Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy

In this chapter, the author explains why it is worthwhile to study the foreign and security policy of Poland, a medium-rank Central European country and an important element of the international order. He approaches this subject from a neorealist perspective in order to show to what degree Poland’s foreign policy has depended on the evolving international order during the entire period from the end of the Cold War until today. He also makes use of social constructivism to show the specifics of Poland’s international identity and its international roles. The book’s chapters detail, successively: the main determinants of Poland’s foreign and security policy, particularly in the twenty-first century (Chap. 2); the immersion of Poland’s relations with Russia in historical issues (Chap. 3); Poland’s bandwagoning with regard to the USA (Chap. 4); Poland’s dialectic of strengthening and weakening the European Union (Chap. 5); Poland’s pushing of NATO and the EU to the East (Chap. 6); the meanders of Poland’s policy with regard to Central Europe (Chap. 7); Poland’s declining activeness for collective security at the UN and OSCE (Chap. 8); and the evolution of Poland’s international roles (Chap. 9).

In this chapter, the author presents the main determinants of Poland’s foreign and security policy, with an emphasis on those appearing in the twenty-first century. The author makes his point of departure Poland’s geopolitical location at the center of Europe and he examines the country’s potential as a medium-rank state. He analyzes how Polish foreign and security policy is immersed in history and how this manifests itself in a selective memory of the past, in the theory of “two enemies” (Russia and Germany), and in the idea of Poland’s mission in Eastern Europe. The author points to how the instability of Poland’s political system and the lack of consensus over its foreign and security policy affect the country’s behavior on the international stage. Next, he characterizes Poland as a member of the Atlantic community within NATO and the EU. In conclusion, he shows Poland’s lack of adaptation to the changing international order in the twenty-first century and to its return to Central European geopolitics.

The author claims that contemporary Polish foreign and security policy is under the overwhelming influence of historical events in relations with Russia. Poland’s focus on its negative experiences in relations with Russia and disputes over interpretations of history greatly hinder the evolution of those relations in a positive direction. Different visions of European security and Poland’s fears about energy security are also important problems. The author’s analysis leads him to advance the idea that the generally poor state of Poland’s relations with Russia has a negative impact on Poland’s ability to pursue its interests successfully on the international stage, both in its immediate vicinity and in the European Union. Poland’s fears of Russia have persisted throughout the period since Poland regained its sovereignty in 1989 and have led successive Polish governments to adopt a pro-American stance.

This chapter shows the importance of the USA for Poland’s security and Warsaw’s attempts to establish the closest possible bilateral relations with Washington. Since 1989, these efforts were meant to bring about a strategic partnership, but in practice, they have led to Poland’s asymmetric dependence on its powerful transatlantic partner. This was the result of Poland’s efforts to join NATO, and after this aim was achieved in 1999 with Washington’s support, the country proceeded to turn itself into a vassal of the USA. In the years 2007–2015, the Polish government attempted to rationalize Polish–American relations, above all by actively working for EU integration. After the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in Poland in 2015, the country openly adopted a policy of clientelism in regard to the USA. The chapter analyses specific traits of Polish–American relations in the years 1989–2019.

In this chapter, the author presents Poland’s behavior within the EU. He discusses Warsaw’s position on EU institutional reform in the years 2002–2004. Poland favored strengthening the intergovernmental nature of this organization and after 2005 refused to ratify the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which it had signed. Subsequently, the Civic Platform and Polish People’s Party (PO-PSL) governments played a constructive role in efforts to overcome the financial crisis in the euro area. Poland adopted changing positions in regard to EU defense policy. It initially criticized the EU’s initiatives, but later it cautiously joined in. Beginning in 2009 it made attempts, jointly with Germany and France, to reinforce the CSDP; later, it advocated unrealistic ideas about creating a European army and it was not, particularly after 2015, interested in overcoming the stagnation of the CSDP. During the immigration crisis, the PO-PSL government showed solidarity with the majority of EU member states, but the succeeding PiS government adopted the opposite stance and rejected the mandatory relocation of illegal immigrants and refugees. The PiS government’s view of the future of the EU also differs from that of the majority of EU countries.

The author claims that Poland is seeking to bring about an active NATO and EU policy in the east of Europe. He shows how Poland participates, by close cooperation with the USA and EU, in the West’s promotion of democracy in the East. The consequences of this have included the inducement of “color revolutions” in post-Soviet countries and rivalry with Russia. The author demonstrates how this policy led to the crisis in Ukraine in the autumn of 2013. He details Poland’s participation in NATO’s “open door” policy of expansion, including to post-Soviet states. He also analyzes Poland’s efforts to have NATO’s eastern flank reinforced, with the consequence that European security has become militarized.

In this chapter, the author presents Poland’s engagement for collective security, by discussing its activeness at the UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He refers to Poland’s activeness during the years of Cold War. During that period, Poland proposed well-known initiatives seeking to limit arms in Central Europe and in general, to develop the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, and to strengthen peace and universal disarmament. The author considers that for several years after 1989 sovereign Poland continued to be engaged at the UN and CSCE/OSCE. However, when the opportunity to join NATO emerged, the importance of those structures diminished in Polish foreign and security policy. Poland opted for hard, group security (defense) guarantees within NATO at the expense of its involvement for collective security within the UN and OSCE. This trend has been significantly stronger in the policies of the Law and Justice government since 2015.

In this chapter, the author presents the conclusions from his analysis of Polish foreign and security policy in the context of the changing international order. In accord with the theory of international roles, he distinguishes three types of roles connected with Poland: (1) those expected from Poland by participants in the Euro-Atlantic system; (2) the roles declared by Poland; and (3) the roles that Poland actually performs. The latter group contains the following: Poland is (1) a model for successful systemic transformation; (b) a party weakening Russia’s imperial ambitions; (c) a satellite and client of the USA; (d) a brake on European integration; (e) a pragmatic and engaged participant in European integration; and (f) a force breaking up the EU. In his final comments, the author discusses the nature and effectiveness of Poland’s international roles.