2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Generic Universal Forgery Attack on Iterative Hash-Based MACs
verfasst von : Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wang
Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2014
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In this article, we study the security of iterative hash-based
MAC
s, such as
HMAC
or
NMAC
, with regards to universal forgery attacks. Leveraging recent advances in the analysis of functional graphs built from the iteration of
HMAC
or
NMAC
, we exhibit the very first generic universal forgery attack against hash-based
MAC
s. In particular, our work implies that the universal forgery resistance of an
n
-bit output
HMAC
construction is not 2
n
queries as long believed by the community. The techniques we introduce extend the previous functional graphs-based attacks that only took in account the cycle structure or the collision probability: we show that one can extract much more meaningful secret information by also analyzing the distance of a node from the cycle of its component in the functional graph.