2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
On the Relation between Redactable and Sanitizable Signature Schemes
verfasst von : Hermann de Meer, Henrich C. Pöhls, Joachim Posegga, Kai Samelin
Erschienen in: Engineering Secure Software and Systems
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
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Malleable signature schemes (
$\mathcal MSS$
) enable a third party to alter signed data in a controlled way, maintaining a valid signature after an authorized change. Most well studied cryptographic constructions are (1) redactable signatures (
$\mathcal RSS$
), and (2) sanitizable signatures (
$\mathcal SSS$
).
$\mathcal RSS$
s allow the removal of blocks from a signed document, while
$\mathcal SSS$
s allow changing blocks to arbitrary strings. We rigorously prove that
$\mathcal RSS$
s are less expressive than
$\mathcal SSS$
s: no unforgeable
$\mathcal RSS$
can be transformed into an
$\mathcal SSS$
. For the opposite direction we give a black-box transformation of a single
$\mathcal SSS$
, with tightened security, into an
$\mathcal RSS$
.