Abstract
We prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria for discounted stochastic games with general state and action sets, using minimal assumptions (measurability as a function of states, and for each fixed state, compactness of action sets and continuity on those)—except for the rather strong assumption that the transition probabilities are norm-continuous functions of the actions.
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Mertens, JF., Parthasarathy, T. (2003). Equilibria for Discounted Stochastic Games. In: Neyman, A., Sorin, S. (eds) Stochastic Games and Applications. NATO Science Series, vol 570. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-1493-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0189-2
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