nach oben

Erschienen in:

2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. European, National and International Competition Regime

verfasst von : Walter Frenz

Erschienen in: Handbook of EU Competition Law

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Overlaps are nevertheless possible in areas where German competition law under the German Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) and European Union competition law largely parallel each other. However, this only applies to the limited scope of Art. 101, 102 TFEU, thus only to circumstances which are apt to impair trade between the Member States or have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Internal Market. Outside of the area of merger control, any resulting conflicts had not been resolved by means of European law under Art. 103 (2) lit. e) TFEU for a long period of time. Actual problems are the application of the EU rules on competition to undertakings operating internationally, the compatibility with GATT and WTO and the cooperation with competition authorities from third countries, e.g. from the USA.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel The Significance of Freedom of Competition in the European Union Law

Nächstes Kapitel Prohibition of Cartels

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

Article 21 (2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, p. 1. The entire text was published in the form of an amendment, OJ, 1990 L 257, p. 13.

See Khan, In: Geiger et al. (2010), Art. 103 AEUV, para 14.

Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1.

Council Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 6 February 1962, OJ No. 13, p. 204, last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 effective 1 May 2004.

See by contrast, Art. 9 (1) Regulation No. 17 which provided for the exclusive competence of the Commission in this regard.

Critical of this method, Lässig (1997), p. 78 et seq. The aspects set out therein are likewise still of importance on the basis of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 to the extent they are not tied to a requirement to provide notice to national authorities.

Brohm (2012), p. 195.

General Court, Case T-9/99, ECLI:EU:T:2002:70 (para 491)—HFB.

Frenz (2010), para 1597.

ECJ, Case C-325/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:245 (para 23)—France/Commission; for further discussion, see Frenz (2010), paras 1596 et seq. with further citations.

See e.g. ECJ, Case C-303/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:424 (paras 23 et seq., 35)—Commission/France; Case C-325/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:245 (paras 30 et seq.)—France/Commission; General Court, Case T-258/06, ECLI:EU:T:2010:214—Germany/Commission; Frenz (2010), paras 1542 et seq.; Thomas (2009), 426 et seq.

For further discussion, see Pampel (2005b), p. 83 et seq.; Pampel (2005a), 12; court rulings General Court, Case T-119/02, ECLI:EU:T:2003:101 (para 242)—Philips. For a detailed discussion, see Frenz (2010), paras 1557 et seq. Taking a more reserved approach, Immenga (2012), p. 25: “created a certain degree of confidence.”

Also based on this, Immenga (2012), p. 25.

ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (paras 24 et seq.)—Expedia.

See Frenz (2010), para 1587 as well as Adam (1999), p. 71 et seq.; other view Thomas (2009), p. 436 et seq. For additional discussion, see paras 336 et seq.

From the perspective of Art. 3 (2) Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 and paras 335 et seq.

See fundamentally ECJ, Case C-144/04, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709—Mangold; for further discussion, see Frenz (2010), paras 92 et seq.; regarding continued development Frenz (2011a), 199 et seq.

For example, the assessment of Durner (2012), p. 958.

Frenz (2010), paras 1554 et seq., in particular paras 1560 et seq., 1564 et seq. on competition law; see also in this regard Walzel (2008), p. 342 et seq.

Brohm (2012), p. 187 et seq., 199 et seq.

See, Immenga (2012), p. 25.

However, asserted by Durner (2012), p. 958.

ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738—E.ON.

Independent of the question of what the binding effect is based upon, whether the principle of equality or the principle of sincere cooperation (Brohm 2012, p. 181 et seq.). Rejecting the latter, Thomas (2009), p. 435 et seq.; Frenz (2010), para 1588.

ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 37)—Expedia.

Bechtold (2013), § 48.

For further discussion of the binding effect, see Ehricke (1994), p. 170 et seq.

ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 7)—Walt Wilhelm.

Fundamentally Koch (1959), p. 241 et seq.

See ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 3)—Walt Wilhelm.

ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (paras 8 et seq.)—Walt Wilhelm.

ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 16)—Giry und Guerlain.

ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 18)—Giry und Guerlain in the event of a comfort letter halting proceedings.

ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 14)—Giry und Guerlain: “primary problem”. Providing further analysis, Walz (1994), p. 37 et seq.

ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 18 end)—Giry und Guerlain.

ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 18)—Giry und Guerlain.

See ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 3)—Walt Wilhelm.

ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 18)—Giry und Guerlain.

ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 11)—Walt Wilhelm.

ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 6)—Walt Wilhelm. In general, see ECJ, Case 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 (593 et seq.)—Costa/E.N.E.L.; Case C-184/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:50 (para 20)—Nimz.

ECJ, Case 106/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49 (para 17/18)—Simmenthal; Case 249/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:245 (para 14)—Albako.

For further discussion, see above paras 1 et seq.

Ultimately in favour, Walz (1994), p. 265.

However, this does not oblige the authorities of the Member States to examine national law in every case in addition to European Union law, see below, para 322.

For a detailed overall discussion, see Post-doctoral thesis from Hucke (2000) passim.

Emphasised in Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 paras 22 et seq.

The Commission expected both, XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, SEC (2004) 658 final, sub-section 30, 724, also in relation to the following aspect.

Commission Notice—Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 81 (para 9 end).

See, ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (paras 37 et seq.)—Expedia.

Hossenfelder and Lutz (2003), p. 120.

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 26.

ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 5)—Walt Wilhelm.

Bechtold (2001), p. 51; Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 101 AEUV para 169; Wiedemann, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 13 para 284 even refers to white lists as conflicting with the system.

See Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 101 AEUV paras 169 et seq.

Viewing this as “questionable” Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 23 end, however in para 25 approving of the context described above.

ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (paras 29 et seq.)—Expedia.

ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 33)—Expedia.

In favour Schweda (2004), p. 1142; contra Frenz (2010), para 1588; Grune (2013), p. 116 et seq.

See Frenz (2010), paras 299, 1587 as well as para 1189 with additional citations.

See, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738—E.ON; in this context Frenz (2012a), 359 et seq.

Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), OJ 2014 C 2291, p. 1 (para 5).

Relying on this, ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 24, 26)—Expedia.

ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 37)—Expedia.

The exploitation of a dominant position brought about by “several undertakings” is also covered by the prohibition of abusive practices.

Accord Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 29.

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 30.

Schwarze and Weitbrecht (2004), § 3 para 33.

In favour Weitbrecht (2003), p. 72 referring to the eighth recital. However, the interpretation of the wording of the text has priority.

For a more detailed discussion of overlaps and distinctions, see Bechtold (2013), § 20 paras 115 et seq.

Presuming this to be the case Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 30 end.

See ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents; Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (para 26)—CBEM, doctrinally fundamental ECJ, Case C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (paras 49 et seq.)—Magill; Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (paras 38 et seq.)—Bronner; Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257—IMS Health; further discussion under paras 2077 et seq., 2085 et seq. re Microsoft (General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289—Microsoft I as well as Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II).

Weidenbach et al. (2012), p. 73; see e.g. BGH, WRP 2005, 1278—Arealnetz.

See below paras 2072, 2077 et seq.

For further discussion, Frenz (2012b), 188 et seq.

Presuming such a general rule, Schwarze and Weitbrecht (2004), § 3 para 34.

ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (para 31)—Bronner.

For further discussion, see paras 4152 et seq.

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 32.

Regarding national and European Union courts as well as the Commission, ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (para 56)—Masterfoods.

Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the functioning of the network of Competition Authorities of 10 December 2002, 15435/02 ADD 1, RC 22, Interinstitutional Dossier: 2000, 0243 (CNS) (para 22).

In favour Schwarze and Weitbrecht (2004), § 9 para 11.

ECJ, Case C-441/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:377 (paras 36 et seq.)—Alrosa; see by contrast then General Court, Case T-170/06, ECLI:EU:T:2007:220 (para 140)—Alrosa; discussed previously in Frenz (2010), paras 3567 et seq.

Lübking and von Koppenfels (2012), p. 81.

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 36.

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 45/56)—United Brands.

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 448)—Suiker Unie.

Schwarze and Weitbrecht (2004), § 9 para 59.

Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (paras 10 et seq.).

Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (para 8).

Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (para 11).

Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (para 14) also including the following examples.

Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (para 15).

On the competitive relationship, above paras 221 et seq.

See above para 355.

See above para 356.

On this issue, above paras 335 et seq.

ECJ, Case C-234/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91 (para 45)—Delimitis.

ECJ, Case C-24/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:163 (para 54)—Alcan; Case C-298/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:372 (paras 35 et seq.)—Oelmühle; to a limited extent also Case C-453/00, ECLI:EU:C:2004:17—Kühne & Heitz; in this context Frenz (2013b), paras 969 et seq.

Accordingly, there are likewise no concerns with regard to the allocation of authority; additional discussion, see Odersky (1996), p. 699 et seq.; Bornkamm (2000), p. 343 et seq.

100

ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (para 60)—Masterfoods; Case C-234/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91 (para 46)—Delimitis with regard to the deviation of an exemption regulation.

101

ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (para 56)—Masterfoods in the context referred to here.

102

Divivier (2014), p. 361 et seq.

103

Regarding an action for annulment against a Commission decision, ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (paras 57 et seq.)—Masterfoods.

104

The following matter also originated from a reference for a preliminary ruling: ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795—Expedia.

105

ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (para 57 end)—Masterfoods.

106

Terhechte (2004), p. 124 contra Emmerich (2001), p. 3 et seq.

107

See General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289—Microsoft I and Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323—Microsoft II.

108

Cf. regarding the mergers Boeing/McDonell Douglas Corp. Commission Decision 97/816/EC, OJ 1997 L 336, p. 16 and Commission Decision 2004/134/EC, OJ 2004 L 48, p. 1—General Electric/Honeywell; summarised in Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 paras 108 et seq., § 25 paras 78 et seq.

109

Von Meibom and Geiger (2002), p. 261 et seq.

110

See below paras 424 et seq.

111

ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 49)—Portugal/Council; Case C-93/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517 (para 53)—Biret International; General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 802)—Microsoft I.

112

For additional discussion, see below para 476 et seq.

113

Cf. on this concept Meng (1994), p. 501.

114

However, this only applies for the definition of the territoriality principle posited here. To some extent, this is also addresses the consequence that the effects of an external act may also be felt within the territory of another state; critical view Meng (1994), p. 504 et seq.

115

Cf. Meng (1994), p. 526.

116

Commission Decision 69/243/EEC, OJ 1969 L 195, p. 11—Farbstoffe.

117

Commission Decision 69/243/EEC, OJ 1969 L 195, p. 11—Farbstoffe.

118

Commission Decision 85/202/EEC, OJ 1985 L 85, p. 1 (para 79)—Zellstoff.

119

Commission Decision COMP/38899 (para 315)—Gas Insulated Switchgear.

120

Commission Decision 76/743/EEC, OJ 1976 L 254, p. 40—Rento, BASE; 85/618/EEC OJ 1985 L 376 p. 29—Siemens/Fanuc; Rose and Bailey (2013), para 1.109.

121

ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447 (para 14)—Ahlström.

122

ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447 (para 16)—Ahlström.

123

ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70 (paras 126/130 et seq.)—ICI.

124

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 41 with additional citations.

125

Rose and Bailey (2013), para 1.114.

126

On the question of the applicability of international law in the context of European Union law, ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (paras 10/13 et seq.)—International Fruit Company; further discussion with additional citations Frenz (2011b), paras 44 et seq.

127

Regarding this principle, see Hailbronner and Kau, In: Vitzthum (2010), 3rd Part, paras 128 et seq.

128

PCIJ 5, 71 (89 et seq.).

129

Regarding the discussion, Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 paras 48 et seq.; Engel (1988), p. 279.

130

Meng (1994), p. 541 et seq.

131

Engel (1988), p. 273 et seq.; Basedow (1989), p. 636; Knebel (1991), p. 270 et seq.

132

Open General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 103)—Gencor. Reh-binder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 17, 65 each with additional citations.

133

Krimphove (1992), p. 401 et seq.

134

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 65 citing Commission Decision 97/26/EEC, OJ 1997 L 11, p. 30 (paras 14 et seq.)—Gencor; 97/816/EC, OJ 1997 L 336, p. 16 (18, 39)—Boeing/Mc Donnell Douglas; OLG Düsseldorf, WuW/E DE-R 2477 (2481, 2491 et seq.).

135

Asserting this position, Knebel (1991), p. 271.

136

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 18.

137

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 19; Meng (1994), p. 616 et seq.

138

These barriers to jurisdiction are likewise found in U.S. legal practice, cf. the reference in Schwarze (2001), p. 1200.

139

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 21; Meng (1994), p. 535 et seq.

140

Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (paras 92 et seq.)—Gencor; see also the Opinion of AG Mayras, ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:32 (702)—ICI and AG Darmon, ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:258 (paras 47 et seq.)—Ahlström.

141

Meng (1994), p. 536.

142

ECJ, Cases 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120 (para 142)—Ahlström.

143

See ECJ, Cases 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120 (para 144)—Ahlström.

144

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 22.

145

See above paras 386 et seq., 390 et seq.

146

Cf. Commission Decision 75/77/EEC, OJ 1975 L 29, p. 26 (28)—Pilze; 85/618/EEC, OJ 1985 L 376, p. 29 (para 24)—Siemens/Fanuc. For additional discussion, see below paras 476 et seq.

147

ECJ, Case 174/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:60 (para 44)—Bulk Oil; see however in the event of repercussions for the former Common Market Commission Decision 75/94/EEC, OJ 1975 L 38, p. 10 (para 8)—Goodyear Italiana/Euram: here merely no appreciability. In favour of an expansion, below paras 486 et seq.

148

See also under para 485.

149

Commission Decision 94/815/EC, OJ 1994 L 343, p. 1 (para 47)—Zement.

150

Commission Decision 79/90/EEC, OJ 1979 L 21, p. 16 (para 29)—Bleiweiß.

151

So in ECJ, Case C-306/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:173 (para 19-26)—Javico/Yves Saint Laurent Parfums; stronger in detail Rose and Bailey (2013), paras 1.111 et seq.

152

Commission Decision 75/94/EEC, OJ 1975 L 38, p. 10 (para 8)—Goodyear Italiana/Euram.

153

Commission Decision 2001/418/EC, OJ 2001 L 152, p. 24 (paras 231 et seq.)—Amino acids; 2003/2/EC, OJ 2003 L 6, p. 1 (paras 565 et seq.)—Vitamins.

154

Procedural law is regulated in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1 as well as in Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 2004 L 133, p. 1.

155

Cf. regarding this distinction Knebel (1991), p. 271.

156

ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447 (paras 13 et seq.)—Ahlström.

157

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 77; Knebel (1991), p. 271.

158

According to Art. 21 (1) Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004, there are five possible means of sending invitations and documents of the Commission: (a) delivery by hand against receipt; (b) registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt; (c) fax with a request for acknowledgement of receipt; (d) telex; (e) electronic mail with a request for acknowledgement of receipt.

159

Zurkinden and Lauterberg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101-105 AEUV para 120.

160

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 80.

161

See von Stoephasius (1971), p. 134 et seq.

162

Regulation (EC) 802/2004, OJ 2004 L 133, p. 1.

163

ECJ, Case 52/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:73 (para 11)—Geigy.

164

ECJ, Case 52/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:73 (para 11)—Geigy; critical response Haymann (1974), p. 347: no detailed discussion of the international law barriers of service of process to parties located abroad.

165

ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70 (para 39/43)—ICI; Case 52/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:73 (para 18)—Geigy; critical Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 80; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), para 49.

166

See ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70 (paras 34 et seq.)—ICI, without disagreeing to this method; resp. Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 81. Expressing a critical view Knebel (1991), 273 et seq.

167

Similarly Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 81.

168

OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1.

169

For a detailed discussion of investigatory powers in the Regulation, see Klees (2005), § 9 as well as under paras 2511 et seq.

170

Meessen, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), IntKartR para 53; Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 84.

171

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 84 end.

172

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 86.

173

See above paras 386 et seq., 390 et seq.

174

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 86 citing Commission Decision 76/593/EEC, OJ 1976 L 192, p. 27 (28)—CSV; contra Meessen, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), IntKartR, para 53.

175

For example, through so-called “blocking status” which prohibits domestic undertakings from providing information to foreign courts or authorities. See Pallek (2000), 172.

176

Meng (1994), p. 581 et seq.

177

Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 88 with additional citations; see inter alia the cautious position in Commission Decision 76/593/EEC, OJ 1976 L 192, p. 27 (28)—CSV.

178

Approving Zurkinden and Lauterberg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101-105 AEUV, para 122; contra Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 87.

179

Commission Decision of 14 July 2000, M. 1634—Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; Reh-binder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 87 end. Barthelmeß and Rudolf, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 18 VerfVO para 20, 36.

180

Haymann (1974), p. 340 et seq.; Knebel (1991), 272.

181

Haymann (1974), p. 340 et seq.

182

Cf. Ruffert, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 299 AEUV para 4; Haymann (1974), p. 340.

183

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 81.

184

Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (ECMR), OJ L 24, p. 1.

185

There is thus an independent legal basis to such an extent; cf. re Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 83.

186

Council Regulation of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, p. 1. Its entire text was re-published in corrected form due to a series of errors contained in the separate language versions of the Regulation, OJ 1990 L 257, p. 13.

187

General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 79)—Gencor.

188

General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 82)—Gencor.

189

ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447 (paras 16 et seq.)—Ahlström.

190

General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 87)—Gencor; see above paras 388 et seq.

191

General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (paras 92 et seq.)—Gencor. See above para 397.

192

Bechtold (2000), 20.

193

Bechtold (2000), 21.

194

Accord Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 93.

195

This provision is supplemented by Art. 24 (2) ECMR (EC) No. 139/2004, according to which the Commission regularly prepares a report in which the treatment of undertakings domiciled or having their primary place of business within the European Union is examined in the case of mergers in third countries. To the extent evident, such a report has not yet been prepared so that it may be presumed that disparate treatment is not occurring.

196

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 95.

197

Cf. e.g. Mestmäcker (2011), p. 409 et seq.

198

Zurkinden and Lauterburg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101-105 AEUV para 126–133.

199

Zurkinden and Lauterberg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015) Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101-105 AEUV, paras 126 et seq.; Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 paras 51 et seq.

200

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, OJ 1999 L 175, p. 50; Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities, OJ 2003 L 183, p. 12. Regarding bilateral cooperation with other third countries cf. XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, SEC (2004) 658 final, paras 698 et seq.

201

Philipp (2014), 164 likewise with regard to the foregoing.

202

See the examples provided in Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 107 fn. 143 from 1998.

203

Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, OJ 1995 L 95, p. 47. This agreement represents a sort of forerunner. It is the first of the treaties referred to (para 425 above) the structure and wording of which are relied upon by subsequent treaties.

204

Bulletin EU 3-1999, sub-section 1.3.44 (under the index key word “competition”). The Commission made it expressly clear here that the administrative agreement and the associated exchange of protocols did not represent a binding treaty under international law.

205

Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, OJ 1998 L 173, p. 28.

206

Art. III describes what this is understood to mean as follows: “The competition authorities of a Requesting Party may request the competition authorities of a Requested Party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy anti-competitive activities in accordance with the Requested Party's competition laws. Such a request may be made regardless of whether the activities also violate the Requesting Party's competition laws, and regardless of whether the competition authorities of the Requesting Party have commenced or contemplate taking enforcement activities under their own competition laws.”

207

This protection of confidentiality is seen as a large barrier to efficient collaboration, cf. Pallek (2000), 195 et seq.

208

Cf. Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America and of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws (January–December 2002), COM (2003) 500 final.

209

See COM (2003), 500 final., sub-section 1.2.

210

COM (2003), 500 final., sub-section 1.4.

211

XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, SEC (2004), 658 final, para 682.

212

See with citations to specific cases XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, SEC (2004), 658 final, para 684.

213

COM (2003), 500 final., sub-section 1.6; see also Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 paras 107 et seq.

214

Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 2.

215

Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 3.

216

Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 18.

217

See Dolzer, In: Vitzthum (2010), 6th Part, para 64.

218

On the history of negotiations, see Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A paras 20 et seq.

219

Cf. the German consent act to the GATT, BGBl. II 1994 p. 1438; regarding the WTO agreement, BGBl. II 1994 p. 1625.

220

Tietje, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 9; Tietje (1998), p. 95.

221

Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 32.

222

See Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 34.

223

These include additional panels, arbitrators and expert review groups; on the composition and functions of these institutions, detailed discussion by Ohlhoff, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part C paras 71 et seq.

224

For a detailed discussion on this topic and additional provisions of the GATT (1994), see Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B paras 24 et seq.

225

Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B para 82; regarding additional functions of the most favoured nation clause, see Tietje (1998), p. 196 et seq.

226

Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B para 26.

227

Tietje (1998), p. 223.

228

Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B paras 146 et seq.; Tietje (1998), p. 278 et seq.

229

These parallels are also emphasised by Tietje (1998), p. 283; see also below para 473.

230

Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B para 143.

231

To this extent, this prohibition on discrimination is lex specialis in relation to the most favoured nation principle in Art. I GATT, see Tietje (1998), p. 264 et seq.

232

Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B paras 101 et seq.

233

Ohlhoff, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part C para 16.

234

Cf. Ohlhoff, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part C para 17.

235

Acceptance may only be refused if an appeal has been lodged against a panel decision or if the DSB unanimously decides to refuse the report; cf. Art. 16 (4) DSU.

236

ECJ, Case 181/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41 (para 2/6)—Haegemann; Case 104/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:362 (para 13)—Kupferberg; Case 12/86, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400 (para 7)—Demirel.

237

This distinction may influence interpretation: For example, the Court of Justice interpreted the legal concept “measures with the same effect as quantitative import restrictions” in a free trade agreement differently than in the context of Art. 28 EC, cf. ECJ, Case 270/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:43 (paras 14 et seq.)—Polydor.

238

ECJ, Case 104/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:362 (para 23)—Kupferberg; Case 12/86, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400 (para 7)—Demirel; Cases C-300 and 392/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:688 (para 42)—Dior.

239

ECJ, settled case law, since Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (paras 5/6 et seq.)—International Fruit Company; Case 181/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41 (para 28/30)—Haegemann; Case C-61/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:313 (para 52)—Commission/Germany.

240

Schroeder and Selmayr (1998), 348.

241

Schmalenbach, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 218 AEUV para 34; Epiney (1999), 7.

242

See immediately below regarding the exceptions consolidated into two groups of cases, para 449.

243

ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (paras 10/13 et seq.)—International Fruit Company.

244

ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (para 10/13)—International Fruit Company.

245

ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (para 14/18)—International Fruit Company.

246

ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (paras 21 et seq.)—International Fruit Company; confirmed by Case 266/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:77 (para 28)—SIOT; Cases 267-269/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:78 (para 23)—SPI and SAMI; Case 70/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254 (para 19)—Fediol; Case C-280/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:367 (para 109)—Banana regime.

247

ECJ, Case 70/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254 (para 19)—Fediol.

248

ECJ, Case 69/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:186 (paras 30 et seq.)—Nakajima.

249

ECJ, Case 70/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254 (para 22)—Fediol.

250

ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (paras 25 et seq.)—Portugal/Council.

251

ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 71)—Portugal/Council.

252

Settled case-law, see also e.g. ECJ, Cases C-27 and 122/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:161 (para 93)—Omega Air; Case C-76/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4 (para 53)—Petrotub and Republica; Case C-93/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517 (para 52)—Biret International.

253

ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 35)—Portugal/Council.

254

ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 41)—Portugal/Council.

255

ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (paras 42 et seq.)—Portugal/Council.

256

ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 49)—Portugal/Council; confirmed in Case C-307/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:228 (para 27)—OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft; Case C-93/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517 (para 52)—Biret International; General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 802)—Microsoft I.

257

ECJ, Case C-162/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293 (para 51)—Racke.

258

ECJ, Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523 (para 52)—Netherlands/Parliament and Council.

259

ECJ, Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523 (para 53)—Netherlands/Parliament and Council.

260

ECJ, Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523 (para 54)—Netherlands/Parliament and Council.

261

See above paras 448 et seq.

262

ECJ, Cases C-27 and 122/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:161 (paras 89 et seq.)—Omega Air; Case C-76/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4 (paras 53 et seq.)—Petrotub and Republica; Case C-93/02, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517 (paras 52 et seq.)—Biret International.

263

ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (paras 39 et seq.)—Van Parys.

264

ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (paras 41 et seq.)—Van Parys.

265

ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (paras 42 et seq.)—Van Parys.

266

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 801 et seq.)—Microsoft I.

267

In the opinion of Hilf and Schorkopf (2000), 74, this question is amongst the most disputed in this area of law.

268

Petersmann (1997), 327.

269

Petersmann (1997), 327.

270

Epiney (1999), 11.

271

Petersmann (1997), 327.

272

Hilf and Schorkopf (2000), 74; similarly Sack (1997b), 650 et seq.; Sack (1997a), 688 et seq.

273

COM (1994), 143 final, p. 5a.

274

Tietje (1998), p. 115.

275

Tietje (1998), p. 115.

276

ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (para 43, 48)—Van Parys; see also Ohlhoff, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part C para 117.

277

For additional discussion, see Tietje (1998), p. 117 et seq.

278

For a comprehensive discussion, see Tietje (1998), p. 112 et seq.

279

Meng (1995), p. 1085.

280

Meng (1995), p. 1076 notes that compliance with WTO/GATT norms could also be compelled by means of the instruments contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; thus the imbalance argument is not persuasive.

281

Cf. criticism by Steinbach (2005), p. 334 et seq.

282

See most recently ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (para 40)—Van Parys.

283

See above para 456.

284

ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (paras 41 et seq.)—Van Parys.

285

ECJ, Case C-76/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4 (para 55)—Petrotub and Republica.

286

Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, OJ L 210, p. 28.

287

Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organization of the market in bananas, OJ L 47, p. 1.

288

OJ 1998 L 210, p. 28; additional indicators for the intent to implement in Steinbach (2005), p. 334.

289

Walter, In: Ehlers (2014), § 1 paras 44 et seq.

290

Likewise affirming, Ott (1997), p. 220 et seq.

291

See above para 445.

292

Cf. Epiney (1999), p. 8, who comes to the conclusion that the non-application of an international treaty in the event of a violation of primary law is only an option if the obligations contained in the treaty are invalid (or no longer valid) based on principles of international law.

293

Only the most important trade principles contained in the GATT (1994) discussed above under paras 436 et seq. will be included for purposes of this comparison.

294

Regarding the following discussion, see Frenz (2013a), 461.

295

See above paras 385 et seq.

296

See General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289—Microsoft I; Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323—Microsoft II.

297

Terhechte (2012), p. 97.

298

See above paras 403 et seq.

299

On this issue, see Terhechte (2008), p. 92 et seq.

300

Terhechte (2012), p. 98 citing Basedow et al. (2011).

301

Kamann (2012), p. 111.

302

303

Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements; OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 205), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22; Kamann (2012), p. 113 et seq. citing the example of the Brandeis agreements, Commission Decision 85/206/EEC, OJ 1985 L 92, p. 1—Aluminium imports from Eastern Europe.

304

For general discussion, see above paras 388 et seq.

305

In accordance with the implementation principle (above paras 386 et seq.).

306

307

Kamann (2012), p. 120.

308

309

See generally under paras 2085 et seq., 2355 et seq.

310

Kamann (2012), p. 122 with regard to commodities suppliers.

311

See e.g. ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306 (paras 48 et seq.)—Corsica Ferries II; Case C-35/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303 (paras 53 et seq.)—CNSD.

312

WT-DS 394.395, 398/R, Panel report.

313

Extensively treated by Pitschas (2012), p. 65 et seq., summary on p. 79.

314

Additional examples, above para 401.

315

On this issue, Terhechte (2012), p. 99.

316

Terhechte (2012), p. 99.

317

Terhechte (2012), p. 99.

318

Terhechte (2012), p. 96.

319

For example, together with the requirement of consistency, the approach taken by Terhechte (2012), p. 96.

320

See most recently, ECJ, Case C-68/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:71 (para 18)—Protimonopolný úrad; previously in Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.

Adam H (1999) Die Mitteilungen der Kommission: Verwaltungsvorschriften des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts? Nomos, Baden-Baden

Basedow J (1989) Entwicklungslinien des internationalen Kartellrechts. NJW:627–638

Basedow J, Terhechte JP, Tichý L (eds) (2011) Private enforcement of competition law. Nomos, Baden-Baden

Bechtold R (2000) EC merger control in cross-border mergers. The European Legal Forum 2000/01, pp 19–21

Bechtold R (2001) EG-Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen – eine Zwischenbilanz. EWS:49–55

Bechtold R (2013) Kartellgesetz: GWB. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – Kommentar, 7th edn. C.H. Beck, Munich

Bornkamm J (2000) Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrechtsprechung zwischen nationalem und europäischem Recht. In: Canaris CW, Heldrich A et al (eds) Festschrift aus Anlass des fünfzigjährigen Bestehens von Bundesgerichtshof, Bundesanwaltschaft und Rechtsanwaltschaft beim Bundesgerichtshof, Festgabe aus der Wissenschaft. C.H. Beck, Munich, pp 343–373

Brohm MU (2012) Die “Mitteilungen” der Kommission im europäischen Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsraum. Typologie, Rechtsnatur und Bindungswirkung für die Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten. Nomos, Baden-Baden

Calliess C, Ruffert M (eds) (2011) EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta, 4th edn. C.H. Beck, Munich

Divivier D (2014) Die Reichweite der Befugnis mitgliedstaatlicher Gerichte und Wettbewerbsbehörden zur Anwendung des EU-Kartellrechts. Nomos, Baden-BadenCrossRef

Durner W (2012) Rezension zu Markus U. Brohm: Die ‘Mitteilungen’ der Kommission im Europäischen Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsraum. DVBl.:957–958

Ehlers D (ed) (2014) Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 4th edn. De Gruyter, Berlin

Ehricke U (1994) Die Bindungswirkung von Negativattesten und Verwaltungsschreiben im Gemeinschaftsrecht. ZHR 158:170–181

Emmerich V (2001) Zur Mär von der Arbeitsüberlastung der Kommission. WuW:3

Engel C (1988) Die Bedeutung des Völkerrechts für die Anwendung in- und ausländischen Wirtschaftsrechts. RabelsZ 52:271–302

Epiney A (1999) Zur Stellung des Völkerrechts in der EU. Zugleich Besprechung von EuGH, EuZW 1998, 572 – Hermès und EuGH, EuZW 1998, 694 – Racke. EuZW:5–11

Frenz W (2010) Handbuch Europarecht vol 5: Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz. Springer, HeidelbergCrossRef

Frenz W (2011a) Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten im Arbeitsrecht. RdA:199–203

Frenz W (2011b) Handbuch Europarecht vol 6: Insitutionen und Politiken. Springer, HeidelbergCrossRef

Frenz W (2012a) Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Grundrechte. EWS:359–363

Frenz W (2012b) Zugang zu Energieleitungen und Preisgestaltung. WiVerw:188–197

Frenz W (2013a) Internationaler Handel und EU-Kartellrecht. EWS:461–463

Frenz W (2013b) Öffentliches Recht, 6th edn. Vahlen, Cologne

Geiger R, Khan D-E, Kotzur M (eds) (2010) Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag über die Arbeitsweisen der Europäischen Union, Kommentar, 5th edn. C.H. Beck, Munich

Gleiss A, Hirsch M (eds) (1993) Kommentar zum EWG-Kartellrecht, 4th edn. Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg

Grune JK (2013) Kartellrecht: Spürbarkeit einer Wettbewerbsbeschränkung – Unverbindlichkeit der De-minimis-Bekanntmachung. EuZW:116–117

Haymann M (1974) Extraterritoriale Wirkungen des EWG-Wettbewerbsrechts. Informa-Verlag, Baden

Hilf M, Schorkopf F (2000) WTO und EG: Rechtskonflikte vor dem EuGH? – Anmerkung zum Urteil des EuGH vom 23.11.1999, Portugal/Rat, Rs. C-149/96. EuR:74–91

Hossenfelder S, Lutz M (2003) Die neue Durchführungsverordnung zu den Artikeln 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag. WuW:118–129

Hucke A (2000) Erforderlichkeit einer Harmonisierung des Wettbewerbsrechts in Europa. Nomos, Baden-Baden

Immenga U (2012) Gestaltungsspielräume der Kommission. In: Immenga U, Körber T (eds) Die Kommission zwischen Gestaltungsmacht und Rechtsbindung. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 9–36

Immenga U, Mestmäcker E-J (eds) (2012) Wettbewerbsrecht. Kommentar zum Europäischen Kartellrecht, vol 1, 5th edn. C.H. Beck, Munich

Kamann H-G (2012) Die Einkaufsgemeinschaft als Strategie der Rohstoffsicherung? Eine kartellrechtliche Standortbestimmung. In: Ehlers D, Herrmann C, Wolffgang H-M, Schröder UJ (eds) Rechtsfragen des internationalen Rohstoffhandels. Tagungsband zum 16. Münsteraner Außenwirtschaftsrechtstag 2011. Fachmedien Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a.M., pp 101–125

Klees A (2005) Europäisches Kartellverfahrensrecht mit Fusionskontrollverfahren. Carl Heymanns, Cologne

Knebel H-W (1991) Die Extraterritorialität des Europäischen Kartellrechts. EuZW:265–274

Koch N (1959) Das Verhalten der Kartellvorschriften des EWG-Vertrages zum Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen. BB:241–247

Krimphove D (1992) Europäische Fusionskontrolle. Carl Heymanns, Cologne

Lässig P (1997) Dezentrale Anwendung des europäischen Kartellrechts. Carl Heymanns, Cologne

Loewenheim U, Meessen KM, Riesenkampff A (eds) (2009) Kartellrecht – Kommentar, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, Munich

Lübking J, von Koppenfels U (2012) Effektive Durchsetzung des EU-Wettbewerbsrechts und Verfahrensgarantien. In: Immenga U, Körber T (eds) Die Kommission zwischen Gestaltungsmacht und Rechtsbindung. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 59–88CrossRef

Meng W (1994) Extraterritoriale Jurisdiktion im öffentlichen Wirtschaftsrecht. Springer, BerlinCrossRef

Meng W (1995) Gedanken zur Frage unmittelbarer Anwendung von WTO-Recht in der EG. In: Beyerlin U, Bothe M, Hofmann R, Petersmann E-U (eds) Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung. Völkerrecht, Europarecht, Staatsrecht. Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 1063–1086

Mestmäcker E-J (2011) Kooperative horizontale Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen im US-Antitrustrecht und im europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht. Eine vergleichende Anmerkung zum Urteil des US-Supreme Court vom 24.5.2010. In: Bechtold S, Jickeli J, Rohe M (eds) Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb. Festschrift für Wernhard Möschel. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 409–426

Mestmäcker E-J, Schweitzer H (2004) Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, Munich

Odersky W (1996) Art. 85, 86 EG-Vertrag und die nationalen Gerichte. Einige Bemerkungen aus der Sicht des Bundesgerichtshofes. In: Immenga U, Möschel W, Reuter D (eds) Festschrift für Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 699–710

Ott A (1997) GATT und WTO im Gemeinschaftsrecht. Carl Heymanns, Cologne

Pallek M (2000) Wettbewerbsschutz im Zeitalter der Globalisierung – Zur Kooperation der amerikanischen und europäischen Wettbewerbsbehörden. AVR 38:169–216

Pampel G (2005a) Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht – Rechtsnatur und Rechtswirkungen von Mitteilungen der Kommission im europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht. EuZW:11–13

Pampel G (2005b) Rechtsnatur und Rechtswirkungen horizontaler und vertikaler Leitlinien im reformierten europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht. Nomos, Baden-Baden

Petersmann E-U (1997) Darf die EG das Völkerrecht ignorieren? EuZW:325–331

Philipp O (2014) Kartellrecht: Zusammenarbeit von Wettbewerbsbehörden. EuZW:164

Pitschas C (2012) Internationaler Rohstoffhandel aus der Sicht des WTO-Rechts. In: Ehlers D, Herrmann C, Wolffgang H-M, Schröder UJ (eds) Rechtsfragen des internationalen Rohstoffhandels. Tagungsband zum 16. Münsteraner Außenwirtschaftsrechtstag 2011. Fachmedien Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a.M., pp 57–79

Prieß H-J, Berrisch GM (eds) (2003) WTO-Handbuch. C.H. Beck, Munich

Rose V, Bailey D (2013) Bellamy & child: European Union law of competition, 7th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Sack J (1997a) Noch einmal: GATT/WTO und europäisches Rechtsschutzsystem. EuZW:688

Sack J (1997b) Von der Geschlossenheit und den Spannungsfeldern in einer Weltordnung des Rechts. EuZW:650–651

Schroeder W, Selmayr M (1998) Die EG, das GATT und die Vollzugslehre oder: Warum der EG manchmal das Völkerrecht ignoriert. JZ:344–349

Schwarze J (2001) Die extraterritoriale Anwendbarkeit des EG-Wettbewerbsrechts – Vom Durchführungsprinzip zum Prinzip der qualifizierten Auswirkung. WuW:1190–1202

Schwarze J, Weitbrecht A (2004) Grundzüge des europäischen Kartellverfahrensrechts. Die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003. Nomos, Baden-Baden

Schweda M (2004) Die Bindungswirkung von Bekanntmachungen und Leitlinien der Europäischen Kommission. WuW:1133–1144

Steinbach A (2005) Zur Rechtswirkung von WTO-Streitbeilegungsentscheidungen in der Gemeinschaftsrechtsordnung – zugleich Anmerkung zum EuGH-Urteil Léon van Parys. EuZW:331–335

Terhechte JP (2004) Die Rolle des Wettbewerbsrechts in der europäischen Verfassung, supplement to issue 3: Das Binnenmarktziel in der europäischen Verfassung. EuR:107–126

Terhechte JP (2008) OPEC und europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht. Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Phänomen der Fragmentierung des internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts. Nomos, Baden-Baden

Terhechte JP (2012) Rohstoffexportkartelle und -beschränkungen im Lichte einer europäischen Rohstoff-Governance. In: Ehlers D, Herrmann C, Wolffgang H-M, Schröder UJ (eds) Rechtsfragen des internationalen Rohstoffhandels. Tagungsband zum 16. Münsteraner Außenwirtschaftsrechtstag 2011. Fachmedien Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a.M., pp 83–100

Thomas S (2009) Die Bindungswirkung von Mitteilungen, Bekanntmachungen und Leitlinien der EG-Kommission. EuR:423–443

Tietje C (1998) Normative Grundstrukturen der Behandlung nichttarifärer Handelshemmnisse in der WTO/GATT-Rechtsordnung. Eine Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Countertrade. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

Vitzthum W (ed) (2010) Völkerrecht. Lehr-/Studienbuch, 5th edn. De Gruyter, Berlin

von der Groeben H, Schwarze J, Hatje A (eds) (2015) Europäisches Unionsrecht, vol 2, 7th edn. Baden-Baden, Nomos

von Meibom W, Geiger A (2002) Ein Weltkartellrecht als ultima ratio. EuZW:261–266

von Stoephasius H-P (1971) Anwendung des Europäischen Kartellrechts auf Unternehmen mit Sitz in Drittstaaten. Diss., Göttingen

Walz R (1994) Der Vorrang des europäischen vor dem nationalen Kartellrecht. Nomos, Baden-Baden

Walzel DK (2008) Bindungswirkungen ungeregelter Vollzugsinstrumente der EU-Kommission – mit Schwerpunkt auf Mitteilungen, Bekanntmachungen, Leitlinien und Rahmen der Kommission im EG-Wettbewerbsrecht. Carl Heymanns, Cologne

Weidenbach G, Vogt B, Hauser SM (2012) Zugang zu Produktplattformen im europäischen und deutschen Kartellrecht. WRP:66–75

Weitbrecht A (2003) Das neue EG-Kartellverfahrensrecht. EuZW:69–73

Wiedemann G (ed) (2008) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, Munich

Titel: European, National and International Competition Regime
verfasst von: Walter Frenz
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch: Handbook of EU Competition Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48591-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-48593-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48593-4_2

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"