6. International Economic Law as a Possible Vehicle for the Implementation of Unbundling Measures

This is the reason why existing multilateral trade regulation focuses first and foremost on governmental restrictions on trade.

See Sect. 4.​4.

See Sect. 4.​2.

Michael Trebilcock, ‘Competition Policy and Trade Policy’ (1996) 30 Journal of World Trade 71, 74.

WTO (n 10) 60–61.

Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat (n 8) [3].

Ibid [31]. See also ibid [44].

Ibid [37].

Ibid [6].

See Sect. 1.​4.

Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (24 March 1948) UN Doc. E/CONF.2/78.

Ibid, Article 46(3).

Trebilcock (n 13) 88.

The GATT only features provisions on state trading enterprises, which are of some relevance in the present context and will be discussed below.

Basedow (n 12) 63–64.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (1980) A/C.2/35/6, annex.

United Nations General Assembly, Restrictive business practices (05 December 1980) A/RES/35/63.

Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (n 27).

Friedl Weiss, ‘From World Trade Law to World Competition Law’ (2000) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 250, 255.

For a brief overview of the interlinkages between the WTO agreements and competition policy, see Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason (n 14) 761–762.

Article XVII WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (15 April 1994) 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Articles VIII WTO, General Agreement on Trade in Services (15 April 1994) 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.

Article 9 WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (15 April 1994) 1868 U.N.T.S. 186.

Article 40 WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (15 April 1994) 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.

Article IX GATS (n 32).

Ibid, Article XVIII reads: ‘Members may negotiate commitments with respect to measures affecting trade in services not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI or XVII, including those regarding qualifications, standards or licensing matters. Such commitments shall be inscribed in a Member’s Schedule.’

World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration: Adopted on 13 December 1996 (18 December 1996) WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 20.

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration: Adopted on 14 November 2001 (20 November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 23.

World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 (02 August 2004) WT/L/579, 3.

Basedow (n 12) 34ff; Florian Wagner-von Papp, ‘§ 11 Internationales Wettbewerbsrecht’ in Christian Tietje (ed), Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (De Gruyter 2015) [90ff]. The negative comity principle means that a State refrains from enforcing its competition laws in a cross-border context in order to respect the legitimate sovereign interests of the other State party. The positive comity principle means that a State can request the other State party to initiate competition proceedings against certain anti-competitive practices that occur outside the jurisdiction of the requesting State.

Wagner-von Papp (n 41) [95ff].

François-Charles Laprévote, Sven Frisch and Burcu Can, ‘Competition Policy within the Context of Free Trade Agreements’ (2015) 1 <http://​e15initiative.​org/​publications/​competition-policy-within-the-context-of-free-trade-agreements/​> accessed 23 August 2016.

Ibid 5, 12.

Understanding 7(a) Energy Charter Treaty (17 December 1994) 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.

Article VIII:5 GATS (n 32).

See Aaditya Mattoo, ‘Dealing with Monopolies and State Enterprises: WTO Rules for Goods and Services’ in Thomas Cottier and Petros C Mavroidis (eds), State Trading in the Twenty-First Century (University of Michigan Press 1998) 44; Mireille Cossy, ‘Water Services at the WTO’ in Edith B Weiss, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder (eds), Fresh Water and International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 2005) 128 (referring to transport, telecommunications and energy).

Werner Zdouc, Legal Problems Arising under the General Agreement on Trade in Services – Comparative Analysis of GATS and GATT (Dissertation Nr. 2608, Difo-Druck 2002) 269; Sadeq Z Bigdeli and Stefan Rechsteiner, ‘Article VIII GATS’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinäugle (eds), WTO – Trade in Services (Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law vol 6. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) [16]; Nellie Munin, Legal Guide to GATS (Global Trade Law Series vol 31, Kluwer Law International 2010) 258.

Michaelis (n 49) [86]; Pierre Sauvé, ‘Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services: Half-Full or Half-Empty?’ (1995) 29 Journal of World Trade 125, 131; Bigdeli and Rechsteiner (n 51) [32].

Bigdeli and Rechsteiner (n 51) [28].

Article VIII:5 GATS (n 32).

Bigdeli and Rechsteiner (n 51) [4]; Rudolf Adlung, ‘Public Services and the GATS’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 455, 473; Mattoo (n 50) 38–39; Christoph Herrmann, Wolfgang Weiß and Christoph Ohler, Welthandelsrecht (C.H. Beck 2007) [877]; Clemens Feinäugle, ‘Article XXVIII GATS’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinäugle (eds), WTO – Trade in Services (Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law vol 6. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) [32]; Cossy (n 50) 128. But see Yulia Selivanova, ‘The WTO Agreements and Energy’ in Kim Talus (ed), Research Handbook on International Energy Law (Research Handbooks in International Law. Edward Elgar 2014) 297, who seems to assume that Article VIII GATS would apply to the ‘incumbent natural monopolist’ in the gas transportation and distribution market.

Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat (n 8) [39], in particular footnote 17.

See Mattoo (n 50) 66, note 2; Zdouc (n 51) 267.

Mattoo (n 50) 66, note 2.

Feinäugle (n 56) [32]; Bigdeli and Rechsteiner (n 51) [5].

United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (n 60) [228–230]. See also Panagiotis Delimatsis and Martín Molinuevo, ‘Article XVI GATS’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinäugle (eds), WTO – Trade in Services (Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law vol 6. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) [48].

In Lithuania, for example, a license to transport gas is limited to a certain territory where the respective operator enjoys exclusive rights. The current licensee, Amber Grid, is granted the exclusive right to supply gas transmission services throughout the entire territory of the Republic of Lithuania; see Amber Grid, ‘AB Amber Grid Corporate Strategy 2015–2020’ (2015) 11 <https://​www.​ambergrid.​lt/​uploads/​structure/​docs/​318_​fb0afbcac104e270​ce2e52d63b42ba33​.​pdf> accessed 24 August 2016. In Portugal, REN Rede Elétrica Nacional and REN Gasodutos have exclusive rights to the transmission of electricity/gas in continental Portugal under corresponding public service concessions; see European Commission, Commission Opinion pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and Article 10(6) of Directive 2009/72/EC and to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and Article 10(6) of Directive 2009/73/EC – Portugal – Certification of REN Rede Elétrica Nacional S.A. and REN Gasodutos S.A. (12 May 2014) C(2014) 3255 final, 1.

See Mattoo (n 50) 41, 45, 48.

Australia, Cambodia, Croatia, Hungary, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Nepal, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Macedonia and Ukraine have made market access commitments (mode 3) on CPC 7131.

Mattoo (n 50) 48. It could, however, also be argued that the lack of GATS commitments in this area is due to the fact that, generally speaking, energy transmission is a sensitive activity for many WTO Members.

Bernard Hoekman and Petros C Mavroidis, ‘Economic Development, Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 1, 12.

Mattoo (n 50) 40.

See Sect. 4.​2.

Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat (n 72) [71].

Lee Tuthill, ‘The GATS and New Rules for Regulators’ (1997) 21 Telecommunications Policy 783, 792; Mattoo (n 50) 37.

Zdouc (n 51) 271. But see Bigdeli and Rechsteiner (n 51) [23–32], who focus exclusively on the notion of abuse of a monopoly position.

See Sects. 4.​5.​1, 4.​5.​3, and 4.​6.​2.​2.

Bigdeli and Rechsteiner (n 51) [28].

See also WTO (n 10) 63 (‘very basic rules on competition’).

For a general overview, see Bigdeli and Burri Nenova (n 68).

Article XVII:1(a) GATT (n 32).

Ibid, Article XVII:1(b).

Selivanova (n 56) 291–292; Selivanova (n 20) 19.

The working definition reads in full: ‘Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.’

Emphasis added.

See above Sect. 6.3.1.

Andras Lakatos, ‘Overview of the Regulatory Environment for Trade in Electricity’ in Janusz Bielecki and Melaku G Desta (eds), Electricity Trade in Europe – Review of the Economic and Regulatory Changes (Kluwer Law International 2004) 131. See also Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Trade in Energy – WTO Rules Applying under the Energy Charter Treaty’ (2001) [148] <http://​www.​energycharter.​org/​fileadmin/​DocumentsMedia/​Thematic/​WTO_​Rules_​applying_​to_​the_​ECT_​2002_​en.​pdf> accessed 13 May 2016.

Both companies were notified as State trading enterprises within the meaning of Article XVII GATT, see WTO, Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, New and Full Notification Pursuant to Article XVII:4(a) of the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII – European Communities (26 February 1999) G/STR/N/4/EEC, 2–3.

Lakatos (n 93) 132 (‘territorial franchise rights’); Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Trade in Energy – WTO Rules Applying under the Energy Charter Treaty’ (n 93) [148].

See on this also Selivanova (n 56) 292.

In favor of interpreting Article XVII GATT as covering also the national treatment obligation: WTO, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Report of the Panel (31 July 2000) WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R [753]. Contra: GATT, Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Panel Report (7 February 1984) [5.16].

See e.g. GATT, Article XVII (State Trading Enterprises) – Note by the Secretariat (11 August 1987) MTN.GNG/NG7/W/15, [20].

John H Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (MIT Press 1991) 284 (cited by Mattoo (n 50) 39–40); Selivanova (n 56) 292–293; Vitaliy Pogoretskyy, ‘Energy Dual Pricing in International Trade: Subsidies and Anti-dumping Perspectives’ in Yulia Selivanova (ed), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (Kluwer Law International 2012) 197–198.

See Selivanova (n 56) 293.

The same argument is also mentioned by Pogoretskyy (n 101) 197.

See also Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat (n 8) [37] (stating that the ‘cross-border trade of energy goods encounters obstacles … such as vertical foreclosure of transmission and distribution networks in the destination country’ and that this type of obstacles ‘falls out of the scope of WTO agreements’).

Annex on Telecommunications (15 April 1994) 33 I.L.M. 1192 (1994).

Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications Services (24 April 1996) 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997).

For the Annex on Telecommunications, see Lee Tuthill, ‘Users’ Rights? The Multilateral Rules on Access to Telecommunications’ (1996) 20 Telecommunications Policy 89, 90–91.

Annex on Telecommunications (n 106), Section 1.

See ibid, Sections 2(c)(i) and 5(e)(iii).

Ibid, Section 2(a).

In the Mexico – Telecoms case, Mexico had argued that ‘the Annex applies only to access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services as a transport means for other economic activities, and not to the supply of basic telecommunications services per se’. However, this contention was rejected by the Panel, see Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (n 37) [7.274ff].

Annex on Telecommunications (n 106), Section 3(b) and (c); Tuthill (n 108) 95; Bobjoseph Mathew, The WTO Agreements on Telecommunications (Studies in Global Economic Law vol 6, Peter Lang 2003) 89. The term ‘public telecommunications transport service’ (lit (b)) is defined as ‘any telecommunications transport service required, explicitly or in effect, by a Member to be offered to the public generally’ (emphasis added). A ‘public telecommunications transport network’ (lit (a)) is defined as ‘the public telecommunications infrastructure which permits telecommunications between and among defined network termination points’.

Zdouc (n 51) 284–285.

Tuthill (n 108) 89.

See Patrick Low and Aaditya Mattoo, ‘Reform in Basic Telecommunications and the WTO Negotiations: The Asian Experience’ (Staff Working Paper 1997) 7 <https://​www.​wto.​org/​english/​res_​e/​reser_​e/​pera9801.​pdf> accessed 18 July 2016.

It is this ‘pro-competitive’ dimension of the Annex on Telecommunications which is particularly relevant for the problem of vertical integration in the energy sector.

Mattoo (n 50) 55; Zdouc (n 51) 282–283.

Tuthill (n 108) 92; Mattoo (n 50) 55–56; Zdouc (n 51) 284–285.

This is highlighted by Gao (n 119) [37]. It must, however, be kept in mind that there are two novel likeness requirements: ‘like public telecommunications transport networks or services’ and ‘like circumstances’. Depending on how these likeness criteria are interpreted, the sector-specific non-discrimination disciplines could lose much of their practical value.

Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications Services (n 107).

See WTO, Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications (15 April 1994) LT/UR/D-5/4.

Tuthill (n 74) 786.

WTO, ‘Telecommunications Services’ (no date) <https://​www.​wto.​org/​english/​tratop_​e/​serv_​e/​telecom_​e/​telecom_​e.​htm> accessed 11 December 2015.

Marco C Bronckers and Pierre Larouche, ‘Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization’ (1997) 31 Journal of World Trade 5, 23.

Mattoo (n 50) 56.

Ibid [7.232].

Gao (n 129) [34].

Bronckers and Larouche (n 127) 27.

Gao (n 129) [2]; Laura B Sherman, ‘“Wildly Enthusiastic” About the First Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications Services’ (1998) 51 Federal Communications Law Journal 61, 73.

Mira Burri Nenova, ‘The Law of the World Trade Organization and the Communications Law of the European Community: On a Path of Harmony or Discord?’ (2007) 41 Journal of World Trade 833, 851; Bronckers and Larouche (n 127) 26–27; Gao (n 129) [27].

Bronckers and Larouche (n 127) 27.

But see Eunike Prokop-Elkettani, ‘Internationales und Europäisches Telekommunikationsrecht’ in Franz J Säcker (ed), Berliner Kommentar zum Telekommunikationsgesetz (2nd edn. Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft 2009) [42] (who argues that Section 1(1) in conjunction with Section 1(2)(a)–(c) establishes ex ante regulatory obligations).

Shin-yi Peng, ‘Trade in Telecommunications Services: Doha and Beyond’ (2007) 41 Journal of World Trade 293, 300; Mathew (n 113) 154; Sherman (n 135) 77; Bronckers and Larouche (n 127) 27–28; Rachel Frid, ‘The Telecommunications Pact under the GATS: Another Step Towards the Rule of Law’ (1997) 24 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 67, 84–85; Irene Öhlinger, Internationaler Dienstleistungshandel und Wettbewerbsaspekte: Lösungsansätze im Telekommunikationsbereich (Verlag Österreich 2001) 254–255; Markus Fredebeul-Krein and Andreas Freytag, ‘The Case for a More Binding WTO Agreement on Regulatory Principles in Telecommunication Markets’ (1999) 23 Telecommunications Policy 625, 628–629; Damien Geradin and Michel Kerf, ‘Levelling the Playing Field: Is the WTO Adequately Equipped to Prevent Anti-Competitive Practices in Telecommunications?’ in Damien Geradin and David Luff (eds), The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services (Cambridge University Press 2004) 149.

WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the United States: Draft Offer on Basic Telecommunications (31 July 1995) S/NGBT/W/12/Add.3, 5. The draft proposal stated that ‘[a] dominant local exchange carrier with annual revenues in excess of a minimum level defined by the regulatory authority will adopt structural separation or cost accounting safeguards to prevent the allocation of costs of non-regulated services to regulated services’. See also WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the United States: Draft Offer on Basic Telecommunications – Revision (26 February 1996) S/NGBT/W/12/Add.3/Rev.1, 6; WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the United States: Pro-competitive Regulatory and other Measures for Effective Market Access in Basic Telecommunications Services (09 February 1995) S/NGBT/W/5, 2–3.

Sherman (n 135) 76–77.

Canada – United States Free Trade Agreement (02 January 1988) 27 I.L.M. 281 (1989), Annex 1404 to Chapter 14, Sectoral Annex on Computer Services and Telecommunications-Network-Based Enhanced Services, Article 5(2).

North American Free Trade Agreement (17 December 1992) 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), Article 1305(2).

Canada – Chile Free Trade Agreement (05 December 1996) <http://​www.​sice.​oas.​org/​trade/​chican_​e/​chcatoc.​asp> accessed 20 January 2018, Chapter I (Telecommunications), Article I-05(2).

Panama – Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (21 August 2003) <http://​www.​sice.​oas.​org/​trade/​panrc/​panrc_​e.​asp> accessed 20 January 2018, Article 13.06(2).

Chile – Korea Free Trade Agreement (15 February 2003) <http://​www.​sice.​oas.​org/​trade/​chi-skorea_​e/​chikoreaind_​e.​asp> accessed 20 January 2018, Article 12.6(2).

Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag (n 139) 628–629, 641.

Gao (n 129) [35].

Bronckers and Larouche (n 127) 27–28.

Bronckers and Larouche (n 127) 27–28; Mathew (n 113) 156. See also Prokop-Elkettani (n 138) [122].

But see Prokop-Elkettani (n 138) [122] (stating that the nature of the obligation is such that the establishment of a ‘firewall’ between the respective divisions of the company is the ‘only measure’ which can ensure compliance with it).

On the ‘residual importance’ of the Annex on Telecommunications in comparison with the Reference Paper, see Bronckers and Larouche (n 127) 32f.

Gao (n 129) [42].

Sherman (n 135) 78; Mathew (n 113) 159.

In this context, the term ‘unbundling’ does not refer to the vertical separation of different activities within vertically integrated undertakings.

In Mexico – Telecoms, the Panel held that the term ‘cost-oriented’ would refer to the ‘costs incurred in supplying the service’ (Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (n 37) [7.177]).

Ibid [7.262, 7.264, 7.269].

Ibid [7.216].

Eleanor M Fox, ‘The WTO’s First Antitrust Case – Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 271, 271.

Ibid 292.

Dabbah (n 11) 616.

Koopmann (n 134) 382.

WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Honduras: Replies to the Comments on the Proposed Annex on Tourism (27 October 2000) S/CSS/W/9, 1–2.

See Michael B Renshaw, ‘Consequences of Integration in UK Tour Operating’ (1995) 15 Tourism Management 243.

Evans (n 167) [23ff]; David Diaz, ‘The Viability and Sustainability of International Tourism in Developing Countries’ (2001) <https://​www.​wto.​org/​english/​tratop_​e/​serv_​e/​diaz.​doc> accessed 20 December 2015; Massimo G Grosso, Molly Lesher and Enrico Pinali, Services Trade Liberalisation and Tourism Development: OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 57 (TD/TC/WP(2006)37/FINAL, 2007) 25ff.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Expert Meeting on Strengthening the Capacity for Expanding the Tourism Sector in Developing Countries, with Particular Focus on Tour Operators, Travel Agencies and Other Suppliers (07 July 1998) TD/B/COM.1/17, TD/B/COM.1/EM.6/3, 2.

WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Proposal Regarding the GATS – Communication from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Honduras (14 October 1999) WT/GC/W/372, S/C/W/127.

WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Communication by Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela – Draft Annex on Tourism (26 September 2001) S/CSS/W/107.

Ibid 2–3. The phrasing of Section 3 of the Draft Annex on Tourism is somewhat unfortunate. Section 3(2) provides that the prevention of anti-competitive practices in the tourism industries, as mandated by Section 3(1), shall require measures to ‘address’ certain specific forms of corporate behavior subsequently enumerated in the provision. Based on this wording, it is not entirely clear whether the types of conduct listed under Section 3(2) automatically qualify as ‘anti-competitive practices’ within the meaning of Section 3(1) and, therefore, whether the WTO Member concerned would have to adopt adequate measures to actually ‘prevent’ such conduct. In the original draft of the proposed annex on tourism, Section 3(2) unambiguously provided that ‘[a]nti-competitive practices such as the ones referred to above [in Section 3(1)] will include, inter alia, the following: … b) Abuse of dominance through exclusivity clauses, refusal to deal, tied sales, quantity restrictions, or vertical integration’, see Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Proposal Regarding the GATS – Communication from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Honduras (n 170) 6.

For an account of ownership unbundling obligations as a remedy in abuse of dominance cases under general EU competition law, see Sect. 2.​4.

See for example the statement of the representative of Mexico, WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting held on 5 and 6 October 2000: Note by the Secretariat (01 December 2000) S/CSS/M/5, [103].

Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part (2008) OJ 2008/L 289/3.

Emphasis added.

See Mireille Cossy, ‘The Liberalization of Energy Services: Are PTAs More Energetic than the GATS?’ in Juan A Marchetti and Martin Roy (eds), Opening Markets for International Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations (Cambridge University Press 2009) 415 (who writes, in 2009, that disciplines on non-discriminatory third party access and the prevention of anti-competitive practices are ‘not found in any PTA so far’); Ilaria Espa and Kateryna Holzer, ‘Negotiating an Energy Deal under TTIP: Drivers and Impediments to U.S. Shale Exports to Europe’ 43 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 357, 360. See also Thomas W Wälde and Andreas Gunst, ‘International Energy Trade and Access to Networks: The Case of Electricity’ in Janusz Bielecki and Melaku G Desta (eds), Electricity Trade in Europe – Review of the Economic and Regulatory Changes (Kluwer Law International 2004) 199 (who state that ‘[i]t is hard to identify a norm in international law … which imposes third-party access’).

Article 217(1) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part (27 June 2014) OJ 2014/L 261/4, 86.

Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part (21 December 2015) OJ 2016/L 29/3, Article 145(1).

Ibid.

Ibid, Article 147(2)(f).

European Commission, ‘EU-US TTIP: Raw Materials and Energy: Initial EU Position Paper’ (2013) <http://​trade.​ec.​europa.​eu/​doclib/​docs/​2013/​july/​tradoc_​151624.​pdf> accessed 5 April 2016.

European Commission, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – EU Textual Proposal: Energy and Raw Materials’ (2016) 4 <http://​trade.​ec.​europa.​eu/​doclib/​docs/​2016/​july/​tradoc_​154801.​pdf> accessed 30 August 2016. The provision further states that under certain conditions, limited derogations from the right to TPA may be introduced.

For a general account of the energy-related negotiations with respect to TTIP, see Espa and Holzer (n 178).

Wälde and Gunst (n 178) 200.

Understanding 1(b)(i) of the Energy Charter Treaty (n 45).

Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Frequently Asked Question about the Energy Charter Process’ (no date) <http://​www.​energycharter.​org/​process/​frequently-asked-questions/​> accessed 6 August 2016.

Andrey Konoplyanik, ‘A Common Russia–EU Energy Space: The New EU–Russia Partnership Agreement, Acquis Communautaire and the Energy Charter’ (2009) 27 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 258, 278; Andrey Konoplyanik, ‘Борьба с мифами – О мнимых выгодах и угрозах Договора к Энергетической Хартии’ (2006) 21 Политический журнал 32, passim.

It is interesting to take a look at the draft Transit Protocol to the ECT, which is the preliminary outcome of negotiations between the contracting parties of the ECT and whose main purpose is to supplement the ECT’s existing transit provisions (Article 7). The relevant provisions of the draft Transit Protocol are contained in Article 10(2), which provides that each contracting party shall ‘ensure that Transit Tariffs and other conditions are not affected by market distortions, in particular those resulting from abuse of a dominant position by any owner or operator of Energy Transport Facilities used for Transit’ (see Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Last Formal Version of the Draft Transit Protocol as Discussed by the Charter Conference in 2003’ (2003) <http://​www.​energycharter.​org/​fileadmin/​DocumentsMedia/​CC_​251_​ENG.​pdf> accessed 10 March 2016). The rationale of this obligation is clear: The incumbent natural monopolist in country A can abuse its control over the transit transmission line in order to charge excessively high prices from country C energy companies that rely on country A as a transit country. Unbundling policies would be suitable to reduce the incentive of TSOs to distort transit tariffs and, thus, an important step towards ensuring compliance with the corresponding obligation of the protocol. However, it is clear that the objective may also be achieved through alternative means, in particular behavioral measures.

See Espa and Holzer (n 178) 358–360, 376; European Commission, ‘EU-US TTIP: Raw Materials and Energy: Initial EU Position Paper’ (n 183) 2.

Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat (n 8) [39, 71].

See Sects. 1.​1 and 6.1.

WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the United States: Energy Services (18 December 2000) S/CSS/W/24, [14–16]. See also WTO, Committee on Specific Commitments, Communication from the United States – Classification of Energy Services (18 May 2000) S/CSC/W/27, [15, 22].

WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Norway: The Negotiations on Trade in Services (21 March 2001) S/CSS/W/59, 10.

Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat (n 72) [82].

Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat (n 72) [79–83].

WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting Held on 11 February 2010 (05 March 2010) S/C/M/97, [83].

Ibid [74, 83].

Poretti and Rios Herrán (n 197) 33ff; Selivanova (n 56) 297.

Cossy (n 72) 168.

Selivanova (n 20) 22; Selivanova (n 56) 297.

For the distinction between behavioral and structural regulation, see Sect. 1.​3.

In its GATS schedule of specific commitments and with respect to the transportation via pipeline of petroleum and natural gas, Ukraine undertook to ‘ensure adherence to the principles of non-discriminatory treatment in access to and use of pipeline networks under its jurisdiction, within the technical capacities of these networks, with regard to the origin, destination or ownership of product transported, without imposing any unjustified delays, restrictions or charges, as well as without discriminatory pricing based on the differences in origin, destination or ownership’; see WTO, Ukraine – Schedule of Specific Commitments (10 March 2008) GATS/SC/144, 34. An identically worded commitment was also made by Montenegro; see WTO, Montenegro – Schedule of Specific Commitments (05 June 2012) GATS/SC/146, 28–29.

See WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organization (23 June 2015) WT/ACC/KAZ/93, [87].

See Sect. 6.4.1.2.

See also Poretti and Rios Herrán (n 197) 38.

Hubertus von Rosenberg, ‘Unbundling Through the Back Door…the Case of Network Divestiture as a Remedy in the Energy Sector’ (2009) 30 European Competition Law Review 237, 240.

Even in the EU, where the European Commission actively enforces EU competition law, there are only a handful of Article 102 TFEU cases which led to the imposition of ownership unbundling measures on private companies. In fact, until today, ownership unbundling remedies have only been imposed under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, i.e. after the undertakings concerned had made voluntary commitments to this effect. See Sect. 2.​4.

See Thomas Cottier, Sofya Matteotti-Berkutova and Olga Nartova, ‘Third Country Relations in EU Unbundling of Natural Gas Markets: The “Gazprom Clause” of Directive 2009/73 EC and WTO Law’ in Dirk Buschle, Simon Hirsbrunner and Christine Kaddous (eds), European Energy Law: Droit européen de l'énergie (Dossier de droit européen vol 22. Helbing Lichtenhahn 2011) 284 (stating that ‘[i]n the field of energy, access to energy grids calls for shared disciplines on unbundling, comparable to the reference paper in telecommunication’; emphasis added).

As regards the telecom sector, several authors have in fact proposed an explicit accounting unbundling requirement; see Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag (n 139) 641; Geradin and Kerf (n 139) 149–150.

See also Olga Nartova, Energy Services and Competition Policies under WTO Law (Научная Мысль, INFRA-M 2010) 251; Jayant Parimal, ‘Energy Services in WTO – A Recommended Course’ (Master’s Thesis 2004) 94 <http://​www.​peacepalacelibra​ry.​nl/​ebooks/​files/​WTI_​PARIMAL_​Energy-Services.​pdf> accessed 15 January 2016. Nartova proposes the following formulation: ‘Members recognise the importance of unbundling in furtherance of competition, efficiency and transparency. In view of this, all members shall endeavour to ensure full legal and functional separation of energy transport activity from other activities such as the sale of energy goods or services, in which energy service is consumed. At a minimum, the members shall ensure functional unbundling of the integrated companies, which will include, inter alia, separate budgeting, accounting and decision-making facilities.’

Peter Abegg and others, ‘Entflechtung in Netzsektoren – ein Vergleich’ [2014] Bremen Energy Working Papers No. 19, 30, 35; see also Sect. 1.​4.