4. Towards a Middle Power Theory in International Relations

The examples are plentiful: See for instance Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 346ff, Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer (2001), Rothstein, Robert L. (Rothstein 1968): Alliances and Small Powers. New York & London: Columbia University Press, p. 7 or Keohane (2005 [1984]): 136–181.

See e.g. article 2, paragraph 2 of the UN Charta: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” UN (2014 [1945]): Charta of the United Nations. https://​www.​un.​org/​en/​documents/​charter/​chapter1.​shtml (17.03.2014). See for a more extensive overview on sovereign equality of states Dahm, Georg/Delbrück, Jost/Wolfrum, Rüdiger (2002): Völkerrecht. Vol. I/3, Berlin: DeGruyter Rechtswissenschaften, p. 783–791.

It should be noted, however, that that sovereign equality of states (in the sense of legal persons) is not present in all texts of international law as there are also differentiations between certain groups of states, e.g. those with a permanent seat within the United Nations Security Council or states in possession of nuclear weapons.

Tucker, Robert W. (1977): The Inequality of Nations. New York: Basic Books, p. 3.

His examples were Sweden and Holland in the seventeenth century. See Treitschke (1899): 117f, see also p. 43. Own translation: So waren Schweden und Holland im siebzehnten Jahrhundert künstliche Großmächte.

Simpson, Gerry (2004): Great Powers and Outlaw States. Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 6. Simpson’s extensive study on what he calls ‘legalised hegemony’ and ‘legalised hierarchy’ revealed that “Great Powers [sic] are subject to a different set of norms from other states in relations to the permissible limits of self-defence.” Ibid.: 10.

Waltz (1979): 72.

Ibid.

Ibid.: 73.

Copeland rightly explains that great powers have an impact both at the global and the regional level due to their “geopolitical placement”. Copeland (2012): 70.

Neack, Laura (1995): ‘Linking State Type with Foreign Policy Behaviour’, in: Neack, Laura/Hey, Jeanne A.K./Haney, Patrick J. (eds.): Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 215–228, p. 227.

Wight, Martin (1978): Power Politics. Leicester: Leicester University Press, pp. 50–52 & pp. 63–65. Interestingly, Max Weber primarily understood middle powers—or Mittelstaaten (middle states), as he labelled them—as middle-sized states (in terms of their relative regional size) that are geographically placed between or next to great powers and act as balancers or effective (if their allegiance could be won) force multipliers. See Weber (1988a): 119. The term Mittelstaat is also used by Roman Herzog in a typology that contrasts this intermediary group of states to that of a Kleinstaat (small state) and a Superstaat (super state). Herzog (2014): 50.

Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 349. He also emphasized that allies can be either wilfully supportive to a great power’s regional policy (thus maximising the impact the alliance can have for fulfilling the aims of the great power) or “balky and unreliably captives” (impairing the aims of the great power). Ibid.: 350. The relevance of non-great power alliance partners in major power conflicts is also discussed in Friedberg (2012): 53.

Rothstein (1968): 247.

Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 444. Emphasis added. Morgenthau also observed that smaller nations usually depend to some extent on great powers in economic, military and political issues—giving the latter “controlling influence”. Ibid.: 473. The impact which middle power alignment has on regional affairs is also briefly mentioned in Betts (1993): 70.

Waltz (1979): 163. Emphasis added.

Waltz (1979): 165.

Rothstein (1968): 249.

Flemes, Daniel/Wojczewski, Thorsten (2012): ‘Sekundärmächte als Gegenspieler regionaler Führungsmächte? Fehlende Gefolgschaft in Südamerika, Südasien und Subsahara-Afrika’, in: Flemes, Daniel/Nabers, Dirk/Nolte, Detlef (eds.): Macht, Führung und Regionale Ordnung. Theorien und Forschungsperspektiven. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 155–184, part. p. 156 and pp. 181–184.

Levin (2008): 8.

Christensen (2001): 21. Note that this underpins the importance of a relational power understanding.

Huntington (2003): 10. He also deducted that the principal regional powers—i.e. those below the US—thus share an interest in cooperating with each other in order to limit US influence in their particular regions. As I have argued elsewhere, the cooperation between Russia and China following the end of the Cold War supports this argumentation. See interview in Ebbighausen (2014).

See Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 181. Waltz was quite sceptical whether these ‘middle powers’ (which should rather be seen as secondary great powers’ or ‘principal regional powers’) could compensate for their lack in capabilities (compared to the US and the Soviet Union) and catch up to the two then-‘super powers’, by closing ranks among them and establishing a durable alliance. He used the (misleading) argument that “nuclear forces do not add up”, dismissing that with an integrated nuclear command and control system and a shared nuclear doctrine they would actually very well add up. Waltz subsequently used the same argument like Europhiles for their wish of an ever-closer union among the European states. He held that “only by merging and losing their political identities can middle states become superpowers”. Ibid.: 182, emphasis added. Waltz himself was, however, very sceptical about political unity in Europe (and thus about the emergence of a European ‘super-power’), because “states strive to maintain their autonomy”. Ibid.: 204. Interestingly, many European intellectuals and politicians have outlined the imminence of political merging of European states in order to play (or regain) a greater role for European nations in international affairs. Note, however, that Mancur Olson established an important insight that comes to play here (and was indirectly taken into account by Waltz), because as long as the political identity of the European nation states is not dissolved completely (e.g. by Europhile political forces), the overall organizational rule is that “the larger the group, the less it will further its common interests”. Olson, Mancur (1965): The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 36. Like Kenneth Waltz before him also former German President Roman Herzog is sceptic when it comes to the dissolution of European nations’ political identities. He subsequently speaks of the EU as an impotent actor regarding the field of foreign and security policy. See Herzog (2014): 27–34, 77f, 87 & 109ff. Notably, the philosopher Roger Scruton warns in this regard against what he labelled oikophobia. See Scruton, Roger (2006): England and the Need for Nations. London: Civitas, part. pp. 33–37. In sum, it is likely going to take considerable time before an effective and united European ‘super-power’ (if ever) will see the light of day—or it only will be a hollow entity that is unable to effectively govern its territories particularly because political separatism by ostensibly amalgamated nations remains a constant force right from the start.

Waltz (1979): 184.

Grieco, Joseph M. (1990): Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 46.

This critique was also brought forward by O’Neil, Andrew (2014): ‘Middle Powers in Asia: The Limits of Realism’, The Interpreter, 9th July 2014, http://​www.​lowyinterpreter.​org/​post/​2014/​07/​09/​Middle-power-Asia-realism.​aspx?​COLLCC=​3464531197& (12.12.2014).

This is also true for Snyder (1997), who wrote one of the best books on alliances.

Gschwend, Thomas/Schimmelfenning, Frank (2011): ‘Conclusion: Lessons for the Dialogue between Theory and Data’, in ibid. (eds.): Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice What They Preach. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 216–225, p. 223.

Rothstein (1968): 7.

While frequently using the term Großmächte (great powers), Max Weber also labelled powerful states as “Machtstaaten” or power states. He furthermore emphasized the importance of geography, i.e. that power states prefer to have as many lesser states as neighbours as possible in order to avoid having to restrain own political leeway due to other close-by power states. See Weber, Max (1988b): ‘Deutschland unter den europäischen Weltmächten’, in: ibid. (ed.): Gesammelte Politische Schriften. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), pp. 157–177, part. pp. 158f & 175f.

Kugler, Jacek/Tammen, Ronald L. (2004): ‘Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to Power’, in: Rolfe, Jim (ed.): The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center Security Studies, pp. 33–53, p. 36. It is of course possible to have more than one dominant power at the top.

See for instance Virmani, Arvind (2005): ‘Global Power from the 18th to 21st Century: Power Potential (VIP”), Strategic Assets & Actual Power (VIP)’, Working Paper at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, No. 175, November 2005, http://​icrier.​org/​pdf/​WP175VIPP8.​pdf (10.02.2015); Noya, Javier (2005): ‘The Symbolic Power of Nations’, Working Paper at the Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internatcionales y Estratégicos, No. 35, http://​www.​isn.​ethz.​ch/​Digital-Library/​Publications/​Detail/​?​lng=​en&​id=​13678 (13.02.2015); Nolte, Detlef (2006): Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen. Ein Analysekonzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungsmächte. Working Paper at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), No. 29, http://​www.​giga-hamburg.​de/​de/​system/​files/​publications/​wp29_​nolte.​pdf (13.02.2015); Casetti, Emilio (2003): ‘Power Shifts and Economic Development: When Will China Overtake the USA?’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No. 6, pp. 661–675.

Waltz (1979): 131. Critics have noted, however, that this approach threatens to be a “lump concept of power which assumes that all elements of power can be combined into one general indicator”. Guzzini (2000): 55. This makes the analysis of relational power so important, even when a sophisticated indicator for aggregate power is constructed.

Bull (1977): 200ff.

Ibid.: 202–205.

Stoll, Richard J. (1989): ‘State Power, World Views, and the Major Powers’, in Stoll, Richard J./Ward, Michael D. (eds.): Power in World Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 135–157, p. 136.

Ibid.: 137.

Ranke, Leopold von (1917 [1832]): Die großen Mächte. Leipzig: Philipp Reclam jun., p. 46. Own translation: “Wenn es als der Begriff einer großen Macht aufgestellt werden könnte, daß sie sich wider alle anderen, selbst zusammengenommen, zu halten vermögen müsse, so hatte Friedrich Preußen zu diesem Range erhoben.”

Heimann, Gadi (2015): ‘What Does it Take to Be A Great Power? The Story of France Joining the Big Five’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 185–206, p. 189.

The extremely sophisticated national intelligence system of the US might be an exception to this rule. As the leaked information by Edward Snowden show, the information penetration of US spy agencies is remarkable and certainly allows US policymakers a very good insight into the discourses within the strategic and foreign policy circles of both friendly and antagonistic great, principal regional as well as middle powers.

Mearsheimer (2001): 45.

Stoll (1989): 137. Emphasis added.

Mandelbaum, Michael (1988): The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 135.

Waltz (1979): 204ff. He mentioned that great powers are also providing global commons, but will not refrain from using benevolent rhetoric to disguise their particular understanding of a ‘necessary’ global common (e.g. fighting a ‘just’ war in order to maintain a specific world order or a desired balance of power within a certain region).

Bull (1977): 201 & 219–227. He cited multiple historic examples for spheres-of-influence agreements.

Zakaria (1999): 182.

Ibid.: 185. Note that his conception of power is clearly one of aggregate power.

Deutsch (1968): 88. Emphasis added.

Mearsheimer (2001): 2f and 140–143. Sokolovsky used the argument of regional hegemony to distinguish between ‘aggressive’ and ‘non-aggressive’ states. See Sokolovsky (1965): 383.

Mearsheimer (2001): 18.

Ibid.

Heimann (2015): 189.

Waltz (1979): 131.

Small, Melvin/Singer, J. David (1982): Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816–1980. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Stoll (1989): 156.

Ibid.

Domke (1989): 161f. Organski (1968): 109.

Taylor (1954): xxxiv.

Organski (1968): 110.

Volgy et al. (2011): 5.

Mearsheimer (2001): 5.

Corbetta, Renato/Volgy, Thomas J./Baird, Ryan G./Grant, Keith A. (2011): ‘Status and the Future of International Order’, in: Volgy, Thomas J. et al. (eds.): Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics. Global and Regional Perspectives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 203–224, p. 204.

Puchala and Hopkins (1982): 272f.

Kupchan (1998): 46, FN 13.

In this context, Mearsheimer himself noted that political forecasting is slippery and prone to error, making precise political predictions impossible. Mearsheimer (2001): 7f. The same applies of course for assessing the value of military capabilities in a potential future war. However, making a prognosis (instead of a prediction) is not only desirable with regards to enriching the discourse on the matter in question, but, as I have argued elsewhere, also possible as long as both regular ‘clocks’ are considered and intangible ‘clouds’ are kept in mind for outlining general trends. In any case, one has to keep in mind that extrapolating current trends has certain limits. See Fels (2011): FN1.

The survivability condition Mearsheimer sets in this context seems to be too strong given the damage that even a single hydrogen bomb can cause in an urban area. Given the size of modern nuclear weapons and the many options for delivering it either openly militarily or hidden via civilian transportation means, states can never be completely sure about fully removing a possible opponents’ second-strike capability. Additionally, great powers might decide against fully-fledged strategic forces, but keep either the potential to develop these within a certain period of time or engage in a regime for ‘sharing’ nuclear weapons. As the discussion in Sect. 5.​3.​3 on latent nuclear powers shows, this strategy can have certain advantages. See also Mearsheimer (2001): 8.

Goldman (2011): 7f. According to her, the strategic environment (and thus the uncertainty) of great powers is more complex than that of lesser powers, which again modifies strategic choices in more or less predictable ways.

Domke (1989): 162. Domke rightly saw the foreign policies of the United States until the early twentieth century as a bit complicated in this regard, because for a long time Washington sticked to a policy of isolationism (few official alliances, no official colonies, no large standing army in peacetime), while at the same time did not act as a small power e.g. by interfering in smaller nations’ domestic affairs (part. in the Western hemisphere), pursuing global interests (e.g. by getting engaged in the two Barbary Wars (1801–1805; 1815)) or resisting pressure by other great powers (e.g. the so-called Quasi War with France (1798–1800)). See on this also Zakaria (1999).

As Mearsheimer showed, great powers may try to act as offshore balancers in other world regions even before they achieved regional primacy, but prefer to be “balancer of last resort”. Mearsheimer (2001): 142f. Also Taliaferro is using ‘extra-territoriality’. He refers to it in order to distinguish between two principal actors: extra-regional hegemons and pivotal states. While the first group encompasses those great powers that can shape dynamics in other regions, the latter encompasses dominant states within a specific region that have to adapt to shifts in the balance of power both within their region as well as at the systemic level, when they consider to apply (or respond to) military action. See Taliaferro (2012): 81ff.

This latter point can also be found in Simpson (2004): 5.

Quoted in Schroeder, Paul (1969): Metternich’s Diplomacy at its Zenith, 1820–1823. Westport: Greenwood Press, p. 126. Emphasis added.

Mearsheimer (2001): 143. This is certainly a feature that also non-great powers share.

For the particular value of land forces compared to air and naval power see ibid.: 83–137. In short, nuclear superiority is the ability to devastate a rival’s territory with nuclear weapons without the fear of retaliation. Ibid.: 145.

Jervis (1978): 169. This again also underlines the relational aspect of power.

It is therefore one of the aims of the study at hand to establish a conceptual link between a realist take on international relations and middle power research.

Manicom, James/Reeves, Jeffrey (2014): ‘Locating Middle Powers in International Relations Theory and Power Transitions’, in Gilley, Bruce/O’Neil, Andrew (eds.): Middle Powers and the Rise of China. Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 23–44.

Ping, Jonathan (2005): Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific. Aldershot & Burlington: Ashgate, p. 56.

Holbraad, Carsten (1984): Middle Powers in International Politics. London: Macmillan, p. 3.

Ibid.: 10–45.

Ibid.: 41.

Bartolus de Saxoferrato cited in ibid.: 12.

Ibid.: 45–66.

Tow and Rigby (2011): 157. Their subsequent definition is based on the availability of sufficient material resources and a respected diplomatic standing in international affairs that allows for taking a leading role on key issues in globally and regionally important areas.

Lee, Sook-jong (2012): ‘South Korea as New Middle Power. Seeking Complex Diplomacy’, EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper, No. 25, September 2012, p. 3, http://​www.​eai.​or.​kr/​data/​bbs/​eng_​report/​2012091211454078​.​pdf (01.07.2015).

Huntington, Samuel P. (1999): ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 35–49, p. 47.

Writing in the early nineteenth century, the Austrian statesman Friedrich Gentz (1764–1832) spoke of “second-rate states” and clustered countries into four groups. Gentz cited in Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 465.

Chapnick, Adam (1999): ‘The Middle Power’, Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 73–82.

Holbraad (1984): 42.

Dewitt, D. B./Kirton, J. (1983): Canada as a Principal Power. Toronto: Wiley, p. 22.

Lee, John (2013a): ‘Australia’s 2015 Defence White Paper: Seeking Strategic Opportunities in Southeast Asia to Help Manage China’s Peaceful Rise’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 395–422, p. 402.

Gelb (2009): 79.

Gelber, Lionel (1946): ‘Canada’s New Stature’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 277–289.

Wrong cited in Chapnick (1999): 74.

Wood, Bernard (1988): The Middle Powers and the General Interest. Ottawa: The North-South Institute, p. 4. This view is reflected in the discussion of ‘soft power’ (a version of relational (in their wording ‘behavioural’) power; following them also ‘hard power’ is part of this kind of power) of Keohane and Nye. They very briefly touch on this matter with regards to Canada, Sweden, and the Netherlands. See Keohane and Nye (1998): 86.

See also the interesting discussion of the behavioural aspects of middle powers in Gilley, Bruce/O’Neil, Andrew (2014): ‘China’s Rise Through the Prism of Middle Powers’, in: ibid. (eds.): Middle Powers and the Rise of China. Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 1–22, p. 9ff.

Cooper, Andrew. F./Higgott, Richard A./Nossal, Kim R. (1993): Relocating Middle Powers. Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. Vancouver: UBS, p. 19.

Wood (1988): 19f. This is obviously quite closely related to a functional understanding of middle powers.

Keohane, Robert O. (1969): ‘Liliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 291–310, p. 296.

Cox, Robert (1989): ‘Middlepowermanship, Japan, and the Future World Order’, International Journal, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 822–862, p. 826.

Wallerstein (2004): 56f.

Ibid.

Pratt, Cranford (1990): ‘Has Middle Power Internationalism a Future?’, in ibid. (ed.): Middle Power Internationalism. The North South Dimension. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, pp. 143–168, p. 151.

Glazebrook, George de T. (1947): ‘The Middle Powers In the United Nations System’, International Organization, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 307–315.

See Lyon, Peyton V./Tomlin, Brian W. (1979): Canada as an International Actor. Toronto: Macmillan, p. 12f.

In this regard, Chapnick rightly notes that the behavioural approach risks being tautological, when scholars set up a list of behavioural characteristics taken from likely middle powers such as Canada and use these characteristics to subsequently identify Canada as a middle power. See Chapnick (1999): 76. However, deducting behavioural features from a group of states is possible as long as no small n-design is used for deducing these features in the first place and the states under examination were not grouped together by indicators, which were designed to identify relevant states a priori as the relevant group to look at. More importantly, one could easily use the same argument to challenge the term and very use of ‘great power’. Thus, the k-means cluster analysis undertaken in the study at hand is a very useful method to circumvent the problems of tautological selection (though applying it also means to subscribe to a hierarchical understanding of middle powers; consequently, both the hierarchical and the behavioural approach are joint in the selection and assessment of potential middle powers). The combination of cluster analysis and a theory-derived definition of middle powers should thus balance the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches. See also Fearon and Laitin (2010).

Nolte, Detlef (2010): ‘How to Compare Regional Powers. Analytical Concepts and Research Topics’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 881–890.

Tow, William/Rigby, Richard (2011): ‘China’s Pragmatic Security Policy: The Middle-Power Factor’, The China Journal, No. 65, pp. 157–178, p. 157.

Gilley and O’Neil (2014): 12. As the discussion of structural and indirect relational power in Chap. 3 has shown, however, this should however not mean to underestimate how much existing institutions reflect (and preserve) power relations among states.

White (2010): 68.

Deutsch (1968): 22.

Morgenthau (2005 [1948]): 133. He also remarked that the “the competition among nations for power transform itself largely into competition for the production of bigger, better and more implements of war”. Ibid. 132. This also highlights the functional interconnection between the political, military and economic sphere.

White (2010): 67.

Morgenthau (2005 [1948]): 188.

The point of a middle power’s military strength was particularly emphasised by Wight (1978): 65. For the case of Japan in Southeast Asia amidst the country’s strategic tensions with China see Wallace, Corey J. (2013): ‘Japan’s Strategic Pivot South: Diversifying the Dual Hedge’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, part. p. 6 & 28, (advanced internet access 06.08.2013; http://​irap.​oxfordjournals.​org/​content/​early/​2013/​07/​18/​irap.​lct011.​full.​pdf+html).

Interestingly, the Economist used a similar argument for the identification of great powers in an article from 24 May 1947, in which the authors discussed the US’ willingness and ability to use own economic resources for political ends, which would only allow it to be really acting as a great power (given its huge material resources and capabilities). Cited in Morgenthau (2005 [1948]): 153f.

In conclusion, a middle power is basically either a fully-developed middle-sized state (in terms of geography and population) that has all the features of a great power except for the size or quantity of those features or it is a larger state (in terms of geography and population) that has the potential to once become a great power but so far lacks the full amount of features of a fully-developed great power. It is also important to note that some scholars basically equate regional great powers with middle powers. While the emphasis on the importance of the regional level is certainly justified, it nevertheless fails to connect to the historic understandings of middle powers in the literature. Moreover, from a realist point of view, the unit of analysis is the same, because following Mearsheimer great powers will always try to increase power and dominate their own region (i.e. gaining regional hegemony), before seeking to prevent hegemons in other regions. Thus, equating middle powers with regional great powers is not helping in understanding the behaviour of those states that are neither great powers nor small ones. See the useful discussion in Nolte, Detlef (2012): ‘Regionale Führungsmächte: Analysekonzepte und Forschungsfragen’, in: Flemes, Daniel/Nabers, Dirk/Nolte, Detlef (eds.): Macht, Führung und Regionale Ordnung. Theorien und Forschungsperspektiven. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 17–52, part. pp. 29–36.

Riddell, R. G. (1948): ‘The Role of Middle Powers in the United Nations’, Statement and Speeches (Canadian Department of External Affairs), Vol. 48. No. 40, 22nd June 1948, 68f. See again Tow and Rigby (2011): 157.

Cox (1989): 825.

On the value and use of middle-range theories in social sciences see also Hedström, Peters/Ylikoski, Petri (2010): ‘Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 49–67, p. 61f.

See Fels (2012): 23 & Fels (2013): 169f. These thoughts were taken up by Gilley and O’Neil (2014): 17ff as well as Manicom and Reeves (2014): 36f.

Morgenthau (2005 [1948]): 196.

Holbraad (1984): 119.

Lee (2012): 11.

Lee, John (2013b): ‘China’s Economic Influence in Thailand: Perception or Reality’, ISEAS Perspective, No. 44, 11th July 2013, p. 1.

Lee, Dog-Ryul (2015): ‘Policy Recommendations for South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea-China Relations’, EAI Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative Policy Recommendation, No. 3, February 2015, p. 1, http://​www.​eai.​or.​kr/​data/​bbs/​kor_​report/​2015030318262622​.​pdf (07.07.2015). Notably, this also includes that China is concerned that some regional middle power, which are allied with the US, compete with it.

Grieco (1993): 321.

The case of Italy’s defection in 1914 comes to mind here again.

This is obviously the danger that Russia faces in its strategic partnership with China.

The example of India is telling: New Delhi pursues close relations with Washington (e.g. on civil nuclear cooperation and democracy promotion) while it is also closely attached to Beijing (via several regional initiatives such as the SCO or the BRICS, formats that indirectly challenge US primacy).

Mearsheimer (1995): 13.

It should be noted here that one of the common distinctions made between classical and structural realism—in the first strand of realism, states are seeking ‘power’, while in the latter strand their ultimate aim is ‘security’—in IR literature is a false one: A closer reading of the work of Morgenthau shows that he already argued (just like Waltz, who made ‘security’ to be the final aim with power as an intermediary aim and means) that states seek both power and security. See Morgenthau (2005 [1948]): 213–220.

Mearsheimer (2001): 42f. Note that also Stephen Walt emphasised the overall importance of key security aims in a nation’s alignment strategies. He subsequently warned of over-emphasising sharded ideology in this regard. See Walt (1985): 25f.

Herzog (2014): 50.

Mearsheimer (2001): 371.

E.g. Morgenthau (2005 [1948]): 190 or Mearsheimer (2001): 305. See also Morgenthau’s depiction of the changed balance of power due to the involvement of other actors or alliance formation among multiple actor to confront a great power. Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 187 & 199. Interestingly, Cline even established an additive listing of aggregate power in the final part of his intriguing analysis along the lines of the then-existing security alliances between capitalist and communist countries. He obviously followed the same realist reasoning as described above. See Cline (1980): 202.

Mearsheimer (2001): 156. He also noted that the major downside of alliances—or external balancing—are that it takes time both to establish and to coordinate them efficiently.

Lee (2012): 12.

On this point see also Huntington, Samuel (1999): ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 35–49, esp. 42 & 46.

Waltz labelled great powers as “consequential states”, i.e. those states that have the most power and seek to coexist peacefully or struggle for mastery. Waltz (1979): 131.

Fels (2013): 170. The quest of the Republic of Taiwan, which is internationally de jure not acknowledged as an independent state (leading to its exclusion from this study’s analysis given data scarcity by international organizations), is an interesting example. Taipei seeks to foster own international acceptance by gaining the allegiance of small nations. This shows that also middle powers might seek to win the support of small nations if their power base is deemed relevant for own national security aims (in this context the small states’ voting powers in international institutions in order to improve the option of getting wide-spread international recognition as an independent state).

Tow, Shannon (2012): ‘Diplomacy in an Asymmetric Alliance: Reconciling Sino-Australian Relations With ANZUS, 1971–2007’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 71–100, p. 72.

Ayson, Robert (2008): ‘A Perspective from Australia’, Paper presented at the 3rd Berlin Conference on Asian Security (SWP/CSIS), 17th–19th September 2008, p. 8, Medcalf, Rory/Mohan, C. Raja (2014): ‘Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Australia, India and Middle Power Coalitions’, Lowy Institute Analysis, August 2014, p. 11ff, http://​www.​lowyinstitute.​org/​publications/​responding-to-Indo-Pacific-rivalry (05.12.2014) and Lee (2012): 13.

Keating, Paul (2013): ‘China’s Responsibilities’, Address to the 21st Century Council in Beijing/China, 3th November 2013, http://​www.​lowyinterpreter.​org/​post/​2013/​11/​27/​Paul-Keating-on-Chinas-responsibilities​.​aspx?​COLLCC=​2216673301& (13.03.2015).

According to Morgenthau, the third option would be to improve one’s own elements of power. For a discussion of these three options see Morgenthau (2005 [1948]): 193–208.

Dyer (2014): 278.

Pillsbury (2015): 233.

Dyer (2014): 279.

Pillsbury (2015): 233.

Cook, Malcom/Medcalf, Rory/Shearer, Andrew/Heinrichs, Raoul (2010): ‘Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures’, Lowy Institute for International Policy Report, p. 15, http://​www.​lowyinstitute.​org/​publications/​power-and-choice-asian-security-futures (06.02.2015), emphasis added.

Yin (2009): 136–141.