Anzeige
Erschienen in:
2009 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
On the (Im)Possibility of Key Dependent Encryption
verfasst von : Iftach Haitner, Thomas Holenstein
Erschienen in: Theory of Cryptography
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
We study the possibility of constructing encryption schemes secure under messages that are chosen depending on the key
k
of the encryption scheme itself. We give the following separation results that hold both in the private and in the public key settings:
Let
$\mathcal{H}$
be the family of poly(
n
)-wise independent hash-functions. There exists no fully-black-box reduction from an encryption scheme secure against key-dependent messages to one-way permutations (and also to families of trapdoor permutations) if the adversary can obtain encryptions of
h
(
k
) for
$h \in \mathcal{H}$
.
There exists no reduction from an encryption scheme secure against key-dependent messages to, essentially,
any
cryptographic assumption, if the adversary can obtain an encryption of
g
(
k
) for an
arbitrary
g
, as long as the reduction’s proof of security treats both the adversary and the function
g
as black boxes.