2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Smart Contracts for Bribing Miners
verfasst von : Patrick McCorry, Alexander Hicks, Sarah Meiklejohn
Erschienen in: Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Abstract
CensorshipCon
, highlights that Ethereum’s uncle block reward policy can directly subsidise the cost of bribing miners. The second contract, HistoryRevisionCon
, rewards miners via an in-band payment for reversing transactions or enforcing a new state of another contract. The third contract, GoldfingerCon
, rewards miners in one cryptocurrency for reducing the utility of another cryptocurrency. This work is motivated by the need to understand the extent to which smart contracts can impact the incentive mechanisms involved in Nakamoto-style consensus protocols.