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Erschienen in:
2011 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256
verfasst von : Jiazhe Chen, Keting Jia, Hongbo Yu, Xiaoyun Wang
Erschienen in: Information Security and Privacy
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Camellia, which is a block cipher selected as a standard by ISO/IEC, is one of the most widely used block ciphers. In this paper, we propose several 6-round impossible differentials of Camellia with
FL
/
FL
− 1
layers in the middle of them. With the impossible differentials and a well-organized precomputed table, impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 are given, and the time complexities are 2
175.3
and 2
206.8
respectively. In addition, an impossible differential attack on 15-round Camellia-256 without
FL
/
FL
− 1
layers and whitening is also be given, which needs about 2
236.1
encryptions. To the best of our knowledge, these are the best cryptanalytic results of Camellia-192/-256 with
FL
/
FL
− 1
layers and Camellia-256 without
FL
/
FL
− 1
layers to date.