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2010 | Buch

The Decision to Patent

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SUCHEN

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
Firms do not patent every invention. In many cases they rather rely on trade secrecy or other non-legal means to protect their intellectual property, i.e. the returns on their investments in research and development (R&D). A patent confers to its owner the exclusive rights to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes the patent protected product (Art. 28, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)). In exchange for the temporary monopoly which is secured by this protection, the patentee has to disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art (Art. 83, European Patent Convention (EPC)). Thus every patent has the drawback of a possible loss of a technological leadership caused by the mandatory disclosure of formerly proprietary knowledge. The patentee has to fear that this transfer of enabling knowledge included in the patent description may benefit his rivals by facilitating their rapid catch-up. The relevance and actual enforcement of the disclosure requirement is underlined by the European Commission’s Green Paper on Innovation (European Commission (1996)). In the so-called Route of Action 8 on the promotion of intellectual and industrial property it is stated that a desirable action should be the “promotion of patent information services as a method of technology watch based, in particular, on the information system set up by the European Patent Office” (European Commission (1996), p. 42). Thus, the European Commission proposes policies which actively encourage firms to make more use of patent databases as a source of technological information for their innovative activities.
Alexandra Zaby
Chapter 2. The Decision to Patent with Vertical Product Differentiation
Abstract
In this chapter we introduce the patenting decision of a successful inventor into a market with vertically differentiated products1. The analysis of the patenting decision in this setting follows Zaby (2009a).
Alexandra Zaby
Chapter 3. An Empirical Investigation of the Decision to Patent with Vertical Product Differentiation
Abstract
The basis for the empirical analysis presented in this chapter is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) of the year 2005. The MIP is an annual survey which is conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The aim of the survey is to provide a tool to investigate the innovation behavior of German manufacturing and service firms. Regularly—currently every two years—the MIP is the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Our empirical investigations are based on about 740 firms.
Alexandra Zaby
Chapter 4. The Decision to Patent with Horizontal Product Differentiation
Abstract
In this chapter we introduce the patenting decision into an oligopolistic model of horizontally differentiated products. The analysis presented here in large parts follows Zaby (2009b).We assume that a drastic product innovation is released on a new market where rivals may enter with non-infringing products as long as patent protection is not perfect. Product characteristics are assumed to be continuously distributed on a circle of unit-circumference where a patent protects a given range on the circle from the entry of rival firms.
Alexandra Zaby
Chapter 5. An Empirical Investigation of the Decision to Patent with Horizontal Product Differentiation
Abstract
For our empirical analysis of the case with horizontally differentiated products we use the same data as in the case with vertically differentiated goods. Nevertheless we implement the differing model assumptions by defining the data sample properly. The empirical analysis proceeds as follows: After summarizing the theoretical results in multiple hypotheses (Section 5.1) the data sample and the implementation of the theoretical parameters in the data are described (Section 5.2). The results of the empirical estimations are presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 concludes. The empirical estimations presented in this chapter in large parts follow Zaby and Heger (2009).
Alexandra Zaby
Chapter 6. Summary and Discussion
Abstract
The main focus of the present book was to investigate the driving forces behind the patenting decision of a successful inventor taking into account the effects of mandatory disclosure. To achieve this the effects of a patent were divided into two parts, a protective and a disclosure effect. By allowing for an immediate impact of the disclosure requirement we moved away from the common assumption that the disclosure requirement has an impact on the inventor’s profits only after a patent expires. Instead, we accounted for the fact that the disclosure requirement affects the patentee from the moment he decides to patent as he loses (part of) his technological lead immediately.
Alexandra Zaby
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
The Decision to Patent
verfasst von
Alexandra Zaby
Copyright-Jahr
2010
Verlag
Physica-Verlag HD
Electronic ISBN
978-3-7908-2612-8
Print ISBN
978-3-7908-2611-1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2612-8