Abstract
To date, most research on Prisoner’s Dilemmas has dealt with isolated dyads. However, most PD-like relations in the real world take place in a network of relations where each player has a choice of partners. In this research project, we have created a situation where (1) every member of a group selects a partner (that is, two parties form a relationship by mutual choice, and each is free to leave the relationship), and (2) a PD game is played by members who have selected each other. We call this situation a prisoner’s dilemma network. We invited social dilemmas researchers to a computer contest of strategies. Nine strategies participated, and the winner of the contest was PURGE submitted by T. Kameda, which was a simple out-for-tat strategy. The major findings of this study are: (1) Action strategy (how to decide between C and D) is not as important as selection strategy (how to select a partner). (2) Out-for-tat seems to be the best strategy in PD networks. (3) In the situation where actions of the partner can be “mistaken,” forgivingness to defection in out-for-tat is important.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Dawes, R.M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193.
Edney, J.J., & Harper, C.S. (1978). The commons dilemma: A review of contributions from psychology. Environmental Management, 2, 491–507.
Hamburger, H. (1979). Games as models of social phenomena. San Francisco: Freeman.
Hayashi, N., Jin, N., & Yamagishi, T. (1993). Prisoner’s Dilemma network: A computer simulation of strategies. Research in Social Psychology, 8, 33–43. (In Japanese)
Jin, N., Hayashi, N., & Shinotsuka, H. (1993). An experimental study of Prisoner’s Dilemma network. Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, in press. (In Japanese)
Messick, D.M., & Brewer, M.B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas: A review. In Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality and social Psychology, Vol. 4 (pp. 11–44). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Orbell, J.M., & Dawes, R.M. (1981). Social dilemmas. In G. Stephenson & J. H. David (Eds.), Progress in applied social psychology, Vol. 1 (pp. 37–65). Chichester: Wiley.
Stroebe, W., & Frey, B.S. (1982). Self-interest and collective action: The economics and psychology of public goods. British Journal of Social Psychology, 21, 121–137.
Yamagishi, T. (1989). Major theoretical approaches in social dilemmas research. Japanese Psychological Review, 33, 64–96. (In Japanese)
Yamagishi, T. (In press). Social dilemmas. In K. Cook., G. Fine, & J. House (Eds.), Sociological perspectives on social psychology. Allyn and Bacon.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1984 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Yamagishi, T., Hayashi, N., Jin, N. (1984). Prisoner’s dilemma networks: Selection strategy versus action strategy. In: Schulz, U., Albers, W., Mueller, U. (eds) Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78860-4_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78860-4_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-78862-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-78860-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive