Abstract
This paper discusses the process of outsourcing in the service platform for the principal-agent relationship between enterprises and ASP and establishes an analysis theoretical framework of the relationship between the enterprise and ASP. Under conditions of asymmetric information, the game between the enterprise and ASP is studied under conditions of asymmetric information, and how the enterprise designs appropriate incentives to prompt ASP to provide high level services and to maximize the benefit of enterprise and ASP so that the enterprise and ASP could have a victory for both sides are also studied.
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Xinjian, D., Junhai, M. (2011). Based on the Theory of Principal-Agent Model of Enterprise Outsourcing Services Platform’s Game Complexity Study. In: Zhang, J. (eds) Applied Informatics and Communication. ICAIC 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 228. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23223-7_78
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23223-7_78
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23222-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-23223-7
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