Skip to main content

2021 | Buch

Tournament Design

How Operations Research Can Improve Sports Rules

insite
SUCHEN

Über dieses Buch

This Palgrave Pivot presents tournament design mainly within the axioms of incentive compatibility and fairness. It illustrates the advantages of an axiomatic approach through various examples, including several FIFA and UEFA tournaments, and uses theoretical tools and simulation methodology in its analysis. Chapter 1 discusses scoring systems of championships with multiple competitions, ranking in Swiss-system tournaments, and tie-breaking rules in round-robin leagues. It is followed by a thorough critical analysis of the current and previous FIFA World Rankings. The broad focus is substantially narrowed in Chapter 2, which turns to the topic of incentive (in)compatibility in multiple qualifiers. It is revealed that UEFA has faced at least three times recently this problem in the qualification to the UEFA Europa League, qualification to the UEFA Champions League, and the draw of the UEFA Champions League groups. Analogously, Chapter 3 discusses incentive (in)compatibility when there is only one group-based tournament but the complex progression rules to the subsequent stage can be designed poorly. Our examples include the qualifying tournaments of recent FIFA World Cups and UEFA European Championships. Chapter 4 moves to the problem of penalty shootout rules in soccer, where the fairness and complexity of some alternative mechanisms from the literature are evaluated. Fairness remains the central issue in Chapter 5, which presents the challenges of designing a tournament with 24 teams if the number of teams per group cannot exceed four. As expected, there is no perfect solution, and both FIFA and UEFA have introduced a reform in this format recently. Chapter 6 deals with the qualification for the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship. Its tournament design is perhaps the most complicated one that has ever been implemented in the real-world and suffers from serious shortcomings.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Topics in Tournament Ranking
Abstract
Ranking rules are a crucial component of every tournament design. This chapter argues for a better consideration of theoretical results in the construction of ranking criteria. Our axiomatic approach provides insight into three fields: points scoring systems applied to determine the outcome of championships including multiple competitions, ranking in Swiss-system tournaments where the strength of opponents has to be taken into account, and tie-breaking criteria in round-robin tournaments. A method is proposed to decide the final ranking in a round-robin league if the season is stopped and cannot resume. The previous FIFA World Ranking, used between 2006 and 2018, illustrates how many ways a rating formula can go awry.
László Csató
Chapter 2. Incentive (In)Compatibility: Multiple Qualifiers
Abstract
Every sports rule should eliminate the possibility that a contestant can be worse off by winning compared to losing. Qualification systems composed of parallel knockout and round-robin tournaments have been proved to satisfy incentive compatibility only if their allocation rule favours the single round-robin competition in filling vacant slots. Three real-world examples are elaborated where this condition is violated. The first is the UEFA Europa League qualification before the 2015/16 season. The second is the UEFA Champions League qualification between 2015 and 2018. The last deficiency is shown by the current regime of the Champions League group stage draw. Since the misaligned incentives can result in serious financial losses for an innocent team, UEFA is encouraged to consider the proposed policy amendments.
László Csató
Chapter 3. Incentive (in)compatibility: Group-based tournaments
Abstract
The business model of the sports industry depends on teams always trying their best. Therefore, tournament designs should not allow a contestant to be strictly better off by exerting a lower effort under any circumstances. This chapter uncovers that a specific format of group-based championships—when there are round-robin groups but some teams from different groups are ranked in a repechage group—usually suffers from such misaligned incentives. Several qualification tournaments for FIFA World Cups and UEFA European Championships have applied this design. We provide a real-world example and a procedure to validate the incentive compatibility of these tournaments. Reasonable mechanisms are proposed to solve the problem.
László Csató
Chapter 4. Soccer Penalty Shootouts: Complexity versus Fairness
Abstract
Previous studies have documented the probable advantage of the team kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts, which calls for better designs to ensure fairness. We offer a two-dimensional evaluation of these mechanisms by introducing a measure of complexity and adopting the equal treatment of equals requirement. Three alternatives to the Standard (ABAB) rule are considered: the straightforward Alternating (ABBA) rule, the recently suggested Catch-Up rule, and its variant called Adjusted Catch-Up rule. The Catch-Up rule turns out to be dominated by the already tried Alternating (ABBA) rule. The Adjusted Catch-Up mechanism, which guarantees the first penalty of the sudden death stage to the team disadvantaged in the first round, is found to be a promising candidate to improve fairness at a small increase of complexity.
László Csató
Chapter 5. Soccer Tournaments with 24 Teams: Problems and Solutions
Abstract
International soccer championships with 24 competitors traditionally allocate the teams into six groups of four teams each, followed by a knockout stage from the round of 16. Their standard knockout format, used until 2016, satisfies balance and diversity of the bracket but implies unequal group advantages. In addition, the rules are biased by an arbitrary choice concerning the allocation of the third-placed teams. Past tournaments were often subject to a deterministic seeding, which further increased unfairness. It is discussed how the designs of the 2019 FIFA Women’s World Cup and the 2020 UEFA European Championship address these problems. Our thorough case study is a compulsory reading before organising a 24 team tournament and provides some general lessons for the governing bodies of major sports.
László Csató
Chapter 6. Three Controversial Issues in the Qualification for the 2020 UEFA European Championship
Abstract
This chapter reveals three problems of the qualification for the 2020 UEFA European Championship. The tournament system is presented to violate incentive compatibility. An issue of unfairness is demonstrated in the path formation rule of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying play-offs. The third and most serious anomaly is found via computer simulations: a top team in the lowest-ranked League D of the 2018/19 UEFA Nations League has a considerably higher probability to qualify than a bottom team in the higher-ranked League C. The last two shortcomings can be solved by slightly changing the path formation policy of the qualifying play-offs. UEFA is advised to reconsider the format of future qualification tournaments to eliminate incentive incompatibility and the unfair advantage enjoyed by certain teams.
László Csató
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Tournament Design
verfasst von
Dr. László Csató
Copyright-Jahr
2021
Electronic ISBN
978-3-030-59844-0
Print ISBN
978-3-030-59843-3
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59844-0