Human Agency and Behavioral Economics

Nudging Fast and Slow

verfasst von: Cass R. Sunstein

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Buchreihe : Palgrave Advances in Behavioral Economics

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

This Palgrave Pivot offers comprehensive evidence about what people actually think of “nudge” policies designed to steer decision makers’ choices in positive directions. The data reveal that people in diverse nations generally favor nudges by strong majorities, with a preference for educative efforts – such as calorie labels - that equip individuals to make the best decisions for their own lives. On the other hand, there are significant arguments for noneducational nudges – such as automatic enrollment in savings plans - as they allow people to devote their scarce time and attention to their most pressing concerns. The decision to use either educative or noneducative nudges raises fundamental questions about human freedom in both theory and practice. Sunstein's findings and analysis offer lessons for those involved in law and policy who are choosing which method to support as the most effective way to encourage lifestyle changes.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Introduction: Agency and Control

Abstract

For most people, control has some intrinsic value; people care about maintaining it and will pay something to do so. Whenever a private or public institution blocks choices or interferes with agency, some people will rebel, even if exercising control would not result in material benefits or might produce material harms. On the other hand, people sometimes want to relinquish control, because exercising agency is burdensome or costly.

Cass R. Sunstein

Chapter 2. People Like Nudges (Mostly)

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a great deal of debate about the ethical questions associated with “nudges,” understood as approaches that steer people in certain directions while fully maintaining freedom of choice. Evidence about people’s views cannot resolve the ethical questions, but in democratic societies (and probably nondemocratic ones as well), those views will inevitably affect what governments are willing to do. Existing evidence, including several nationally representative surveys, supports two general conclusions. First, there is a widespread support for nudges, at least of the kind that democratic societies have adopted or seriously considered in the recent past. Importantly, that support can be found across partisan lines. Second, nudges will not receive majority approval if they steer people in directions that are inconsistent with their interests or their values.

Cass R. Sunstein

Chapter 3. People Prefer Educative Nudges (Kind Of)

Abstract

There is a large and insufficiently explored difference between educative or System 1 nudges, which target or benefit from automatic processing, and noneducative or System 2 nudges, which target or benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic warnings and default rules are System 1 nudges; statistical information and factual disclosures are System 2 nudges. On philosophical grounds, it might seem tempting to prefer System 2 nudges, on the assumption that they show greater respect for individual dignity and promote individual agency. A nationally representative survey in the United States finds evidence that, in important contexts, most people do prefer System 2 nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed and firm.

Cass R. Sunstein

Chapter 4. How to Choose

Abstract

How does one choose between educative and noneducative nudges? One answer points to social welfare: Which kind of nudge increases it? That question requires an inquiry into costs and benefits. Often educative nudges have low costs and high benefits, but sometimes they accomplish little, for example where people lack the motivation or the capacity to learn. Noneducative nudges can be simpler and more automatic. If the concern is autonomy or dignity, educative nudges have some advantages, because they equip people to make their own choices. But educative nudges can also sap autonomy, at least where they intrude on people’s limited “bandwidth,” and force them to devote their time and attention to issues on which they prefer not to focus.

Cass R. Sunstein

Chapter 5. “What Route Would You Like Me To Take?” Paternalists Who Force Choices

Abstract

It can be paternalistic to force people to choose. Although many people insist on drawing a bright line between active choosing and paternalism, that line is often illusory. Calling for active choosing is a form of libertarian paternalism if people are permitted to opt out of choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense not to choose). By contrast, calling for active choosing is a form of nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people are actually required to choose. These points have implications for a range of issues in law and policy, suggesting that those who favor active choosing, and insist on it, may well be overriding people’s preferences and thus running afoul of John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle (for better or for worse).

Cass R. Sunstein

Backmatter

Titel: Human Agency and Behavioral Economics
verfasst von: Cass R. Sunstein
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-55807-3
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-55806-6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55807-3