Interactive Governance for Small-Scale Fisheries

This chapter sets the stage for the book about small-scale fisheries governance and governability, which draws lessons and reflections from 34 case studies about small-scale fisheries in 34 countries around the world, including north and south, east and west. The diversity, complexity, dynamics, and scale of small-scale fisheries and their governance are described. Characteristics of small-scale fisheries and their wicked problems call for a shift from management to governance, under whatever governing mode that aligns best with the particularity of the system that is being governed, and in corresponding with the governing system capacity (instrumental) and quality (normative). The need for and contribution of research on governance, particularly from social and transdisciplinary sciences are underscored, given the human presence and interactions that dominate small-scale fisheries. Interactive governance theory and the governability concept and assessment framework underpinning this investigation are perspectives that emphasize the systemic nature of small-scale fisheries, calling thus for a holistic and integrative analysis that transcends sectoral approaches often employed in management discourse and practice.

This chapter presents interactive governance as an analytic perspective in small-scale fisheries research. It serves as an introduction to the conceptual framework that chapter authors apply and describes the overall research questions raised in this book. A key concept that will be elaborated is governability, which was also central to other books on interactive fisheries governance preceding this one (Kooiman et al. 2005; Bavinck et al. 2013). Given the diversity, complexity and dynamics that characterize small-scale fisheries at various scales, and the multitude of concerns that are associated with them, the governance and governability of small-sale fisheries is a challenge worth exploring. We argue that there is no standard answer to the many problems facing small-scale fisheries globally but governance solutions must always be attuned to the particularities of the sector and circumstances within which they exist and operate. The governability assessment, as outlined in this chapter, is developed to assist the researcher to locate the problems and opportunities and thus address the complex issues and demands in small-scale fisheries governance.

The discourse on solutions to address small-scale fisheries concerns in the Pacific tends to focus heavily on community-based forms of co-management. Decentralizing governance to the community level permits responsiveness and specificity to local dynamics, not possible through hierarchical governance. It also allows for proper recognition of the (often legally backed) customary rights of local resource owners, common throughout the Pacific. Partnerships between communities and governments, NGOs or research organizations draw together knowledge, expertise and institutions to develop and implement co-management arrangements. In exploring Solomon Islands as a case study we find that interactions between community-based, co-management (a form of co-governance), and self-governance (particularly customary institutions) are fundamental for contextualizing and ‘fitting’ management to the community level – and that this helps to account for the exceptionally high social and ecological diversity and complexity of Solomon Islands. Community-based, co-management represents a hybrid of traditional and contemporary, local and higher level images, instruments and actions. Interactions between community-based, co-management and hierarchical governance can bolster and inform local management and governance solutions. This is particularly true (and necessary) for pressures (e.g., population growth and commercial, export-orientated exploitation) that extend beyond the local scale or have not before been encountered by customary institutions. While these relations can increase governability, they can also be contradictory and undermining, particularly when objectives are dynamic and differ across scales. Finding the ‘best mix’ of governance modes and responses is a moving and elusive target. Nonetheless, we conclude that while community-based, co-management is an appropriate and fitting mode for increasing the governability of Pacific small-scale fisheries in some contexts, in its current form it alone is not up to the task of realizing fisheries sustainability objectives. We recommend that small-scale fisheries policy more explicitly seeks, and tests, new forms of governance interactions amidst the diversity and complexity of Pacific small-scale fisheries.

Rote is Indonesia’s southern-most island with a population of approximately 128,000 people. Largely unregulated small-scale fisheries are integral to local livelihood strategies. Local catches are highly diverse, which reflects regional biodiversity and mixed fishing strategies. Rote’s four mile coastal marine zone open to local small-scale fisheries is porous, resulting in competition against fishers from outside the district. Beyond these four miles local fishers compete against large-scale fishing operations for declining resources. To maintain fisheries sustainability and improve fishing-dependant livelihoods, improved governance is needed. Aligning with the interactive governance framework, this chapter examines a small-scale purse seine fishery operating around Rote waters, looking in particular at the implications of governance change through a coherent, carefully prioritized, reform scheme of investment and management. We argue that the major challenges to effective governance frameworks for small-scale fisheries in Rote include: (i) poor information flow that impedes new discourses on the comparative advantages of alternative arrangements leaving governing bodies consistently confronted by wicked problems; (ii) local attitudes towards compliance with fisheries laws and a limited capacity for enforcement; and (iii) a hierarchical governance system characterized by insecure tenure and competing governance priorities. We also present and argue for some likely pathways to improved governance.

The water body that stretches from Azhikode in the north to Alappuzha in the south in Kerala, the southernmost state of India, is generally known as the Cochin Estuarine System or the Cochin backwaters. This backwater system provides a nursery ground for many marine species, making it a productive fishing area for many small-scale fishing communities living in the vicinity. Evidence shows, however, that this water body has been subjected to both horizontal and vertical shrinkages due to various reasons associated with urbanization and industrialization. This chapter examines the challenges that modern development is posing for small-scale fisheries and how small-scale fishers cope with it. We argue that governance interventions to address the threat of urban and industrial development on backwater fisheries requires a deliberative process involving all stakeholders, particularly local organizations (panchayats) in which small-scale fishers play an important role. In order to improve governability of the Cochin backwaters, a platform needs to be created for small-scale fishers so that they can negotiate on equal terms with their urban counterparts, who hold economic and political power, and whose interests centre around industrialization, tourism, and urban infrastructure development.

The Iroise Sea, at the northwest end of Brittany in France, hosts one of the largest kelp forests in Europe. Kelp is large brown marine seaweed that has been used for centuries by small-scale coastal communities for various agricultural and industrial purposes. For the past few decades, the kelp fisheries have been managed through a co-governance system by kelp harvesters in collaboration with processing industries, fisheries administration and scientists, to provide a sustainable supply to local alginate factories. The recent creation of a marine protected area in the Iroise Sea has resulted in the emergence of new actors and new concerns have arisen, modifying thus the system-to-be-governed and its governance. This case study is an example of how socio-ecological system and their governance can rapidly evolve according to changing circumstances. From the governability perspective, we examine how such change affects the viability of small-scale kelp harvesters.

The common octopus (

Octopus vulgaris)

fishery is of substantial importance in southern Europe. This is the case in Portugal where the octopus fishery has considerable social and economic value, with small-scale fishing being increasingly economically dependent on this resource. The octopus fishery in the European Union is excluded from quota regulations under the Common Fisheries Policy, and hence Portugal is responsible for managing its own fishery. This chapter describes the current status of the small-scale octopus fishery in Portugal, its governing system, challenges faced by the fishery and implications of these challenges for the governability of the fishery. The Portuguese octopus fishery faces several challenges including those inherent to the biological features of the species and its sensitivity to environmental influences. Limited understanding about the resource has led to inappropriate monitoring and assessment, and a lack of intervention by authorities in the management of octopus. Although formal participation of fishers in the decision-making process for octopus management is a recent phenomenon, the management measures implemented over the years were the result of pressure from fishers worried about decreasing economic returns. However, poor organization, lack of trust and little cooperation between fishers results in them having little influence in the decision-making process. Several recent developments aimed at improving the governance framework and increasing the profitability of the octopus fishery, however, have the potential to improve the current management system and increase sustainability.

The small-scale sector lands over 95 % of Malawi’s fish catch and provides income and employment to about 65,000 fishers and over 500,000 people engaged in pre and post-harvest activities. The sector contributes 4 % to GDP and fish is the cheapest source of animal protein in the country. Annual production for the commercially important Chambo (

Oreochromis species

) has plummeted from 8,000 to less than 1,000 tonnes annually since the 1980s although recent years have witnessed a 60–70 % increase in catch mainly of low value usipa. Most of the management problems in Malawi can be traced to problems of governance. Fisheries management still remains largely centralized under the Department of Fisheries. A number of co-management arrangements had been introduced in the 1990s such as in Lakes Malombe, Chilwa and parts of Lake Malawi with mixed results. Examples of organic community based management also exist such as on Lake Chiuta, which appear to be yielding very positive results from fishers’ perspective. This chapter attempts to analyze the varying management outcomes under the three existing modes of governance (hierarchical, co-governance and self-governance) using the interactive governance framework’s three components – governing system, system-to-be-governed and governing interactions. Such a critical analysis will contribute towards finding possible solutions to current management failures in Malawi fisheries and other small-scale fisheries with similar characteristics.

The small-scale fisheries sector in the Ecuador mainland and Galapagos Islands face major challenges triggered by large scale human and climatic events, which compromise their sustainability. Lack of trust, leadership and cohesion among small-scale fisheries entities, limited organizational skills, and social problems within fishing communities reduce this sector’s governability. Further, lack of willingness of fishers to observe rules, limited governing capacity and lack of political attention to small-scale fisheries often contribute to making the overall system less governable. According to interactive governance theory, different governing modes would be suitable for different systems, depending also on the types and quality of governing interactions. Using the interactive governance framework, this chapter explores the performance of the hierarchical and co-governance mode for small-scale fisheries governance in the Ecuador mainland and Galapagos Islands, respectively. These two case studies, by using empirical evidence and triangulation-based methods, analyze the small-scale fisheries sector and some mechanisms through which the governing system, the system-to-be-governed, and governing interactions are operating. The chapter highlights that both hierarchical and co-governance modes of governance have underperformed and consequently that their governability has been reduced for three main reasons: the mismatch between legal frameworks, the undefined social system’s borders, and the use of inappropriate mechanisms for information mobilization. The chapter concludes by suggesting that both models need to contribute to national initiatives, to strength the social system, and to increase the small-scale fisheries sector governability. Only then can fisheries sustainability be achieved.

Policy makers are faced with the challenge of improving how small-scale fisheries are governed. Governance is here understood beyond the rule of law, transparent and accountable government and a vibrant civil society which capacitates its citizens to claim their rights. The chapter broadens this understanding to include interactions among governors. By presenting a case study of Lake Victoria small-scale fisheries in Tanzania, the genesis of how the fisheries were governed and how fisher communities around the lake have been self-governing are traced. Using the interactive governance framework, I discuss the quality of local fishers self-governing on the one hand and co-governance on the other hand. The latter is tracked from when the government started to manage the fisheries. The chapter therefore examines the impact of the government’s intervention on the self-governance of fisher communities. The argument made is that achieving high governability will require an arrangement that borrows institutional understanding from established local practices in fisher communities and combining these, in a practical manner, with professional understanding of management institutions, which are easily adopted by governments.

Most research on small-scale fisheries governance derives from developing countries, limiting our understanding of small-scale fisheries dynamics within developed nations. This knowledge gap creates disparities between these systems, limiting comparisons of similarities and differences across ranges of socioeconomic development and deriving solutions that can be feasibly applied to small-scale fisheries governance. Our chapter compares small-scale fisheries governance systems in the Hawaiian Islands and Baja California Sur, Mexico, using the interactive governance framework. Historically, collective action and self-governance were important in both regions, yet over time, have eroded due to a variety of factors. The current state of small-scale fisheries in the Hawaiian Islands and Baja California Sur, Mexico is generally characterized by open-access with low governability, but with opportunities to hybridize customary and centralized management systems through co-management. This chapter will provide insight into why this has occurred by drawing on similarities across small-scale fisheries in developed and developing country contexts, in addition to highlighting divergences occurring along the trajectory from high governability, self-governance of fisheries resources to low governability and open-access tragedies.

Lobster fisheries in the Wider Caribbean region offer an interesting case for governance analysis. From the onset, these fisheries have been exclusively developed for the export market and have generated considerable foreign exchange and extensive livelihood opportunities. While the development of the fishery in the region took place in a similar period (between the 1950s and 1960s) with a similar end market (mainly trade to the US), and the lobster species harvested is identical throughout the region, the governance modes employed in different countries can be quite diverse. This results in differences in exploitation of the resource, value chain of the fishery and well-being of the fisheries. However, these factors will also in turn influence governance and governability. This chapter will analyze the implications of different governing modes in three countries, Belize, Jamaica and Nicaragua, on small-scale lobster fisheries. Specifically, it looks at the commonalties and variances in the governance system and system to be governed of lobster fisheries in the three countries, as well as the developments that underlie these differences and similarities. The chapter shows that the diversity in fisheries call for particularistic governing systems, and also that their diversity is actually the result of different governing modes. The governance mode and diversity of system-to-be-governed are linked by interactive relationships, and understanding the bi-directional interactions between them is crucial in order to improve governability and the wellbeing of fishers and by extension the wider society. Governability assessment of the three fisheries shows that the co-governance governance mode of Belize, resulting in a fair system-to-be-governed and governing system is most appropriate.

Poor people’s consumption of good quality nutrition from fish protein is compromised by the high demand for high quality fish protein from wealthy consumers in the developed world (particularly United States, Europe and Japan). In South Africa, the diet of the poor, and many of those catching high quality fish, consists mostly of cheap processed and industrialized food, rich in fat, salt and sugar. A new small-scale fisheries policy has been developed to help rectify the problem. This policy is based on a human rights approach to fisheries governance and with an aim to promote social and economic justice for small-scale fishers and small-scale communities in South Africa. A key aspect of this policy is to protect livelihoods and promote food security through allocating fishing rights to community entities. How the right to livelihoods translates into the right to food in small-scale fishing communities is a major question, however. This chapter examines this issue by looking at the food system of two important small-scale species –

Thyritesatun

(snoek) for “nutritious” consumption and sale and

Jasus lalandii

(west coast rock lobster; WCRL) for “luxury” consumption. The governance of the food system and the challenges for the governability of the snoek and WCRL small-scale fisheries are critically assessed.

Using Miyagi Prefecture, Tohoku, Japan, as a case study, this chapter highlights the difficulties consolidation of fishing cooperative associations (FCAs) presents currently to small-scale fisheries governance in Japan. Historically, Japanese small-scale fisheries are known for their successful management through fisheries cooperatives and traditional local institutions. Significant change has taken place in the last 20 years, however, with the consolidation of local, port-level FCAs into prefecture level ones. A question is thus raised about the overall quality for governance, i.e. capacity and capability, in such large-scale mergers of local, port-level cooperatives into prefectural ones. In other words, is the fisheries system more or less governable with the new governance arrangement? Consolidating cooperatives may be economically rational; yet doing so disempowers local, small-scale fishers and does not, contrary to stated goals, provide better services to member fishers.

A key contention of governability assessment is that fisheries governance problems are wicked: they cannot be addressed definitively through simple technical expedients nor can interventions to address them satisfy all parties equally. Several aspects of wickedness are evident in the case of the fishers operating from Gimli on Lake Winnipeg but in this chapter we emphasize the historical one. Specifically, our chapter looks at how past governance interventions shape present governability in fisheries. A severe social, economic, and ecological crisis resulting from decades of poorly controlled and exploitative resource extraction shook the Lake Winnipeg fishery in the 1960s. That crisis was averted through intervention by the Canadian state that had two central elements: a state marketing board and an individual transferable quota system. The intervention of the state led to a much more governable and sustainable fishery, though not without contradictions that are now leading to some expressions of dissatisfaction amongst fishers. Unlike in the 1960s, however, current institutional shortcomings are irritants rather than threats to the very existence of the fishery. The governability of the fishery remains high. In our chapter, we use a social wellbeing analytical perspective to illuminate fishers’ mixed feelings about current institutional arrangements in the Lake Winnipeg fishery.

Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) can have severe negative impacts on small-scale fisheries. Such market-based management naturally favors large-scale participants, and cannot support small fishing operations or traditional fisheries without modification. One such modification designed to support small-scale fishers exists within the North Pacific Fishery Management Council’s ITQ market off the coast of the state of Alaska in the form of Community Quota Entities (CQEs). CQEs obtain quota from the market and lease the quota to community members. CQEs allow for flexibility, and locally-tailored programs can directly involve fishers and fishing communities in the governing system. Financial and logistical barriers, however, have resulted in very limited quota share purchases under the program. Old Harbor, represented by the CQE Barnabas, Inc., was the first community to purchase halibut shares under the program, and it remains only one of two communities to do so as of 2013. Nonetheless, the community supports the program and its potential to provide opportunity to access the fisheries. Additionally, the Old Harbor program, governed by a community-based board of directors, has included a number of structures in the design of its CQE system to promote sustainable harvesting, self-enforcement, and inclusion of new and younger fishers. Despite substantial hurdles, the CQE model contains features that enhance governability. In Old Harbor’s CQE system, the key governing interactions are focused on the core intent of CQEs to support small-scale, remote fisheries. These targeted governing interactions enhance governability by encouraging investment and engagement in local communities because they reflect the needs and concerns of those communities. Further development of affirmative action policies and supportive financing structures that reflect additional community needs could further enhance the governability of this system. Small-scale fisheries that face similar challenges under an ITQ or other market-based system—could benefit from similarly fine-tailored modifications to their existing governing systems.

This chapter explores the relationship between small-scale fisheries and market-based governance systems such as individual transferable quotas. The analysis is prompted by the wide-ranging introduction of private and transferable

Vessel Quota Shares

in the Danish demersal fisheries. The chapter documents both quantitative and qualitative changes in the fisheries due the introduction of market mechanisms. Among these changes has been a concentration of resource ownership, changes in the social organization favoring larger operations with better access to legal advisors and financial capital. Consequently, operators in small-scale fisheries are facing challenges, when acting on the quota market, and in general the small-scale sector is in serious and structural decline. The chapter discusses characteristics of the Danish fishing fleet in relation to instruments and actions available for a governing system

governing through markets

. The specific instruments put in place to protect and safeguard small-scale fisheries are analyzed and discussed. As part of this, the chapter asks how the introduction of market mechanisms changes and transforms the overall governability of the small-scale fisheries. The chapter argues that social objectives have been marginalized and that this development reduces the overall governability of the sector. Moreover, participation of operators in the distribution of fishing quotas has increased through joint quota companies, guilds and through the flexible and dynamic, but individual, every-day market transactions.

This chapter investigates governing interactions at the Baleia Franca Environmental Protection Area (Santa Catarina state, South Brazil) as an example of new opportunities and challenges to scale-up small-scale fisheries governability through Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Previous studies on MPAs in Brazil highlight the innovative aspects of these governing systems such as their well-functioning, active, and progressive management councils. We describe the increasing response of the governing system to fisheries issues that are largely aligned with governance paradigms of collaboration and social learning. Despite all efforts and some notable accomplishments in responsiveness and performance, we point out the challenges related to the mismatch between the governing system and the systems-to-be-governed that hinders fishers’ political agency and limits small-scale fisheries governability at broader territorial levels. We identify and analyse the wicked problems faced by actors engaged in processes of transformation in coastal-marine governance and provide suggestions for improving governability.

The governability of small-scale fisheries located adjacent to Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in South Africa has increasingly come under scrutiny as communities, social science researchers, NGOs and human rights activists challenge current governance approaches that disregard the socio-cultural rights and livelihood needs of fishing communities living within or adjacent to MPAs. Drawing on research conducted in seven case studies in South Africa, this chapter explores the current mismatch between the realities facing fishing communities impacted by MPAs and the state-centric and natural science-based approach to governance adopted by South Africa’s fisheries management and conservation authorities. This approach to MPA governance persists despite a suite of policy reforms and political rhetoric that indicates the embrace of a more people-centred approach to natural resource governance. The key focus of this chapter is to gain a deeper understanding as to why this mismatch persists despite almost 20 years of democracy and policy reforms. While the devastating impact of South Africa’s political history is evident in all cases, other factors that inhibit meaningful change and formation of robust governance systems, are highlighted. These include the persistence of a natural-science paradigm; the divergent principles, values, worldviews and images amongst governance actors; institutional shortcomings; failure to recognize and respect local and customary forms of governance; and the lack of attention to implementation mechanisms that are informed by all governance actors.

This chapter identifies and describes the challenges in small-scale fisheries governance in the context of Taklong Island National Marine Reserve in Guimaras Province, Philippines. Results show that diversity (diverse species of flora and fauna; many fishers highly dependent on the fishery resources and other users), complexity (relationship between key fishery habitats and fish catch; low cooperation and compliance to laws and regulations and conflicts within and among stakeholder groups), dynamism (decline in the quality of the resources overtime; low mobility), and scale (relatively small-sized marine reserve with stakeholders from local to national levels) characterize the natural and social systems in the marine reserve, which lend themselves to low governability. The hierarchical governing mode with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources heading the interim Management Board has not been responsive to governance challenges posed by small-scale fisheries in the reserve. The lack of representativeness and inadequate exchange of information have led to poor quality interaction between the systems. Barriers have been created since “step zero” contributing to low governability. The case illustrates that a “non-functional marine reserve” is detrimental to the sustainability of coastal resources and wellbeing of the people.

Marine protected areas (MPAs) are promoted as an effective model for the management of marine areas worldwide. They are not only a technical management measure but also a social institution that interacts with existing use rights. In the Canary Islands, several marine reserves have already been created, while others have been proposed. Some of the already created protected areas were promoted and supported by small-scale fisher organizations. Newly proposed areas are to be backed by different institutions and small-scale fishers. For small-scale fishers marine reserves have some advantages in terms of co-governance and increased involvement in rule making and surveillance. However, increasingly, other stakeholders like recreational fishers are demanding inclusion in the governing process. It is recreational fishers who are usually the most unsupportive of MPAs and thus pose governability challenges. Involving them, therefore, in discussion about MPAs may help improve governability although it will require institution building on their side. We conclude that MPAs’ inception processes are both a challenge and an opportunity for governability, as they promote new patterns of interactions between stakeholder groups.

The continuing loss of coastal-marine biodiversity and the over-exploitation of coastal fisheries in many parts of the world fuel debates about what governance arrangements can turn the tide on these declines. Using the governability framework, this chapter investigates the comparative strengths and weaknesses of self-governance and co-governance arrangements, by interrogating six case studies from a mangrove region in Thailand. Our examination of three successful and three unsuccessful case studies, identifies the characteristics that distinguish cases which were successfully able to continue long-term implementation of negotiated resource management arrangements: (1) trust and cooperation in governance interactions, which enables conflict resolution and informal sanctioning; and (2) stakeholders’ perceptions that the solution was fair and legitimate. Our analysis also challenges three widely accepted “good practices” for managing natural resources: the need for extensive community engagement in designing solutions; the requirement for formal recognition of community-designed solutions; and the desirability of large inputs of funding from external donors. Our data showed that whilst these three good practices are desirable, they are not necessarily required for successful initiatives. We also offer observations about the influence of diversity, complexity, dynamics, and scale on governance outcomes.

Small-scale fisheries in Newfoundland and Labrador have been shaped by multiple institutions and policies occurring at various scales. Some of these institutions and policies present opportunities, while others pose threats to the sustainability and the viability of this inshore fishery, a sector already facing a grim decline. This chapter analyzes contemporary policy areas at three different scales (provincial, national and transatlantic) and assesses their likely effects on the future of the small-scale fisheries and the rural communities who depend on it. Utilizing the governability perspective focusing on ‘meta-level’ governance, the governing principles embedded in these policy areas are given particular attention in the analysis. The discussion generates a set of questions that need to be considered in moving forward with the governance of the small-scale inshore sector in Newfoundland and Labrador. We argue that these inquiries are also crucial for charting the overall direction of the fishing industry in the province as a whole.

Despite being an island state, fisheries have never been a major contributor to GDP in Cyprus. In social and economic terms, however, the island’s extensive coastline is indicative of the importance of fishing for (but not confined to) coastal communities. Cyprus has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 2004 and hence has had to comply with the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy and specifically with the Mediterranean Regulation. Fisheries resources suffer, in spite of a number of regulatory measures being in place, due to (i) overexploitation caused by the activities of the professional, recreational and illegal fishers and also weak enforcement of existing regulations, and (ii) ecosystem shifts due to factors such as climate change and the mushrooming of invasive species. Using the Interactive Governance Approach to supplement author’s empirical data from different studies, this chapter aims to understand the governability (quality of governance) of the Cypriot small-scale fisheries sector and the failure of the fisheries management system to sustain fish stocks and more generally secure the small-scale fisheries sector. Given that in Cyprus fisheries are under a hierarchical mode of governance, failure to govern should as a first step be analyzed in terms of how power is exercised in the interaction between the state and its citizens, or at least the relevant user groups. Power may both enhance and distort governability, depending on who administers it and how it is used. The chapter concludes that existing power relations, interactions and struggles among different stakeholders partly lie at the root of the problem, but that problems are further exacerbated by an economic system which focuses on individual utility-maximization on the one hand and authorities, with a ‘Divide and Conquer’ approach on the other hand. New institutions need to be created and policies improved in order to strengthen civil society institutions at the community level. It is also important that fishing communities are involved in discussions and empowered so that they acknowledge their role and envision the way towards governable fisheries.

Like in many countries around the world, concerns about resource degradation due to high fishing intensity and use of illegal fishing gears have led to the creation of several protected areas in Mexico. Also as in other cases, these conservation efforts have not been very successful, especially in areas where boundaries are unclear; resource uses overlap, and enforcement weak. Under these circumstances, conflicts between users are likely to escalate, making the fisheries system and the protected areas ungovernable. As posited by interactive governance theory, how stakeholders interact depends partly on the inherent characteristics of the social system, including images that they have of each other, and of the governing system. Stakeholder interactions are also reflections of their willingness to cooperate with each other, which in turn affects the overall resource governability. We illustrate the importance of stakeholder cooperation for governability using a case study of two neighboring small-scale fishing communities, San Felipe and Dzilam de Bravo, on the Yucatan coast of Mexico. While sharing fishing grounds and two nested protected areas, fishers from these two communities had different images about what the protected areas were for, who benefited from them, and how they should be governed. The communities also differed in livelihood options, the level of internal organization, and in the mode of governance. Based on our findings obtained through participatory research, we discuss how to foster cooperation between small-scale fishers and promote co-governance in order to enhance resource governability in the area.

Small-scale fisheries are not a fixed scale in terms of governance and governability. While they may be small by their individual size, small-scale fisheries are strongly interconnected to higher levels of governance. This interconnectedness makes them vulnerable to external influences and shocks, which in turn affect their governability. This chapter calls for an analysis of scales beyond the local community in order to grasp all the complexity, diversity and dynamics of interactions at multiple levels. As an illustration, the case of small-scale fisheries in the San Andrés archipelago on the Caribbean coast of Colombia will be looked at. Due to the International Court of Justice decision over boundary dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua in 2012, small-scale fishers in this area lost access to their traditional fishing ground. The chapter examines consequences of this decision using the governability assessment framework and provides lessons about small-scale fisheries governance when spatial scale is a critical issue.

Transboundary fisheries are a worldwide phenomenon that has considerable impact on small-scale fisheries. This chapter explores governability problems of transboundary fisheries in connection with small-scale fishers’ marginality. Insights are derived by studying the practice of transboundary fishing in the Palk Bay, South Asia, where a sizable Indian trawler fleet impedes Sri Lankan small-scale fishers from carrying out their occupation. By analyzing the features of the fisheries systems and the fragmented governance practices, this chapter raises six issues that challenge the overall system’s governability: (1) mismatch between the scale of governance and the scale of the problem; (2) high level of institutional fragmentation with limited cross-linkages; (3) actors’ strategic framing of the nature, causes and solution to the problem; (4) power imbalances between Sri Lankan and Indian fishers; (5) deep politicization that has linked fisheries issues to higher level ethnic and geopolitical conflicts; and (6) path dependency of the trawl sector. I conclude that while co-governance is in theory crucial for transboundary governance to be more responsive to the situation at hand, governability analysis explains why constructive collaborative practices are difficult, if not impossible, to create in practice in this case.

For over 100 years, auctioned “fishing lots” dominated the fisheries in Cambodia’s Great Lake, Tonle Sap. As part of the world’s largest single managed freshwater fishery, these large scale pre-colonial aquatic resource concessions enabled elite stakeholders to strictly control access to lake resources and to extract large aquatic resource rents, paying little in tax, and not being subjected to any truly effective upward accountability to the Fisheries Administration. In 2012, in conjunction with past reforms, the Prime Minister of Cambodia finally removed

all

remaining lots via a unilateral sub-decree known locally as the “deep fisheries reforms”. Using the interactive governance framework and governability assessment methodology, the chapter first outlines the historical context of the fishing lot system and small-scale fishing, and the causes for their often tumultuous and violent relationship. It then begins to unpack the underlying

raison d’etre

for this profound top-down decree. We explore potential impacts and outcomes of what their rapid removal means for any real system reform and increase in aquatic system governability. We examine the important cross scale and organizational level challenges now facing the multiple stakeholders and players in lake management as they try to coordinate and implement these “deep reforms”.

In this contribution, we examine whether current governance mechanisms for sustaining the fisheries resources are better now than they were prior to the civil conflict of the 1990s in Sierra Leone, and if they are not, what policy instruments could contribute to improving governance. The establishment of co-managed systems during the post-conflict period as a conduit for introducing territorial user rights and marine protected areas constitutes an important step towards stewardship and stakeholder involvement in decision-making. However, the process has been criticized on the basis that it was rushed, thereby jeopardizing program implementation at the local level. Using the governability concept and fish chain as analytical tools, an assessment of the transition period from top down to co-management is undertaken to understand the overall quality of governance. There is evidence that the reforms are essential in promoting participatory governance and attaining multiple co-benefits in conservation and development. Yet, the institutional capacity at the local level is inadequate for effective compliance and monitoring. As a result, there is a need to strengthen the governing capacity and build linkages between fisheries and other economic planning activities where capacity is concentrated. Such efforts and transitional changes are relevant for achieving collective action especially in fragile states that are experiencing the increasing impacts of global environmental and economic changes.

Small-scale coastal fisheries, especially for small stocks of relatively sedentary species, are increasingly seen as candidates for still-novel governance arrangements such as adaptive co-management. Yet, co-management initiatives often expose deficiencies in capacity, communication, trust and other factors said to favor success. How then to govern fisheries with highly variable social-ecological systems? How is governability affected by low capacity and arbitrary governing interactions? How can interactive governance address these challenges? Fisheries governance in the Eastern Caribbean is hampered by limited capacity in community and state fisheries organizations, low levels of leadership, inadequate information exchange and low political priority compared to other economic sectors. Little guidance is available to assess pre-conditions and chances of successful adaptive co-management. Using sea urchin fisheries at five sites in Barbados and Saint Lucia as cases, this chapter investigates formal and informal processes and conditions for establishing, implementing and sustaining adaptive co-management. It assesses the potential for approaching co-governance grounded in understanding social-ecological fisheries systems. This informs fisheries governance by exploring opportunities and constraints through a governability lens.

The resilience of small-scale shellfisheries in Latin America is increasingly threatened by climatic and human drivers acting simultaneously at multiple temporal and spatial scales. Co-governance is emerging as a potential solution to enhance the capability of governing systems to respond to the social-ecological impacts of external drivers of change. Although there is an increasing understanding of the factors that determine the success and failures of diverse co-governance arrangements in Latin America, there is still a poor understanding about how this mode of governance responds to different crises, and how these responses are shaped by past experiences and by the features of the governing system and the system-to-be-governed. In this chapter, we evaluate how institutions learn, self-organize and respond to diverse climatic and human drivers in seven co-governance arrangements, and identify the factors that enable or inhibit building institutional adaptability. Our analysis shows that the combined impact of different drivers produced social-ecological impacts on local fishing communities’ wellbeing. In this context, institutions and actors displayed coping and adaptive responses to prevent or mitigate the damage on fishery resources and fishers’ livelihoods. These varied according to the magnitude, extent, periodicity and intensity of press and pulse perturbations, and were shaped by past crises, social-ecological memory and the particular social features of fishing communities in which institutions are embedded. In most cases, after severe crises, small-scale fishers took collaborative actions for re-organizing their cooperatives and their harvesting and trading strategies in order to prevent future crises and enter into more sustainable pathways. In conclusion, the same factors that promote (or preclude) high governability are also those that enable (or inhibit) building institutional adaptability and resilience.

This chapter discusses the need to define the small-scale coastal fisheries sector in the Netherlands. It shows that the fact that there is no clear definition of what small-scale fisheries is, affects its governability. This seems to go hand in hand with the lack of a clear perspective on what the problems and opportunities of the small-scale fisheries sector are. This is partly because many small-scale métiers (‘metiers’ is commonly used to describe a fishing activity, which can be characterized by a combination of the area that is fished, the gear that is used, and the species that is targeted (

http://datacollection.jrc.ec.europa.eu/wordef/fishing-activity-metier

)) are out of sight, as they are outside the bounds of data collected, or hidden in ‘default rest categories’ or because of lack of clear representation. We argue that the relative invisibility of the small-scale fishing sector in the Netherlands, its diversity, lack of representation, and the ‘preference’ for specialization of the governing system impacts on the governability of the small-scale fisheries in the Netherlands. In this chapter we apply the theory of interactive governance by describing the governing system and the system-to-be-governed as well as the governing interactions between them to analyze the challenges for small-scale fisheries in the Netherlands.

Small-scale fisheries in Senegal are extremely diverse, diffuse, and dynamic, and they dominate export and local markets. They have defied conventional management efforts, and Senegal is currently transitioning to participatory co-management. Because much of small-scale fisheries fall under “development”, we focus on the role international actors have on issues of legal plurality, governance structure and contextual fit. For example, Senegal fishers involve diverse contexts and cultures, complex gendered relations and cultural and spiritual value systems that affect governance interactions and legitimacy but are not often recognized. This is compounded when international actors frequently bring their own images of problems and principles for solutions with little knowledge of local context, but have significant influence on governance structures and processes. Also multiple independent programs and projects with their own values, rules, “governors”, images and principles contribute to a complex legal plurality and fragmented information, impeding coherence and synergy. We introduce coordination as an important interactive process in governance. Coordination problems are endemic to development, economics, and collective action, and impede effective policies and governance. For example policy coherence is an important coordination process and desired state for fisheries. Co-management introduces a very different scale of world views, histories, knowledge systems and outcome desires that will need to be addressed in multi-scaled policy coherence. Downward accountability needs to be improved with fisher perspectives, values and feedback. Also cultural inclusive processes such as institutional syncretism can enhance social sustainability, functional effectiveness and cultural legitimacy of decentralized institutions.

This chapter highlights some governance challenges in small-scale fisheries in the East African region using the case of Chwaka Bay, Zanzibar, Tanzania. In this case, self-governance processes involve strong normative and cultural-cognitive aspects that have underpinned

de facto

management actions and blocked other options towards sustainability. The conflict level between the villages in the Bay is very high and there is a need to address how the system may move from self-governance and conflict to co-governance and cooperation. The chapter focuses on the governance interactions between the state and the fishing villages as well as the state’s failed attempts to break unsustainable self-governance. It identifies the role that the state has played to promote co-management and participation, as well as highlights changing legislation and conservation in the area. What went wrong with these strategies and why? Who and with what method does the capacity for dynamic, interactive governance develop? Who co-ordinates interactions across different identities, interests, and different spatio-temporal scales, and how? Who establishes a common world view for action, and how? Which institution functions as a court of appeal for disputes arising within and over interactive governance?

This chapter explores interactions between institutions and stakeholders’ mindset in the context of a fisheries co-management system in South Korea. Locally called Jayul, this co-management system was initiated by the central government to address resource degradation and illegal fishing concerns by involving small-scale, coastal fishing communities in fisheries management. As part of this, the program strives to affect changes in the minds of involved stakeholders, most notably fishers, to instill certain ideals such as self-initiative, community cohesion, and local rule-setting. Using semi-structured and open-ended surveys as a primary method, I conducted a study to examine the ‘match’ between the institutional aims of the Jayul program and the people’s mindset. Results show that while mismatches prevail suggesting that implementation has been less than effective, some attunement of this co-management institution can be done to better align with the mindset of small-scale fishing people, such as incorporating the principles of equity and adjacency. I argue that such attentive consideration towards the institutional design and implementation is crucial for improving the governability of the system and facilitating the governance transition.

Interactive governance theory emphasizes the two-way exchange that occurs between the system-to-be-governed and the governing system. Thus, in the case of small-scale fisheries, the working hypothesis is that their governability, and hence their survival, depends on the ability and readiness of the governing system to respond to changes that occur within the system-to-be-governed and vice versa. It follows that governability of small-scale fisheries would be determined within both systems, as well as in the way they interact. Using Norway as a case study, this chapter argues that the governability of small-scale fisheries is dependent on the ability and willingness of fishers to respond not only to changes in the socio-ecological environment, but also to actions or reactions of the governing system. Their inclination to adapt, “adaptamentality”, is seen as the motivation for acquiring the necessary skills, knowledge and resources that make them able and prepared for change. It is argued that the institutional design of the governing system, as it has developed during the twentieth century, has been important for this adaptamentality, as it has facilitated constructive partnership with the government and generated mutual trust. Whether these qualities will remain with current institutional reforms, is a question that will be discussed.

This final chapter synthesizes the arguments that chapter authors make with regard to the governance and governability of small-scale fisheries. They point to a general conclusion that in order to enhance governability for the benefit of small-scale fisheries, given the related conditions and characteristics, governance designs and interactions must be sensitive to the needs of small-scale fishing people and responsive to their situations. We do not claim that one governing mode, be it hierarchical, co- or self-governance, is inherently better than others. Rather, the choice of governing modes must take into account the particularities of the system-to-be-governed as well as the governing system. Small-scale fisheries globally will benefit from more constructive interaction, collective action, empowerment, and innovation, but they are simply too diverse for preconceived and generalized governance blue prints. Governability assessments as carried out by chapter authors reveal that despite their structural commonalities, governing modes typically have unique features. Each governing mode must be seen as a governor’s response to the existing and emerging challenges and opportunities of a specific small-scale fishery. The transition of governing modes observed in many cases illustrates how governance actors try to cope with system dynamics. Often, the combination of different modes into one coherent but hybrid approach is warranted. This chapter summarizes how these processes occur in real world situations accounted for by the chapter authors in this book.