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Erschienen in:
2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Incentive Ratios of Fisher Markets
verfasst von : Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Hongyang Zhang, Jie Zhang
Erschienen in: Automata, Languages, and Programming
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In a Fisher market, a market maker sells
m
items to
n
potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most
$e^{1/e}\thickapprox 1.445$
for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.