Abstract
Magnani’s recent discussion of animal abduction sheds considerable light on both instinctual and inferential character of Peircean abduction. Inspired by this, I elsewhere noted some analogies and disanalogies between Avicenna’s ideas on estimative faculty of animals and Peirce’s and Magnani’s views on animal abduction. Also, I confirmed the dividing role and function of the Beast-Machine controversy in the history of the study of animal cognition. In this paper, I propose to discuss rather extensively some of the most salient differences between Avicenna and Peirce-Magnani. Unlike estimation that only allows animals to sense what is insensible, i.e., intentions, abduction in both Peirce and Magnani is applicable to all perceptions. In order to appreciate the implications of such a contrast, I shall try to shed a light on Peirce’s well-known view of perception in the context of animal cognition by emphasizing the double aspect of abduction as inference and instinct. Further, I shall present an interpretation of Magnani’s recent studies of abduction as a sustained effort to answer how to learn abduction from animals by expanding Peircean view of perception as abduction.
This paper derives from the Lecture given at MBR012_ITALY in Honor of the 60th Birthday of Lorenzo Magnani, Chair of Conference.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Cadwallader cites “On a New List of Categories” (1867) [CP 1.545–1.559] and “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” (1868) [CP 5.213–5.263] in this regard ([3], p. 170–171).
- 3.
Based on Peirce’s own recollection and the evidence from the large set of notes that began aroud 1865 (Ms. 1956), Cadwallader notes that “[a]s the 60s progressed, Wundt’s influence began to be apparent in Peirce’s writings”. Also, based on a large notebook (Ms. 1156), Cadwallader reports that Peirce showed continued interest in Wundt by referring to Wundt’s Physiological Psychology of 1874 at least 47 times [3, p. 171].
- 4.
According to Campbell, the word “cotary” is a neologism from Latin, meaning “whetstone”. So, Peirce’s three cotary propositions of pragmatism are supposed to sharpen the concept of pragmatism [4]. I am indebted to Lorenzo Magnani for this reference.
- 5.
Gobet and Chassy promise to show the key features of expert intuition in chess. Their theory “explains the rapid onset of intuition and its perceptual nature, provides mechanisms for learning, incorporates processes showing how perception is linked to action and emotion, and how experts capture the entirety of a situation. [7, p. 151].
- 6.
“The Order of Nature” is the title of the article, from which this passage has been excerpted. It was published in Popular Science Monthly 13 (June 1878), 203–217.
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Acknowledgments
I am indebted to many participants of MBR 12 conference for their incisive questions and criticisms. As always, John Woods, Claudio Pizzi, and Lorenzo Magnani gave me unmistakable moral support.
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Park, W. (2014). How to Learn Abduction from Animals? From Avicenna to Magnani. In: Magnani, L. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 8. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37428-9_12
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