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2009 | Buch

Abductive Cognition

The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning

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Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Theoretical and Manipulative Abduction
Conjectures and Manipulations: The Extra-Theoretical Dimension of Scientific Discovery
Abstract
More than a hundred years ago, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, when working on logical and philosophical problems, suggested the concept of pragmatism (“pragmaticism”, in his own words) as a logical criterion to analyze what words and concepts express through their practical meaning. Many authors have illustrated creative processes and reasoning, especially in the case of scientific practices. In fact, many philosophers have usually offered a number of ways of construing hypotheses generation, but they aim at demonstrating that the activity of generating hypotheses is paradoxical, obscure, and thus not analyzable.
Lorenzo Magnani
Non-explanatory and Instrumental Abduction
Plausibility, Implausibility, Ignorance Preservation
Abstract
In chapter one I have illustrated the basic distinction between theoretical and manipulative abduction and the other main features of abductive cognition. Further important cognitive and logico-epistemological considerations have to be added. First of all the fact that abduction is a procedure in which something that lacks classical explanatory epistemic virtue can be accepted because it has virtue of another kind: [Gabbay and Woods, 2005] contend that abduction presents an ignorance preserving (but also an ignorance mitigating) character. From this perspective abductive reasoning is a response to an ignorance-problem; through abduction the basic ignorance – that does not have to be considered a total “ignorance” – is neither solved nor left intact. Abductive reasoning is an ignorance-preserving accommodation of the problem at hand.
Lorenzo Magnani
Semiotic Brains and Artificial Minds
How Brains Make Up Material Cognitive Systems
Abstract
In chapter one the important role of external representations and epistemic mediators was stressed, when illustrating the concept of manipulative abduction, especially in the field of scientific reasoning. Further insight can be granted by some considerations that also take into account Turing’s seminal ideas about human and machine intelligence, some paleoanthropological results, and a Peircean semiotic perspective.
Lorenzo Magnani
Neuro-multimodal Abduction
Pre-wired Brains, Embodiment, Neurospaces
Abstract
In chapter three I have illustrated the main features of the so-called disembodiment of mind from the point of view of the cognitive interplay between internal and external representations, where the problem of the continuous interaction between on-line and off-line intelligence can be properly addressed. I consider this interplay critical in analyzing the relation between meaningful semiotic internal resources and devices and their dynamical contact with the externalized semiotic materiality already embedded in the artificialized environment. Hence, minds are “extended” and artificial in themselves. It is from this distributed perspective that I will further stress how abduction is essentially multimodal, in that both data and hypotheses can have a full range of verbal and sensory representations, involving words, sights, images, smells, etc., but also kinesthetic experiences and other feelings such as pain, and thus all sensory modalities. The presence of kinesthetic aspects plainly demonstrates that abductive reasoning is basically manipulative. Again, both linguistic and non linguistic signs have an intrinsic semiotic life, as particular configurations of neural networks and chemical distributions (and in terms of their transformations) at the level of human brains, and as somatic expressions. However they can also be delegated to many external objects and devices, for example written texts, diagrams, artifacts, etc. We can also see, in this regard, how unconscious factors take part in the abductive procedure, which consequently acquires the character of a kind of “thinking through doing”.
Lorenzo Magnani
Animal Abduction
From Mindless Organisms to Artifactual Mediators
Abstract
The first two sections of this chapter are strictly related to some seminal Peircean philosophical considerations concerning abduction, perception, inference, and instinct which I consider are still important to current cognitive research. Peircean analysis helps us to better grasp how model-based, sentential and manipulative aspects of abduction have to be seen as intertwined. Moreover, Peircean emphasis on the role of instincts in abduction provides a perfect philosophical introduction to the problem of animal hypothetical cognition in the remaining part of the chapter.
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First, Peirce explains to us that perceptions are abductions, and thus that they are hypothetical and withdrawable. Moreover, given the fact that judgments in perception are fallible but indubitable abductions, we are not in any psychological condition to conceive that they are false, as they are unconscious habits of inference. Unconscious cognition legitimately enters the abductive processes (and not only in the case of some aspects of perception, as we will see). The same happens in the case of emotions, which provide a quick – even if often highly unreliable – abductive appraisal/explanation of given data, which is usually anomalous or inconsistent.
 
1
Second, Peirce contends that perception is the fruit of an abductive “semiotic” activity that is inferential in itself. The philosophical reason is simple, Peirce stated that all thinking is in signs, and signs can be icons, indices, or symbols. The concept of sign includes “feeling, image, conception, and other representation”: inference is in turn a form of sign activity, that is, the word inference is not exhausted by its logical aspects and refers to the effect of various sensorial activities.
 
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Third, iconicity hybridates logicality: the sentential aspects of symbolic disciplines like logic or algebra coexist with model-based features – iconic. Sentential features like symbols and conventional rules are intertwined with the spatial configuration, like in the case of “compound conventional signs”. What I have called sentential abduction is in reality far from being strongly separated by model-based aspects: iconicity is always present in human reasoning, even if often hidden and implicit.
 
It is from this perspective that [sentential] syllogism and [model-based] perception are seen as rigorously intertwined. Consequently, there is no sharp contrast between the idea of abduction (both creative and selective) as perception and the idea of abduction as something that pertains to logic. Both aspects are inferential in themselves and fruit of sign activity. Taking the Peircean philosophical path we return to observations made in the previous chapter: abduction is basically multimodal in that both data and hypotheses can have a full range of verbal and sensory representations, involving words, sights, images, smells, etc. but also kinesthetic and motor experiences and feelings such as pain, and thus all sensory modalities.
Lorenzo Magnani
Abduction, Affordances, and Cognitive Niches
Sharing Representations and Creating Chances through Cognitive Niche Construction
Abstract
As we have seen in the previous chapters, humans continuously delegate and distribute cognitive functions to the environment to lessen their limits. They create models, representations and other various mediating structures, that are thought to be aid for thinking. The aim of this chapter is to shed light on these design activities. In the first part of the chapter I will argue that these design activities are closely related to the process of niche construction. I will point out that in building various mediating structures, such as models or representations, humans alter the environment and thus create cognitive niches. In this sense, I argue that a cognitive niche emerges from a network of continuous interplays between individuals and the environment, in which people alter and modify the environment by mimetically externalizing fleeting thoughts, private ideas, etc., into external supports. Cognitive niche constructionmay also contribute to making available a great portion of knowledge that would otherwise remain unexpressed or unreachable. This can in turn be useful in all those situations that require the transmission and sharing of knowledge, information and, more generally, of cognitive resources.
Lorenzo Magnani
Abduction in Human and Logical Agents
Hasty Generalizers, Hybrid Abducers, Fallacies
Abstract
After having illustrated in the previous chapters the main features of my cognitive-epistemological analysis of abduction, it is necessary to further stress the dynamics involved in the interplay between internal and external representations in the case of logic. This will provide a tool for exploring the relationship between human and logical agents in section 7.1. First of all I will further develop my distinction between creative and mimetic artifacts. As I explained in chapter three these artifacts play the role of external objects (representations) active in what I have called disembodiment of mind. Mimetic external representations mirror concepts and problems that are already represented in the brain and need to be enhanced, solved, further complicated, etc. so they can sometimes creatively give rise to new concepts and meanings. From this perspective the expansion of the minds is, in the meantime, a continuous process of disembodiment of the minds themselves into the material world around them so that the evolution of the mind is inextricably linked with the evolution of many kinds of large, integrated, material cognitive systems. This chapter illustrates some features of this extraordinary interplay by focusing on the construction of logical cognitive systems and its consequences for abductive reasoning.
Lorenzo Magnani
Morphodynamical Abduction
Causation of Hypotheses by Attractors Dynamics
Abstract
This last chapter is intended to clarify some central methodological aspects of morphodynamical abduction as regards dynamical systems and the catastrophe theory. Some problems arise in the classical computational approach to cognition in describing the most interesting abductive issues. A cognitive process (and thus abduction) is described by the manipulation of internal semiotic representations of external world. This view assumes a discrete set of representations fixed in discrete time jumps and, because of its functionalist character, cannot render the embodied dimension of cognition and the issue of anticipation and causation of a new hypothesis adequately. An integration of the traditional computational view with some ideas developed within the so-called dynamical approach and catastrophe theory can lead to important insights. What is the role of abduction in the dynamical system approach?What is the role of the “salient/pregnant” dichotomy with respect to abduction?What is embodied cognition from the point of view of its “physics”?
Lorenzo Magnani
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Abductive Cognition
verfasst von
Lorenzo Magnani
Copyright-Jahr
2009
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Electronic ISBN
978-3-642-03631-6
Print ISBN
978-3-642-03630-9
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03631-6