Abstract
In a considerable number of areas, the European Union has developed its own state-like foreign policy. One important dimension is participation in international legal regimes. This is membership of international organisations and the signing of multilateral conventions. Because of the EU’s internal complexity participation in international legal regimes raises many issues of a constitutional nature. The Court of Justice has repeatedly been asked to scrutinise whether a particular case of participation is in compliance with EU law. In this regard, it is fair to say that the Court of Justice’s greatest concern has been the preservation of the autonomy of the EU legal order and more specifically the autonomous interpretation of EU law by the Court itself. Indeed, the Court has not so far accepted that it must be submitted to the authority of any external (quasi-)judicial structure. The two most prominent examples of international (quasi-)judicial bodies that have had and will continue to have a normative impact on the EU are the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization and the European Court of Human Rights. As is well known the EU is a member of the WTO, while negotiations for accession to the European Convention on Human Rights are ongoing. The underlying questions are: How does, will and should the Court of Justice deal with the decisions of these two (quasi-)judicial bodies? What could be the reasons for the Court of Justice’s concern about the autonomy of the EU legal order?
Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (http://jur.uva.nl/acelg). I would like to thank Chris Koedooder, Joana Mendes, Jan Willem van Rossem, Louise van Schaik and the two editors for their comments on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are of course my own.
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Notes
- 1.
See also Chap. 7 of this volume.
- 2.
See also Chap. 6 of this volume.
- 3.
Editorial Comments, 2005 Common Market Law Review 42:584.
- 4.
The EFTA court, for instance, that has taken the place of the proposed EEA court (see the discussion of Opinion 1/91 below), does not settle disputes between the contracting parties to the EEA agreement.
- 5.
The Arbitral Tribunal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which the EU is also a party, suspended the Mox Plant case pending the Court of Justice’s decision, see ECJ Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635.
- 6.
This is probably best illustrated by the discussions surrounding counter-terrorist sanctions against individuals, see Eckes 2009.
- 7.
See also Chap. 2 of this volume and the case law discussed in this chapter, Sect. 5.2.1.
- 8.
ECJ Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; ECJ Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199.
- 9.
Article 218(11) TFEU.
- 10.
ECJ Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199.
- 11.
See ECJ Opinion 1/09 Unified Patent Litigation System [2011] ECR I-0000.
- 12.
ECJ Opinion 1/76 draft Agreement establishing a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels [1977] ECR 741. In this case, the Court of Justice rejected the establishment of a fund tribunal consisting of six of its own judges. It expressed concern about the possibility of a conflict of jurisdiction in the event of two parallel preliminary ruling procedures on the interpretation of the agreement (one before the fund tribunal and one before the Court of Justice) and on the impartiality of those judges who sit on both judicial bodies.
- 13.
ECJ Opinion 1/91 EEA [1991] ECR I-6079.
- 14.
ECJ Opinion 2/94 Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759.
- 15.
ECJ Opinion 1/00 ECAA [2002] ECR I-3493, paras 21, 23 and 26.
- 16.
ECJ Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635.
- 17.
ECJ Opinion 1/09 Unified Patent Litigation System [2011] ECR I-0000, see in particular paras 73–89.
- 18.
Ibid., paras 80–81.
- 19.
ECJ Opinion 1/91 EEA [1991] ECR I-6079, paras 39–40: The EU’s “capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entail the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such an agreement as regards the interpretation and application of its provisions.”.
- 20.
Ibid., paras 33–36.
- 21.
See for an argument in favour of the direct effect of WTO dispute decisions but against the direct effect of WTO law more broadly: Eeckhout 2011, 375 et seq.
- 22.
See Article 17(14) Dispute Settlement Understanding.
- 23.
Ibid.
- 24.
Article 53 ECHR: The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are parties. Article 54 ECHR: The judgement of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.
- 25.
Greer 2003 goes as far as to argue that the ECtHR’s primary function is “constitutional justice” rather than “individual justice”. This, of course, is subject to societal change, see: ECtHR Cossey v UK [1990] application no. 10843/84, Judgment (Plenary), Series A, Volume 184, para 35.
- 26.
The effectiveness of EU law is the result of the interplay between the Member States’ acceptance of supremacy and direct effect (normative impact), on the one hand, and a strong court and respect for the rule of law and human rights (constitutionalisation) on the other.
- 27.
- 28.
See ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) [1995] Application No. 310, Series A, para 75; ECtHR Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (GC) [2005] Application No. 45036/98; ECtHR Behrami & Behrami v France [2007] Application No. 71412/01; ECtHR Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (GC) [2007] Application No. 78166/01, para 145.
- 29.
Walker 2001, 35.
- 30.
Ibid., 50–51. For the ECHR compare Alec Stone Sweet’s analysis, Stone Sweet 2009.
- 31.
See also Chap. 7 of this volume.
- 32.
See e.g. Antoniadis 2004, 327.
- 33.
WT/DS86 Sweden—Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Complainant: United States) 28 May 1997; WT/DS83 Denmark—Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Complainant: United States) 14 May 1997; WTDS82 Ireland—Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (Complainant: United States) 14 May 1997; WT/DS80 Belgium—Measures Affecting Commercial Telephone Directory Services (Complainant: United States) 2 May 1997; WT/DS68 Ireland—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (Complainant: United States) 14 February 1997; WT/DS131 France—Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies (Complainant: United States) 5 May 1998; WT/DS130 Ireland—Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies (Complainant: United States) 5 May 1998; WT/DS129 Greece—Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies (Complainant: United States) 5 May 1998; WT/DS128 Netherlands—Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies (Complainant: United States) 5 May 1998; WT/DS127 Belgium—Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies (Complainant: United States) 5 May 1998.
- 34.
In the list of disputes on the WTO website, no Member State has brought a complaint. Cases brought by or against the Union since 1 January 2009: WT/DS425 China—Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment from the European Union (Complainant: European Union) 25 July 2011; WT/DS424 United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy (Complainant: European Union) 1 April 2011; WT/DS409 European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit (Complainant: Brazil) 12 May 2010; WT/DS408 European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit (Complainant: India) 11 May 2010; WT/DS407 China—Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Iron and Steel Fasteners from the European Union (Complainant: European Union) 7 May 2010; WT/DS405 European Union—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (Complainant: China) 4 February 2010; WT/DS401 European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (Complainant: Norway) 5 November 2009; WT/DS400 European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (Complainant: Canada) 2 November 2009; WT/DS397 European Communities—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (Complainant: China) 31 July 2009; WT/DS396 Philippines—Taxes on Distilled Spirits (Complainant: European Communities) 29 July 2009; WT/DS395 China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Complainant: European Communities) 23 June 2009; WT/DS389 European Communities—Certain Measures Affecting Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United States (Complainant: United States) 16 January 2009.
- 35.
This was the case in the last complaint that was brought against an individual Member State: WT/DS210 Belgium—Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice (Complainant: United States) 12 October 2000. In WT/DS173 France—Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight Management System (Complainant: United States) 21 May 1999 and WT/DS125 Greece—Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs (Complainant: United States) 4 May 1998 an identical request for consultations was addressed to the Union, see WT/DS172 European Communities—Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight Management System (Complainant: United States) 21 May 1999; WT/DS124 European Communities—Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs (Complainant: United States) 30 April 1998.
- 36.
See e.g. WT/DS67 United Kingdom—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (Complainant: United States) 22 June 1998; WT/DS68 Ireland—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (Complainant: United States) 22 June 1998.
- 37.
As a matter of principle this has not changed even though Article XXIV GATT has solved the legal problem.
- 38.
Licková 2008, 473.
- 39.
Only a few bodies are capable of adopting decisions, see also Chap. 6 of this volume.
- 40.
Paasivirta and Kuijper 2005 emphasise that WTO law and decisions of the dispute settlement bodies are the exception that confirm the rule that international agreements do form part of the EU legal order and can have direct effect. More recently also decisions of the UNCLOS Tribunal, see ECJ Case C-308/06 Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057.
- 41.
ECJ Case C-93/02 P Biret International v Council (Biret) [2003] ECR I-10497.
- 42.
ECJ Case C-377/02 Van Parys [2005] ECR I-1465. See on the same issue and with the same outcome in more detail Advocate General Léger C-351/04 IKEA Wholesale [2007] ECR I-7727, paras 77 et seq.
- 43.
ECJ Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P FIAMM v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6513.
- 44.
Ibid.
- 45.
See also Chap. 7 of this volume.
- 46.
See for example ECJ Case C-70/94 Werner v Germany [1995] ECR I-3189, para 23 and ECJ Case C-83/94 Leifer and Others [1995] ECR I-3231, para 24; but see also for an example where the Court did not have recourse to the technique of consistent interpretation ECJ Case C-351/04 Ikea Wholesale [2007] ECR I-7723. See in more detail on the attitude of the Court of Justice to giving effect to WTO dispute decisions Chap. 7 of this volume.
- 47.
This is very different for the ECtHR, see infra.
- 48.
See e.g. WT/DS62/R European communities—customs classification of certain computer equipment (LAN case) (Complaint:United States) 22 June 1998; WT/DS67 United Kingdom—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (Complainant: United States) 22 June 1998; WT/DS68 Ireland—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (Complainant: United States) 22 June 1998.
- 49.
See above.
- 50.
Cases WT/D315/1 European Communities—Selected Customs Matters, request for consultation by the US, 21 September 2004; WT/DS 315/R European Communities—Selected Customs Matters, Report of the Panel, 16 June 2006, paras 2.2–2.31; WT/D315/AB/R European Communities—Selected Customs Matters Report of the AB, 13 November 2006, para 69.
- 51.
Official talks on the EU's accession to the ECHR started on 7 July 2010. On the side of the Council of Europe, its Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) negotiated with the Commission the necessary legal steps for the EU’s accession to the ECHR. The draft accession agreement together with its explanatory report was finalised in June 2011 (Draft Legal Instrument on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH-UE(2011)16). See also Chap. 6 of this volume.
- 52.
See e.g. Memorandum of the Commission of 4 April 1979, Bulletin of the European Communities, supp. 2/79.
- 53.
ECJ Opinion 2/94 accession of the Community to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759.
- 54.
Article 6(2) TEU “The Union shall accede…” and Protocol 8. See also on the side of the ECHR Article 59(2) ECHR as amended by Protocol 14.
- 55.
Jacqué 2011.
- 56.
The CDDH submitted the draft accession agreement (8th Working Meeting of the CDDH Informal Working Group on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (CDDH-UE) with the European Commission, Draft Legal Instrument on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH-UE(2011)16) on 14 October 2011 to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (see Para 15 of Document CDDH(2011)009). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as both Courts will give their opinion on the agreement. It will then need to be adopted by the Committee of Ministers. The EU will finally accede to the ECHR after the accession agreement has entered into force, which will be the case after it is ratified by all states parties to the ECHR as well as the EU itself.
- 57.
Document CDDH-UE(2011)16 ibid., para 27.
- 58.
On 1 October 2011, 15 protocols are open for signature. Protocol 1 (property; education; elections); Protocol 4 (civil imprisonment, free movement, expulsion); Protocol 6 (restriction of death penalty); Protocol 7 (crime and the family); Protocol 12 (discrimination); Protocol 13 (complete abolition of death penalty) and of course on procedural issues Protocol 14 (entered into force on 1 June 2010) as well as Protocol 11 (entered into force on 1 November 1998).
- 59.
Article 57 ECHR; see also on the necessary clarity of reservations: ECtHR Belilos v Switzerland [1988] Application No. 10328/83. For a valid reservation see ECtHR Jecius v Lithuania [2002] Application No. 34578/97. For a list of all declarations and reservations by all Contracting Parties see: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=06/06/2011&CL=ENG&VL=1 (last visited on 23 April 2012).
- 60.
Lock 2011. See also the Robert Schuman Foundation’s Policy Paper, European issues No. 218, of 7 November 2011.
- 61.
Article 3 of CDDH-UE (2011) 16fin; see also the Explanatory report to the agreement, para 54.
- 62.
Explanatory report to Protocol No. 14, para 101.
- 63.
See the discussions on attribution in ECtHR Behrami & Behrami v France [2007] Application No. 71412/01; ECtHR Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (GC) [2007] Application No. 78166/01. See also Articles 3 and 4 of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organisations, 2011.
- 64.
ECJ Opinion 1/91 EEA [1991] ECR I-6079, para 34.
- 65.
The ECAA Agreement had been substantially amended and had become a mixed agreement by the time it was signed in 2006. See Bronckers 2007, 609.
- 66.
Accepted by the Court of Justice in Opinion 1/92 EEA II [1992] ECR I-2821.
- 67.
ECJ Opinion 1/00 ECAA [2002] ECR I-3493.
- 68.
ECJ Opinion 1/94 WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267.
- 69.
ECtHR Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (GC) [2005] Application No. 45036/98.
- 70.
ECtHR, Connolly v Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and UK, Application No. 73274/01 (available in French only).
- 71.
ECtHR Matthews v UK [1999] Application No. 24833/94, paras 45 et seq.
- 72.
ECtHR Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (GC) [2005] Application No. 45036/98, para 145.
- 73.
Article 288 TFEU.
- 74.
Article 275 TFEU.
- 75.
The best example of this is a Behrami-type situation, see ECtHR Behrami & Behrami v France [2007] Application No. 71412/01.
- 76.
See Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, OJ 2001 L 344/93, Article 2.
- 77.
ECJ Case C-340/08 M and Others [2010] ECR I-3913. This is a case concerning the question of whether the subsistence allowance of a spouse of the listed person was covered.
- 78.
This practice will continue. In Case C-130/10, Parliament v Council, of 19 July 2012, the CJEU confirmed that it is possible to adopt measures under Article 215(2) TFEU in order to give effect to pre-Lisbon common positions [paras 96 et seq]. In the same case, the CJEU interpreted Article 215(2) TFEU broad enough to serve as a legal basis for all existing types of EU counter-terrorist sanctions [paras 50 et seq]. This will strictly limit the future use of Article 75 TFEU—the TFEU sanctions competence that does not require a prior CFSP decision.
- 79.
ECtHR Behrami & Behrami v France [2007] Application No. 71412/01.
- 80.
Rosas 2011.
- 81.
GFCC, Decision of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04 (Görgülü; ECHR decision). See more recently GFCC, Decision of 4 May 2011, 2 BvR 2365/09; 2 BvR 740/10; 2 BvR 2333/08; 2 BvR 1152/10; 2 BvR 571/10 (Preventive Detention).
- 82.
See explicitly GFCC, Decision of 4 May 2011 (Preventive Detention) ibid., second headnote (Leitsatz): “Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention steht zwar innerstaatlich im Rang unter dem Grundgesetz.”; see also para 94 “…Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte auf der Ebene des einfachen Rechts…”.
- 83.
GFCC, Decision of 4 May 2011 (Preventive Detention), para 86: ‘Auslegungshilfe’.
- 84.
Press release no. 31/3011 of 4 May 2011. See also the first headnote (Leitsatz) of the decision of 4 May 2011 (Preventive Detention): “Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, die neue Aspekte für die Auslegung des Grundgesetzes enthalten, stehen rechtserheblichen Änderungen gleich, die zu einer Überwindung der Rechtskraft einer Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts führen können.”
- 85.
ECtHR M v Germany [2009] Application No. 19359/04 (preventive detention).
- 86.
Press release no. 31/3011 of 4 May 2011. See also: second headnote (Leitsatz) of decision of 4 May 2011 (Preventive Detention): “Der Konventionstext und die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte dienen auf der Ebene des Verfassungsrechts als Auslegungshilfen für die Bestimmung von Inhalt und Reichweite von Grundrechten und rechtsstaatlichen Grundsätzen des Grundgesetzes”.
- 87.
ECJ Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, para 18.
- 88.
ECJ Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, para 72; ECJ Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, paras 41–2; ECJ Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, para 16.
- 89.
UK Supreme Court McCaughey [2011] UKSC 20, 18 May 2011.
- 90.
It is considered moderate because international customary law does have internal effect but does not take precedence over a conflicting rule of Dutch law (HR 6 March 1959; NS 1962,2 (Nyugat)).
- 91.
Article 94 of the Dutch Constitution. Except for provisions of international agreements that are not binding on everyone (“een ieder verbindend”).
- 92.
Articles 258 and 260 TFEU.
- 93.
Article 46 ECHR and Protocol 14. The implementation of rulings is monitored by the Committee of Ministers.
- 94.
See also ECtHR Behrami & Behrami v France [2007] Application No. 71412/01.
- 95.
The EU is committed to the rule of law: see Article 2 TEU on values; for case law see e.g. ECJ Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23; ECJ Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, para 16; ECJ Case C-314/91 Weber v Parliament [1993] ECR I-1093, para 8.
- 96.
“Justification deficit”—this term is borrowed from: Habermas 1973.
- 97.
One case stands out in which, it could be argued, the Court of Justice departed from the position of the ECtHR: ECJ Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-665.
- 98.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 8 relating to Article 6 (2) TEU dealing with the accession of the Union to the ECHR.
- 99.
Final paragraph of the preamble to the draft agreement.
- 100.
Several scholars have convincingly argued this with regard to the investment treaty cases: ECJ Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805; ECJ Case C-433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-6985; and ECJ Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden [2010] ECR I-0000. See e.g. De Baere 2011, 111.
- 101.
Eckes 2011.
- 102.
Article 53 ECHR.
- 103.
ECtHR Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (GC) [2005] Application No. 45036/98. Of course, it remains uncertain what will happen with the presumption after EU accession to the ECHR.
- 104.
For an argument on the importance of the latter see: Hoeksma 2011.
- 105.
Neframi 2010, 323.
- 106.
- 107.
- 108.
Kingsbury 1992.
- 109.
- 110.
Hathaway 2008, 115 et seq., who ultimately sees international delegation as an exercise of state sovereign authority and not a diminution thereof.
- 111.
E.g. when they delegate powers to external bodies, Article 24(1) of the German Constitution: “Der Bund kann durch Gesetz Hoheitsrechte auf zwischenstaatliche Einrichtungen übertragen.”
- 112.
For a good overview see Hlavac 2010.
- 113.
Many national Constitutions confer a particular status on EU law, different from international law: Article 23 of the German Constitution; The Dutch Raad van State (Council of State) no longer refers to Article 94 of the Dutch Constitution (the effect of binding obligations of international law in the national legal order) but accepts primacy as flowing directly from EU law (e.g.: ABR v S, Metten, 7 July 1995, AB 1997, 117); Section 2(1) of the UK European Communities Act of 1972 that is expressed in forthright terms which are absolute and all-embracing. Any rights or obligations created by the Treaty are to be given legal effect in the UK without more ado (Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] Ch 401, 419, per Lord Denning.).
- 114.
The majority of international agreements concluded by the EU are mixed agreements (see e.g. Hillion and Koutrakos (eds) 2010).
- 115.
Licková 2008, 464.
- 116.
Wotopka and Tsutsui 2008, 724 et seq.
- 117.
E.g. most recently: UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities (last accessed 23 April 2012).
- 118.
The complete list of the Council of Europe's treaties gives an overview of all Council of Europe conventions open to the EU, available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG; indicated in the column “U”. Notice also the tremendous increase in recent years: 17 of 135 conventions or additional protocols signed between 1949 and 1989 are open to the EU. 34 of 76 conventions or additional protocols signed between 1990 and 2011 are open to the EU. See also more generally on the “normative interaction” between the Council of Europe and the EU in Chap. 6 of this volume.
- 119.
See: Articles IX and XI of the WTO Agreement of 1994 and Article 305(1)(f) UNCLOS in combination with Annex IX.
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Eckes, C. (2013). The European Court of Justice and (Quasi-)Judicial Bodies of International Organisations. In: Wessel, R., Blockmans, S. (eds) Between Autonomy and Dependence. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-903-0_5
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