4 we put forth the notion of winnable revocation games. Winning a sequence of such games implies that the adversary can be eventually disabled by the tracer. Nevertheless, the fact that the adversary can be disabled does not necessarily imply that a certain leaking incident, i.e., an incident where some key material of some users are exposed to the adversary, can be simultaneously contained. This is due to the fact that a leaking incident enables possibly the creation of a sequence of adversaries that may have to be successively revoked (in a succession of many revocation games). This gives rise to the notion of an evolving adversary which is the subject of this chapter.
Aggelos Kiayias, Serdar Pehlivanoglu
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Encryption for Digital Content
verfasst von
Aggelos Kiayias
Serdar Pehlivanoglu
Copyright-Jahr
2010
Verlag
Springer US
Electronic ISBN
978-1-4419-0044-9
Print ISBN
978-1-4419-0043-2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0044-9