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Erschienen in:
2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
CCA2 Key-Privacy for Code-Based Encryption in the Standard Model
verfasst von : Yusuke Yoshida, Kirill Morozov, Keisuke Tanaka
Erschienen in: Post-Quantum Cryptography
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Abstract
The code-based public-key encryption schemes by McEliece and Niederreiter are famous candidates for the post-quantum world. In this work, we study key-privacy (or anonymity) for these schemes in the standard model. Specifically, we show that the following two paradigms for constructing \(\mathrm {IND}\text {-}\mathrm {CCA}2\) encryption yield \(\mathrm {IK}\text {-}\mathrm {CCA}2\) encryption, if the underlying primitive satisfies \(\mathrm {IK}\text {-}\mathrm {CPA}\) under k-repetition: (1) The Rosen-Segev construction (TCC 2009), we instantiate it with the Niederreiter scheme; (2) The Döttling et al. construction (IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 2012), we instantiate it with both the McEliece scheme and the Niederreiter scheme. As far as we know, these instantiations give the first IK-CCA2 code-based schemes in the standard model. In our proofs, we rely on an important observation by Yamakawa et al. (AAECC 2007) that the randomized McEliece encryption is \(\mathrm {IK}\text {-}\mathrm {CPA}\) in the standard model. As a side result, we show that the randomized Niederreiter encryption is \(\mathrm {IK}\text {-}\mathrm {CPA}\) as well.