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Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising

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New Developments in the Theory of Networks

Part of the book series: Contributions to Management Science ((MANAGEMENT SC.))

Abstract

The aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of governance. The degree of contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty (negatively), trust (positively), franchisees’ specific investments (negatively), environmental uncertainty (negatively), intangibility of system specific know-how (negatively) and contract design capabilities (positively). The hypotheses are tested with a data base consisting of 52 franchise systems in Austria. The empirical results support the hypotheses regarding behavioural uncertainty, trust and intangible system-specific know-how.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Business Studies, University of Vienna, Brünner Str. 72, A- 1210, Vienna, Austria

    Josef Windsperger

Authors
  1. George Hendrikse
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  2. Josef Windsperger
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Correspondence to Josef Windsperger .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , School of Business and Economics, University of Jyväskylä, MaE, Jyväskylä, 40014, Finland

    Mika Tuunanen

  2. Fak. Sozial-u.Wirtschaftswiss., Inst. BWL / LS Organisation, Universität Wien, Brünner Str. 72, Wien, 1210, Austria

    Josef Windsperger

  3. Centre Recherche en Economic et, Management (CREM), Universite de Rennes 1, rue Jean Macé 11, Rennes CX, 35708, France

    Gérard Cliquet

  4. School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burg. Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam, 3000 DR, Netherlands

    George Hendrikse

Appendix: Measures of Variables

Appendix: Measures of Variables

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Hendrikse, G., Windsperger, J. (2011). Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising. In: Tuunanen, M., Windsperger, J., Cliquet, G., Hendrikse, G. (eds) New Developments in the Theory of Networks. Contributions to Management Science. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2615-9_2

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