2011 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
A Formal Analysis of Authentication in the TPM
verfasst von : Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, Mark D. Ryan, Graham Steel
Erschienen in: Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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The Trusted Platform Module
(TPM)
is a hardware chip designed to enable computers to achieve a greater level of security than is possible in software alone. To this end, the
TPM
provides a way to store cryptographic keys and other sensitive data in its shielded memory. Through its API, one can use those keys to achieve some security goals. The
TPM
is a complex security component, whose specification consists of more than 700 pages.
We model a collection of four
TPM
commands, and we identify and formalise their security properties. Using the tool
ProVerif
, we rediscover some known attacks and some new variations on them. We propose modifications to the API and verify our properties for the modified API.