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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. The Establishment of the (European) Banking Union

verfasst von : Christos V. Gortsos

Erschienen in: European Central Banking Law

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on the establishment of the (European) Banking Union. After briefly discussing, in the first section, its creation in response to the ongoing fiscal crisis in the euro area and the new institutional and regulatory framework set up in this respect, the subsequent three sections briefly present its three main pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which relates to the authorisation and prudential supervision of credit institutions, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Single Resolution Fund, which relate to the resolution of credit institutions, and the (single) European Deposit Insurance Scheme, which constitutes the (still pending) third main pillar on deposit guarantee. Each section makes due reference to the legislative, delegated and implementing acts of European Union (EU) institutions which constitute the single rulebook governing substantive aspects on all the above, the relationship between the three main pillars and the single rulebook, as well as the impact of public international banking law on the shaping of EU banking law.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Establishment of the European System of Financial Supervision

Nächstes Kapitel The Systems and Mechanisms of the European Central Bank and National Central Banks

Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33785/131201.pdf.

The other three elements were setting up an integrated budgetary framework (‘European Fiscal Union’), an integrated economic policy framework (‘European Economic Union’) and a democratic legitimacy and accountability framework (‘European Political Union’).

Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June 2012, first paragraph, first sentence, available at: https://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf. For a historical perspective on the ‘vicious circles’ (also called ‘vicious cycles’, ‘diabolic loops’ or ‘doom loops’) between the banking sector and sovereign bond markets, see Mitchener (2014).

Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf.

COM(2012) 510 final, 511 final and 512 final, respectively.

For arguments for or against establishing the Banking Union, see indicatively (out of a vast existing literature) Eijffinger and Nijskens (2012), Louis (2012), Beck (2012), Bofinger et al. (2012), Carmassi et al. (2012), House of Lords (2012), Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012), Schoenmaker (2012), Sibert (2012), Wyplosz (2012), Goyal et al. (2013) and Herring (2013). On various aspects of the functioning of the BU, see also the contributions in Allen et al. (2013, 2014, 2015).

This term is used to refer to the total harmonisation of rules pertaining to the prudential regulation and supervision of financial firms and was first introduced in June 2009, when the European Council called for the establishment of a “European single rulebook applicable to all financial institutions in the Single Market” (11225/2/09 REV 2, paragraph 20, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf). For a detailed analysis on the single rulebook, see Lefterov (2015).

On the link between the BU and the single market, see Lastra (2013), Binder (2016), pp. 13–15, and Alexander (2016), pp. 258–260.

On Articles 289–291 TFEU, see Appendix of Chap. 5.

For a general overview and assessment of the legal framework on the BU, see indicatively Binder (2013), Moloney (2014), various contributions in Castaneda et al. (2015, editors), Lastra (2015), pp. 355–382, the contributions of the co-authors in Binder and Gortsos (2016) and individual contributions in Busch and Ferrarini (2015, editors) and Chiti and Santoro (2019, editors). On the specific aspect of how the BU framework also impacts on private law relationships (duties), see Grundmann (2015). On extending the framework governing single supervision and resolution also to systemically important non-bank EU financial institutions, see Busch and van Rijn (2017) and (in relation to resolution) Binder (2019).

Lastra and Goodhart (2015), p. 16. The three main pillars of the BU and the related single rulebook are presented, in turn, in Sects. 4.2–4.4. Table 4.1 summarises the key legal sources thereof and Table 4.2 the addressees of and the dates by which the main provisions are applicable. Table 4.3 presents the content of EU banking law before and after the establishment of the BU, denoting the elements of continuity and change. On the ELA, see Chap. 9, Sect. 9.3.

On the potential application of the BU on Member States with a derogation under the so-called close cooperation procedure, see Chap. 5, Sect. 5.2.5.

See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2.3.

COM(2015) 587 final.

COM(2017) 592 final.

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/reflection-paper-deepening-economic-and-monetary-union_en.

Its conclusions are available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/11/conclusions-non-performing-loans. The Commission’s proposals are laid down in pp. 17–18 of its Communication of 11 October 2017. Developments on this field are constant; for a detailed overview, see Montanaro (2019).

For the calculation of their capital requirements in accordance with the (alternative) ‘internal ratings-based approach’, credit institutions must take into account four specific parameters for each exposure: a borrower’s probability of default (the ‘PD’); loss given default (the ‘LGD’), which refers to the calculation of a bank’s (average) expected loss per claim (a function of accepted collateral) in the event of a borrower’s inability to meet liabilities (a concept which incorporates capital losses, loss of interest income and operating expenses); exposure at default (the ‘EAD’); and the loan contract’s maturity (see Gleeson (2010), pp. 75–77).

For an analytical study of this case, see European Systemic Risk Board (2015). On the same aspect from a global point of view, see the discussion paper of the Basel Committee of 7 December 2017 on the “Regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures” (available at: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d425.htm). The experience from the ‘voluntary’ haircut on Greek government bonds under the Private Sector Involvement (the ‘PSI’), which resulted in Greek credit institutions suffering extremely severe losses from their participation therein to the extent that their capital basis was depleted, has shown that these provisions are not appropriate. They provide credit institutions with perverse incentives when including government bonds in their portfolios, especially in their banking books (on the key terms of the PSI following the 26 October 2011 Euro Summit, see Gortsos (2013), pp. 166–169, more analytically Zettelmeyer et al., Gulati (2013) and Buchheit (2016)) and Hadjiemmanuil (2019), pp. 73–77. Nevertheless, any (even adequate) increase of risk weights might lead to a distortion of capital markets, given the volumes of higher risk government bonds involved.

COM(2018) 839 final. The text of the Commission’s Staff Working Document “Impact Assessment” (SWD(2018) 252 final, 24.5.2018) is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/ better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-400473. This proposal is analysed in Gortsos (2018), with extensive further references.

All these initiatives were without prejudice to other regulatory developments designed for the enhancement of financial stability and affecting the operation of EU credit institutions, such as the new international accounting standard ‘IFRS 9’ on the classification and measurement of financial instruments, whose application started on 1 January 2018. On this accounting standard and its implications for financial stability, see European Systemic Risk Board (2017).

COM (2017) 821 final, 6.12.1017, pp. 11–12.

On the CMU, see by way of mere indication Dixon (2014), Ringe (2015), Véron and Wolff (2015), the individual contributions in Busch et al. (2018, editors) and Lannoo and Thomadakis (2019).

Commission Communication (11.10.2017), Section 7, first paragraph.

COM(2017) 542 final.

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/com-2017-536_en.

Commission Communication (11.10.2017), Section 7, second paragraph.

Commission Communication (20.09.2017), pp. 9–10.

This argument is further developed in Gortsos (2015b).

SSMR, Article 1, first sub-paragraph.

On these aspects, see Chap. 5, Sects. 5.1.1 and 5.2.4.

OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, pp. 5–14.

OJ L 141, 14.5.2014, pp. 1–50.

SSM Framework Regulation, Article 1(1); see also Article 6(7) SSMR.

On these bodies, see Chap. 6, Sect. 6.2.2.

For a systematic overview of the ECBlegal acts adopted in the (initial) period 2014–2015, see Gortsos (2015a), pp. 77–80 and 82–83.

OJ L 320, 30.11.2013, pp. 1–6.

The main provisions of all these acts are presented in Chap. 5, Sect. 5.2.

OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, pp. 1–337. This legislative act is in force as repeatedly amended and mainly in 2017 by two Regulations of the European Parliament and of the Council: Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 of 12 December 2017 mainly as regards the mitigation of the impact of the introduction of IFRS 9 on own funds (OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, pp. 27–33) and Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 of 12 December 2017 mainly on the treatment of securitisation positions (OJ L 347, 12.2.2017, pp. 1–34). In May 2019, it has been further amended (see later).

OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, pp. 338–436. In May 2019, this legislative act has also been amended.

In fact, this is a misnomer for the Directive, which addresses several other prudential aspects rather than merely capital requirements.

Article 53 TFEU is analysed in Schlag (2019).

CRD IV, Articles 8–27, 33–46, 47–48 and 49–117, respectively.

CRR and CRD IV, Articles 128–142 (on capital buffers).

On the SREP, see more details in Chap. 8, Sect. 8.2.3 and on the macro-prudential capital buffers Chap. 8, Sect. 8.1.3.

All these draft technical standards and Guidelines adopted by the EBA are available at: https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook; the related Q&As are available at: https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa. The making of delegated and implementing acts and EBA Guidelines is briefly presented in Appendix of Chap. 5.

The Basel III framework consists of three Reports: “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems” (available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs189.htm), “Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio [LCR] and liquidity risk monitoring tools” (at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm), and “Basel III: The net stable funding ratio [NSFR]” (at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs295.htm). On this framework and its evolution, see Gortsos (2012), pp. 250–281, McNamara et al. (2014a) and (2014b) and Bodellini (2019).

See Sect. 4.1.2.

OJ 150, 7.6.2019, pp. 1–225. The consolidated version of the CRR contains 814(!) pages.

OJ 150, 7.6.2019, pp. 253–295.

Available at: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm. The EBA already conducted and published an ad hoc cumulative impact assessment of this new regulatory reform package for the EU banking system (available at: https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1720738/Ad+Hoc+Cumulative+Impact+Assessment+of+the+Basel+reform+package.pdf).

SSMR, Article 4(3), first sub-paragraph.

OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, pp. 1–90.

SRMR, Article 99(2).

See also recital (14) SRMR; on this aspect, see details in Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.3.

The main provisions of this legislative act, which was amended in May 2019 (see Sect. 4.3.2), are presented in Chap. 5 (Sect. 5.3).

Available at: https://register.consilium.Europa.eu/content/out?lang=EN&typ=ENTRY&i=SMPL&DOC_ID=ST%208457%202014%20COR%201.

The only Member States which are not Contracting Parties to the Agreement, which is subject to ratification, approval or acceptance by its signatories under their respective constitutional requirements, are Sweden and the UK.

This Article provides that Member States must, inter alia, facilitate the achievement of the EU’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of its objectives; see on this indicatively Lenz (2010), pp. 19–20 and, in detail, Hatje (2019), pp. 69–91.

See Sect. 4.3.2.

SRF Agreement, Article 12.

SRMR, Articles 1, second sub-paragraph, second sentence and 67(1), first sentence.

SRF Agreement, Article 1.

Ibid., Article 1(1), point (b), with reference to Article 68 SRMR.

SRMR, Articles 70 and 67(2), respectively.

On the SRF Agreement, see by way of mere indication Fabbrini (2014), Burke (2015), Hadjiemmanuil (2014), pp. 26–29, Zavvos and Kaltsouni (2015), pp. 36–49, Wolfers and Voland (2018) and Gortsos (2019b), pp. 99–106 and 263–271.

OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, pp. 190–348.

For an analytical commentary, see Haentjens (2017) and the various contributions in World Bank (2017) (in particular Freudenthaler (2017) on its scope); see also Huber and Merc (2014), Thole (2014) and Ventoruzzo and Sandrelli (2019).

BRRD, Article 130(1), second sub-paragraph.

Ibid., Articles 4–26, 27–30 and 31–86, respectively.

Ibid., Article 2(1), points (101) and (102), respectively.

These resolution tools are defined (in a similar way) in Articles 3(1), points (30)–(33) SRMR and 2(1), points (55), (57)–(58) and (60) BRRD and are governed by Articles 24–27 SRMR and 37–44 BRRD. For an overview, see Haentjens (2017), pp. 230–255, Binder, J.-H. (2019) and Gortsos (2019b), pp. 193–203.

On the bail-in instrument, see by way of mere indication Coffee (2010), Huertas (2012), Goodhart and Avgouleas (2014), Joosen (2014), Hadjiemmanuil (2014) and (2019), Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015), Krahnen and Moretti (2015) and Tröger (2015) and (2017).

Along with the CRR and the CRD IV, the draft technical standards and Guidelines adopted by the EBA are available at its website.

Available at: https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.htm. These Key Attributes laid down the core elements considered to be necessary for an effective regime governing the resolution of any type of financial institutions that could be systemic in failure, and in particular: the scope of application, the resolution authority, the resolution powers, set-off, netting, collateralisation and segregation of client assets, safeguards, funding of firms in resolution, legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation, crisis management groups (‘CMGs’), institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements, resolvability assessments, recovery and resolution planning, and access to information and information sharing. For an overview, see Grünewald (2014), pp. 79–80 and Kleftouri (2015), pp. 160–165.

Available at: https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/10/r_141015.

Available at: https://www.fsb.org/2016/10/key-attributes-assessment-methodology-for-the-banking-sector.

On the NCWO principle and its application under EU resolution law, see (by way of mere indication) Grünewald (2014), pp. 92–93, Wojcik (2015), de Serière and van der Houwen (2016), Grünewald (2017), pp. 302–307, and Haentjens (2017), pp. 272–274. See also the 2016 FSB “Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Banking Sector”, pp. 38–39.

COM(2016) 853 final.

OJ L 345, 27.1.2.2017, pp. 96–101.

COM(2016) 851/2 final and 852/2 final, respectively.

OJ 150, 7.6.2019, pp. 226–252.

OJ 150, 7.6.2019, pp. 296–344.

See Sect. 4.2.2; on the definition of G-SIIs, see Chap. 8, Sect. 8.1.3.

For a brief overview of the TLAC and of the new framework, see Gortsos (2019b), pp. 175–179.

See Sect. 4.1.2.

COM(2017) 827 final, 6.12.2017.

EMF Regulation, Article 1(2) and recital (18).

Ibid., Article 19(1), second sentence; on this instrument, see later.

For a systematic presentation and an assessment of the proposed legal framework on the EMF, see Louis (2017) and (2018), pp. 23–27, as well as Gortsos (2017) and in particular pp. 28–31 and 53 on the common backstop. On the case for establishing a common backstop, see Schoenmaker (2014) and (2017) and Schlosser (2017).

The text of this Statement is available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35999/29-euro-summit-statement-en.pdf.

Euro Summit meeting (29 June 2018), Statement, point 2.

Euro Summit meeting (14 December 2018), Statement, points 1 and 2. The terms of reference are annexed to the Statement of the Eurogroup’s report of 4 December 2018 (available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37268/tor-backstop_041218_final_clean.pdf); the term sheet is annexed to the Statement as well and available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37267/esm-term-sheet-041218_final_clean.pdf.

Euro Summit meeting (21 June 2019), Statement, point 1, first bullet (available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39968/20190621-euro-summit-statement.pdf).

On this aspect, see also the Assessments and Conclusions, Sect. 2.3, when discussing liquidity in resolution in the context of the euro area. On the ECB’s role in supporting the ESM, see Zilioli and Athanassiou (2018), pp. 649–650 and O’Gorman (2019), pp. 246–251.

Available at: https://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/Establishment%20of%20the%20instrument%20for%20the%20direct%20recapitalisation%20of%20insti%20.pdf.

Available at: https://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/20141208%20Guideline%20on%20Financial%20Assistance%20for%20the%20Direct%20Recapitalisation%20of%20Institutions.pdf; on this instrument, see details in Hadjiemmanuil (2014), pp. 29–34 and Vovolinis (2015).

BRRD, Articles 43–62.

See, on this, European Stability Mechanism (2014).

100

In principle, the DRI must be conducted against the acquisition of common shares satisfying the Common Equity Tier 1 (the ‘CET1’) requirements laid down in Articles 28–29 CRR.

101

SRMR, recital (18), first and second sentences.

102

BRRD, Articles 5–9, 19–26, 56–58, 63–72, 87–92 and 108, respectively.

103

On this aspect, see more details in Chap. 8, Sect. 8.1.2.

104

On this arrangement, see Haentjens (2017), pp. 210–213.

105

On this form of state aid and the conditions under which it can be provided in accordance with Articles 37(10) and 56–58 BRRD, see Gortsos (2016b), Haentjens (2017), pp. 252–254 and Huber (2017).

106

On these two aspects, see Haentjens (2017), pp. 256–272 and 285–296, respectively.

107

SRMR, Article 5(1) (the definition of the two terms is given in Article 3(1), points (4) and (27), respectively). On this aspect, see more details in Gortsos (forthcoming).

108

On both these reports, see Sect. 4.1.1.

109

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf.

110

COM(2015) 600 final.

111

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/banking-union/european-deposit-insurance-scheme/151124-proposal_en.pdf.

112

‘Participating DGSs’ means DGSs, which are introduced and officially recognised in a participating Member State (proposed SRMR, Article 3(1), point (55)).

113

Ibid., Article 2(2), first sub-paragraph.

114

On this Directive and on these functions, see Sect. 4.4.2.

115

Proposed SRMR, Article 1(2), second sub-paragraph.

116

Ibid., Articles 41i and 41j. On various aspects of this proposal, see Gros (2015), Carmassi et al. (2018), Brescia Morra (2019) and in details Gortsos (2019c). On the adequacy of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the establishment of the EDIS, see Herdegen (2016).

117

Ibid., Articles 41a–41c, 41d–41g and 41h, respectively.

118

EMU reflection paper (2017), pp. 19–20.

119

The text of this report’s statement is available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/04/eurogroup-report-to-leaders-on-emu-deepening/pdf.

120

Euro Summit meeting (21 June 2019), Statement, point 2.

121

OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, pp. 149–178.

122

DGSD, Article 21; on Directive 94/19/EC, see above in Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2.2.

123

Ibid., Article 1(1).

124

Ibid., Article 2(1), point (1), with reference to Article 1(2), points (a)–(c). ‘IPS’ means an agreement meeting the requirements laid down in Article 113(7) CRR (ibid., Article 2(1), point (2)). On these three types of DGSs under the DGSD (including an analysis of this CRR Article), see Gortsos (2014), pp. 37–40.

125

This legal act is analysed in Gortsos (2014).

126

This traditionally primary function of DGSs is to serve as a ‘paybox’ for depositors, guaranteeing the default-free character of deposits in the event of a bank failure. In this respect, DGSs pursue two objectives: protecting retail depositors and acting as a buffer in the event of a banking crisis and contributing to safeguarding the stability of the banking system (being part of the bank safety net), thus curbing the likelihood of banking panics. For an overview of banking panic models, see Calomiris and Gorton (1990).

127

See on this Gortsos (2019a), with extensive further references.

128

This delegated act, based on EBA’s draft regulatory technical standards, provides for the adjustment of the amount of coverage level laid down in Article 6(1) DGSD (i.e. 100,000 euros per depositor per credit institution), in accordance with inflation in the EU on the basis of changes in the harmonised index of consumer prices published by the Commission since the previous adjustment (ibid., Article 6(6)–(7)).

129

Available at: https://www.iadi.org/en/assets/File/Core%20Principles/cprevised2014nov.pdf. Noteworthy are the differences in terminology between the IADI report and the EU Directives, since the report makes use of the terms ‘deposit insurance’ instead of ‘deposit guarantee’, and ‘deposit insurance systems’ instead of ‘deposit guarantee schemes’.

130

On these principles, see Gortsos (2016a), pp. 8–15.

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Titel: The Establishment of the (European) Banking Union
verfasst von: Christos V. Gortsos
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: European Central Banking Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-34563-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-34564-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34564-8_4