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Dual System Framework in Multilinear Settings and Applications to Fully Secure (Compact) ABE for Unbounded-Size Circuits Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Chameleon-Hashes with Ephemeral Trapdoors

And Applications to Invisible Sanitizable Signatures

verfasst von : Jan Camenisch, David Derler, Stephan Krenn, Henrich C. Pöhls, Kai Samelin, Daniel Slamanig

Erschienen in: Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2017

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

A chameleon-hash function is a hash function that involves a trapdoor the knowledge of which allows one to find arbitrary collisions in the domain of the function. In this paper, we introduce the notion of chameleon-hash functions with ephemeral trapdoors. Such hash functions feature additional, i.e., ephemeral, trapdoors which are chosen by the party computing a hash value. The holder of the main trapdoor is then unable to find a second pre-image of a hash value unless also provided with the ephemeral trapdoor used to compute the hash value. We present a formal security model for this new primitive as well as provably secure instantiations. The first instantiation is a generic black-box construction from any secure chameleon-hash function. We further provide three direct constructions based on standard assumptions. Our new primitive has some appealing use-cases, including a solution to the long-standing open problem of invisible sanitizable signatures, which we also present.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Deterring Certificate Subversion: Efficient Double-Authentication-Preventing Signatures
Nächstes Kapitel Improved Structure Preserving Signatures Under Standard Bilinear Assumptions
Fußnoten
1
The randomness r is also sometimes called “check value” [5].
 
2
Actually we need one \(\mathsf {crs}\) per language, but we do not make this explicit here.
 
3
See for example the ruling from the German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) 29.07.2015, Az.: 6 C 33.14, 6 C 35.14.
 
4
A disorder involving difficulty in learning to read or interpret words, letters and other symbols.
 
5
We want to stress that Krenn et al. [48] also introduce “strong transparency”, which is not related to the definition given by Ateniese et al. [4].
 
6
We note that IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme \(\varPi \) is sufficient, as the abort in Game 1 ensures that the adversary can only submit queries with respect to ciphertexts which were previously generated in the reduction, i.e., where we can simply look up the respective values \(\mathsf {etd}_i\) instead of decryption.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Chameleon-Hashes with Ephemeral Trapdoors
verfasst von
Jan Camenisch
David Derler
Stephan Krenn
Henrich C. Pöhls
Kai Samelin
Daniel Slamanig
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2017

Print ISBN: 978-3-662-54387-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-54388-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54388-7_6