Abstract
With different governing systems but similar ideals of policy outcomes, Nigeria and South Africa represent prototypes of limited government. In spite of their authoritarian backgrounds, their constitutions provide for dispersion of powers among institutions of government (Steytler 2016). Unlike their previous authoritarian regimes, there are constitutional limitations on the exercise of power by the institutions of government. South Africa’s hybrid of presidential and parliamentary features incorporates the principle of separation of powers among the legislature, executive and the judiciary. The entire executive, comprising of the Cabinet and Deputy Ministers, are directly accountable to the legislature. Similarly, Nigeria’s presidential system espouse the ideals of separation of legislative and presidential powers with an independent judiciary. This devolution of powers, as Steytler (2016, pp.282–283) has noted, was significant in ‘turning the Leviathan on its head through the articulation of the core values of a people-centered sovereignty’.
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Notes
- 1.
First, both countries were former colonies of foreign powers, and, second, ruled by authoritarian apartheid (South Africa) and military regimes (Nigeria), before their transition to democratic rules.
- 2.
United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2017] ZACC 21, para1.
- 3.
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11, paragraph 85.
- 4.
ibid., para 22.
- 5.
Section 91(1) defines the Cabinet to consist of the President, as the head of the Cabinet, the Deputy President, and Ministers. By implication, it excludes Deputy Ministers.
- 6.
The Constitutional Court has described these measures as ‘crucial accountability-enhancing instruments that forever remind the President and Cabinet of the worst repercussions that could be visited upon them, for a perceived or actual mismanagement of the people’s best interests’. See United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2017] ZACC 21, para 10.
- 7.
ibid., para 32.
- 8.
ibid.
- 9.
ibid., para 43.
- 10.
ibid., para 45. Indeed, the Constitutional Court has described impeachment as a punitive accountability mechanism. See Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Another [2017] ZACC 47, para 138.
- 11.
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11, para 50.
- 12.
ibid., paras 52–53.
- 13.
ibid., para 52.
- 14.
ibid., para 58.
- 15.
Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 Of 1998.
- 16.
Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Another [2017] ZACC 47; Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11, para 50.
- 17.
Inakoju & 17 Ors. V. Adeleke & 3Ors, (2007) 1 S. C (Pt. I), para 10–40, at page 65.
- 18.
United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2017] ZACC 21, para 76.
- 19.
ibid.
- 20.
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11, para 94.
- 21.
ibid., para 105 (3).
- 22.
ibid., para 73.
- 23.
Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Another [2017] ZACC 47.
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Fagbadebo, O. (2019). An Overview of Legislative Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms in Nigeria and South Africa. In: Fagbadebo, O., Ruffin, F. (eds) Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa. Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93509-6_2
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