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Erschienen in:
An Efficient Privacy-Preserving E-coupon System Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Optimal Proximity Proofs

verfasst von : Ioana Boureanu, Serge Vaudenay

Erschienen in: Information Security and Cryptology

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Provably secure distance-bounding is a rising subject, yet an unsettled one; indeed, very few distance-bounding protocols, with formal security proofs, have been proposed. In fact, so far only two protocols, namely SKI (by Boureanu et al.) and FO (by Fischlin and Onete), offer all-encompassing security guaranties, i.e., resistance to distance-fraud, mafia-fraud, and terrorist-fraud. Matters like security, alongside with soundness, or added tolerance to noise do not always coexist in the (new) distance-bounding designs. Moreover, as we will show in this paper, efficiency and simultaneous protection against all frauds seem to be rather conflicting matters, leading to proposed solutions which were/are sub-optimal. In fact, in this recent quest for provable security, efficiency has been left in the shadow. Notably, the tradeoffs between the security and efficiency have not been studied. In this paper, we will address these limitations, setting the “security vs. efficiency” record straight.
Concretely, by combining ideas from SKI and FO, we propose symmetric protocols that are efficient, noise-tolerant and—at the same time—provably secure against all known frauds. Indeed, our new distance-bounding solutions outperform the two aforementioned provably secure distance-bounding protocols. For instance, with a noise level of \(5\,\%\), we obtain the same level of security as those of the pre-existent protocols, but we reduce the number of rounds needed from 181 to 54.

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Vorheriges Kapitel A Model-Driven Security Requirements Approach to Deduce Security Policies Based on OrBAC
Nächstes Kapitel Simpler CCA-Secure Public Key Encryption from Lossy Trapdoor Functions
Fußnoten
1
As discussed herein, FO has an incomparable approach for TF-resistance in which the number of rounds is not relevant.
 
2
Our model was recently extended to cover public-key distance-bounding [31, 32].
 
3
The verification phase can be interactive or not.
 
4
Provers have no clock. They are in a waiting state to receive the challenge and loose the notion of time while waiting.
 
5
A “malicious verifier” running an algorithm \(V^*(x)\) can be seen as a malicious prover running \(V^*(x)\).
 
6
we stress that this is a local definition of independence which is unrelated to statistical independence.
 
7
“Seen” means either received as being the destinator or by eavesdropping.
 
8
In [33], a protocol with two bits of challenges and one bit of response achieving \(\alpha =\mathsf {Tail}(n,\tau ,\frac{1}{3})\) is proposed. But it actually works with \(\mathsf {num}_r=3\) as it allows response 0, response 1, and no response.
 
9
Same remark about [33] as in Theorem 7.
 
10
Since provers loose the notion of time in the challenge phase, pre-ask and post-ask attacks cannot be detected.
 
11
Note that cases where there is a close-by prover or a close-by verifier are trivial since they hold the secret \(x\) in their view.
 
12
this is actually confirmed by experiment for the data we use.
 
13
We take the FO protocol as described in [30] since the original one from [18] introduces two counters and has an incorrect parameter \(p_e\). The one from [30] has been shown to provide an optimal expression for \(p_e\).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Optimal Proximity Proofs
verfasst von
Ioana Boureanu
Serge Vaudenay
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Buch
Information Security and Cryptology

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-16744-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-16745-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2015

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16745-9_10