Why Agents Comply with Norms, and Why They Should

In the current debate on norm-governed societies different approaches have emerged. One is based on game theory, and its basic idea is that of identifying norms with behavioural equilibria, as resulting from certain evolutionary processes. In this approach norms do not play any direct motivational role: a norm only is a general regularity of behaviour, which persists since self-interested agents act in such a way as to preserve it (the norm is an outcome of their actions, but is not an object of their intentions). This approach, therefore, fails to account for the main function of norms: building co-ordination when only a sub-optimal equilibrium would be accessible through self-interested action. To remedy this failure, the second approach adopts an explicit representation of norms as a distinct component of the agent’s psychological state, which play an autonomous motivational role. However, it does not explain why a norm can play such a motivational role, and how this is related to the agent’s rationality. One possible explanation is provided by the third approach, which focuses on the motivational role of sanctions: norm governed behaviour consists in self-interested behaviour determined by the threat of a sanction. However this explanation is insufficient since it does not cover those cases when norms are followed because the agent believes them to be valid or binding, and not just out of self-interest, i.e. not just to avoid the sanction.