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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Secure Multiparty Computation from SGX

verfasst von : Raad Bahmani, Manuel Barbosa, Ferdinand Brasser, Bernardo Portela, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Guillaume Scerri, Bogdan Warinschi

Erschienen in: Financial Cryptography and Data Security

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this paper we show how Isolated Execution Environments (IEE) offered by novel commodity hardware such as Intel’s SGX provide a new path to constructing general secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols. Our protocol is intuitive and elegant: it uses code within an IEE to play the role of a trusted third party (TTP), and the attestation guarantees of SGX to bootstrap secure communications between participants and the TTP. The load of communications and computations on participants only depends on the size of each party’s inputs and outputs and is thus small and independent from the intricacies of the functionality to be computed. The remaining computational load– essentially that of computing the functionality – is moved to an untrusted party running an IEE-enabled machine, an attractive feature for Cloud-based scenarios.
Our rigorous modular security analysis relies on the novel notion of labeled attested computation which we put forth in this paper. This notion is a convenient abstraction of the kind of attestation guarantees one can obtain from trusted hardware in multi-user scenarios.
Finally, we present an extensive experimental evaluation of our solution on SGX-enabled hardware. Our implementation is open-source and it is functionality agnostic: it can be used to securely outsource to the Cloud arbitrary off-the-shelf collaborative software, such as the one employed on financial data applications, enabling secure collaborative execution over private inputs provided by multiple parties.

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Fußnoten
1
Since our emphasis is on efficiency and analysing SGX-based protocols used in practice, we do not consider Universal Composability, but rather a simulation-based security model akin to those used for other practical secure computation protocols, e.g. [6].
 
2
We use schemes which satisfy the additional notion of minimal leakage which ensures that the outsourced instrumented program \(P^*\) reveals no information about its internal state beyond what the normal input/output behavior of the original program P would reveal.
 
4
This particular choice in our model has implications for the composability properties of our results, as discussed in the related work section.
 
5
We also note that ABY assumes a semi-honest adversary, which is weaker than the one we consider; but still our performance gains are significant.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Secure Multiparty Computation from SGX
verfasst von
Raad Bahmani
Manuel Barbosa
Ferdinand Brasser
Bernardo Portela
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Guillaume Scerri
Bogdan Warinschi
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer International Publishing
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_27