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Erschienen in:
2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
The Higher-Order Meet-in-the-Middle Attack and Its Application to the Camellia Block Cipher
(Extended Abstract)
verfasst von : Jiqiang Lu, Yongzhuang Wei, Jongsung Kim, Enes Pasalic
Erschienen in: Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2012
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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The meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack is a technique for analysing the security of a block cipher. In this paper, we propose an extension of the MitM attack, which we call the higher-order meet-in-the-middle (HO-MitM) attack; the core idea of the HO-MitM attack is to use multiple plaintexts to cancel some key-dependent component(s) or parameter(s) when constructing a basic unit of “value-in-the-middle”. We introduce a novel approach, which combines integral cryptanalysis with the MitM attack, to construct HO-MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia under 256 key bits, all of which include FL/FL
− 1
functions. Finally, we apply an existing approach to construct HO-MitM attacks on 14-round Camellia without FL/FL
− 1
functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without FL/FL
− 1
functions under 256 key bits.