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2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

15. The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data

verfasst von : Georges Dionne

Erschienen in: Handbook of Insurance

Verlag: Springer New York

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Abstract

We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Three problems are examined: moral hazard, adverse selection, and asymmetric learning. One theoretical conclusion, drawn by many authors, is that information problems may introduce significant distortions into the economy. However, we verify, in different markets, that efficient mechanisms have been introduced in order to reduce these distortions and even eliminate, at the margin, some residual information problems. This conclusion is stronger for pure adverse selection. One explanation is that adverse selection is related to exogenous characteristics, while asymmetric learning and moral hazard are due to endogenous actions that may change at any point in time. Dynamic data help to identify the three information problems by permitting causality tests.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Predictions and Tests

Nächstes Kapitel Workers’ Compensation: Occupational Injury Insurance’s Influence on the Workplace

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²Based on Dionne and Rothschild (2011) and Dionne et al. (2013b).

³This section is based on Dionne et al. (2013b).

On point-record driver’s license, see Bourgeon and:̧def:̧def Picard (2007).

For a recent analysis of insurance fraud in the unemployment insurance market, see Fuller et al. 2012.

On double-sided adverse selection in the presence of insurance, see Seog (2010); on adverse selection in the labor market, see Greenwald (1986).

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Titel: The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data
verfasst von: Georges Dionne
Verlag: Springer New York
Buch: Handbook of Insurance
Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-0154-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-1-4614-0155-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2013
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0155-1_15