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The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten

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Reforming European Data Protection Law

Part of the book series: Law, Governance and Technology Series ((ISDP,volume 20))

Abstract

This paper looks at the right to data erasure contained in Article 17 of the Draft Data Protection Regulation and challenges the choice to label it as a right ‘to be forgotten’. It first explains what this right entails and why it is necessary particularly in the online world. It then puts forward ten reasons why its labeling as a ‘right to be forgotten’ does no good while it may cause harm. It shows that it does not tell the truth and is difficult to justify even if one is willing to think outside the strict boundaries of plain speech. It can mislead individuals as to its exact reach and as a result, unnecessarily trouble data controllers and eventually also frustrate the expectations of data subjects. The relevant label does not take into account the multi-purpose nature of the right (in a rapidly evolving online world), which necessitates a name that is both accurate and flexible. Fortunately, the ‘to be forgotten’ label can easily be omitted from the final text of the Regulation without necessitating any other change to the wording of Article 17. The right should simply be called a ‘right to erasure’, which cannot validly be subjected to similar objections. In general, the paper looks the right through the ‘lens’ of its label and offers an alternative introduction to the right and some of the issues pertaining to it.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Scott Michels, “Teachers’ Virtual Lives Conflict With Classroom,” ABC News, May 6, 2008, accessed October 8, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=4791295&page=1.

  2. 2.

    Jeffrey Rosen, “Free Speech, Privacy and the Web that Never Forgets”, Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 9 (2011), accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.jthtl.org/content/articles/V9I2/JTHTLv9i2_Rosen.PDF.

  3. 3.

    See for example Pere SimónCastellano, “The Right to be Forgotten under European Law: a Constitutional debate”, Lex Electronica, 16.1 (2012): 7–8, accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.lex-electronica.org/docs/articles_300.pdf.

  4. 4.

    Bert-JaapKoops, “Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in Big Data Practice”, SCRIPTed, 8(3), (2011): 233, accessed October 8, 2013, http://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/koops.pdf.

  5. 5.

    Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011) 1.

  6. 6.

    Jeffrey Rosen, “The Web Means the End of Forgetting”, New York Times, July 21, 2010, accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. See for example, Pere SimónCastellano, “A Test for Data Protection Rights Effectiveness: Charting the Future of the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Under European Law”, The Columbia Journal of European Law Online, (2013): 4–6, SSRN (AAT 2244352).

  7. 7.

    Jean-Franois Blanchette and Deborah G. Johnson, Data Retention and the Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness”, The Information Society, 18 (2002): 36, accessed October 8, 2013, http://classes.dma.ucla.edu/Spring06/259M/readings/BlanchetteJohnson.pdf: “A world in which there is no forgetfulness—a world in which everything one does is recorded and never forgotten—is not a world conducive to the development of democratic citizens. It is a world in which one must hesitate over every act because every act has permanence, may be recalled and come back to haunt one, so to speak”; Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos and Peggy Valcke, “The Right to be Forgotten in the Internet Era”, ICRI Research Paper No. 11, (2012): 2–3, SSRN (AAT2174896); Kiyoshi Murata and Yohko Orito, “The Right to Forget/Be Forgotten”, CEPE 2011: Crossing Boundaries. Ethics in Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Relations, (2011): 193–197, accessed October 8, 2013, http://users.gw.utwente.nl/Coeckelbergh/site/publicaties/Conference%20Proceedings.pdf.

  8. 8.

    Liam J. Bannon, “Forgetting as a Feature, not a Bug: the Duality of Memory and Implications for Ubiquitous Computing”, CoDesign, 2:1 (2006): 10, accessed October 8, 2013, http://archive.kmdi.utoronto.ca/events/documents/CODesign%20Forgetting.pdf.

  9. 9.

    Oscar H. Jr. Gandy, The Panoptic sort: A political economy of personal information (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) 285.

  10. 10.

    Alan F. Westin and Michael A. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society: Computers, Record-keeping, and Privacy (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times, 1972), 268.

  11. 11.

    European Commission, “A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union” (Communication) COM(2010) 609 final, 8.

  12. 12.

    It has even been parallelized with “Pandora’s Box”, see Rolf H. Weber, “The Right to Be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora’s Box?”, Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law, 2.2 (2011): 128, accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-2-2011/3084.

  13. 13.

    See Paul A. Bernal, “A Right to Delete?”, European Journal of Law and Technology, 2.2 (2011): 2–4, accessed October 8, 2013, http://ejlt.org//article/view/75/147; MugeFazlioglu, “Forget me not: the Clash of the Right to be Forgotten and Freedom of Expression on the Internet”, International Data Privacy Law, 3.3 (2013): 153–155 who sees the criticisms valid; Jeffrey Rosen, supra n. 2; JefAusloos, “The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ – Worth Remembering?”, Computer Law and Security Review, 28.2 (2012): 7–8, SSRN (ATT1970392).

  14. 14.

    Fazlioglu, supra n. 13 pp. 151–152; Rosen, supra n. 2 p. 352; Ausloos, supra n. 13 p. 8.

  15. 15.

    ‘Unofficial consolidated version of the LIBE Committee vote provided by the rapporteur’, accessed January 11, 2014, http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/DPR-Regulation-inofficial-consolidated-LIBE.pdf.

  16. 16.

    For more on this issue, see infra pp. 17–18.

  17. 17.

    Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

  18. 18.

    Emphasis added.

  19. 19.

    A similar obligation is imposed on ‘electronic communication service’ providers in relation to traffic data by the Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (the E-privacy Directive), Article 6.

  20. 20.

    Ausloos, supra n. 13 p. 13.

  21. 21.

    Supra n. 11.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    See supra p. 5.

  24. 24.

    Napoleon Xanthoulis, “Conceptualising a Right to Oblivion in the Digital World: A Human Rights-Based Approach”, SSRN (ATT 2064503): 17.

  25. 25.

    See the text of the provision, supra at p. 4.

  26. 26.

    See Data Protection Directive, Article 7(a).

  27. 27.

    Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ WP187: 9, 32.

  28. 28.

    Ausloos, supra n. 13 p. 2.

  29. 29.

    The E-Privacy Directive (supra n. 19), Article 5(3).

  30. 30.

    Christine Riefa and Christiana Markou, “Online Marketing: Advertisers Know You are a Dog on the Internet,” in Savin, A., Trzaskowski, J. (eds.) Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Denmark: Edward Elgar 2014).

  31. 31.

    This is also an argument against proposals mainly coming from US scholars to the effect that a legal right is inappropriate in this context and that technology alone should do the job (Rosen, supra n. 2 at p. 353). For additional reasons why “technology should have a serving function” and “cannot replace the legislator”, see Weber, supra n. 12 p. 127. Notably, technologists themselves who are certainly better aware of the capabilities and limitations of technology than lawyers conclude that “If there is to be an ambitious right to be forgotten, it must be a socio-legal construct, not a technical fix”, see Kieron O’Hara “Can Semantic Web Technology Help Implement a Right to be Forgotten?”, (paper presented at SCL 6th Annual Policy Forum on The New Shape of European Internet Regulation, September 11, 2011:4, accessed October 9, 2013, http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/273096/.

  32. 32.

    See for example, EnCoRe – Ensuring Consent and Revocation, http://www.encore-project.info/, accessed October 9, 2013.

  33. 33.

    Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, “Privacy in the Age of Big Data: Time for Big Decisions”, Stanford Law Review Online, 64 (2012) 67, accessed October 9, 2013, http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/big-data. For another discussion on why privacy choices are often fallible, see YoanHermstrüwer and Stephan Dickert, “Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten”, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2013/15, p. 8, accessed October 9, 2013, http://www.coll.mpg.de/publications/3258.

  34. 34.

    Supra n. 13 p. 156.

  35. 35.

    Supra n. 13 p. 8.

  36. 36.

    This restriction may be caused by the particularization of the cases of incomplete or inaccurate data in Article 12(c) DPD.

  37. 37.

    See Article 12(c) DPD, supra p. 5.

  38. 38.

    European Commission, supra n. 11 p. 7, Viviane Reding, European Commission Speech 12/26, “The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age” (speech given at Innovation Conference Digital, Life, Design, Munich, Germany, January 24, 2012), accessed October 9, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-26_en.htm.

  39. 39.

    For more on how such rights can improve the privacy-related legal framework, see Ausloos, supra n. 13, pp. 6–7.

  40. 40.

    Supra n. 13 p. 9.

  41. 41.

    Christopher Kuner, “The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law”, Privacy and Security Law Report, 11 (2012): 11.

  42. 42.

    Weber supra n. 12 pp. 126–127, Ausloos, supra n. 13 pp. 11–12, Koops, supra n. 4 pp. 248–249.

  43. 43.

    Chris Conley, “The Right to Delete.”, in AAAI Spring Symposium: Intelligent Information Privacy Management (AAAI Press, 2010), 57, accessed October 9, 2013, http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS10/paper/viewFile/1158./1482.

  44. 44.

    “Psychology Class Notes Memory”, AlleyDog.com, accessed October 9, 2013, http://www.alleydog.com/101notes/memory.html.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Ausloos, supra n. 13 p. 9.

  48. 48.

    Rosen, supra n. 2 p. 346.

  49. 49.

    See Xanthoulis, supra n. 24 p. 28. There are voices objecting to viewing the right as an aspect of privacy on the ground that privacy mainly relates to the protection of private information whereas the right to be forgotten extends to rendering publicly-known information private (Weber, supra n. 12 p. 122). Yet apart from the fact that privacy is now understood in a much broader sense (see Xanthoulis, pp. 22–23), the right to be forgotten is as an aspect of data protection, which is also a recognized human right in the EU contained in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, see Hans Graux, JefAusloos and Peggy Valcke, supra n. 7 p. 5. In any event, data protection is very closely related to privacy and other related rights. Andrade sees data protection as a procedural right that sets the methods or procedures through which substantive rights, be it privacy or identity ones, can be protected, see Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, “Oblivion: The Right to Be Different from Oneself: Reproposing the Right to Be Forgotten”, in VII International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Net Neutrality and other challenges for the future of the Internet”, IDP. Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política, 13 (2012): 125.

  50. 50.

    A sort of voluntary forgetting may take place in relation to certain traumatic events, see Kendra Cherry, “Explanations for Forgetting: Reasons Why We Forget”, About.com Psychology, accessed October 9, 2013, http://psychology.about.com/od/cognitivepsychology/tp/explanations-for-forgetting.htm.

  51. 51.

    Xanthoulis, supra n. 24 p. 9.

  52. 52.

    Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos and Peggy Valcke, supra n. 7 p. 16.

  53. 53.

    Supra n. 4, p. 231, emphasis added.

  54. 54.

    For example, telephone numbers which we learn in order to use them right away, see supra n. 44.

  55. 55.

    Such rights are recognized by French and Italian law (see Bernal, supra n. p. 2; Lilian Mitrou and Maria Karyda, “EU’s Data Protection Reform and the Right to be Forgotten - A Legal Response to a Technological Challenge?” (paper presented at the 5th International Conference of Information Law and Ethics, Corfu, Greece, June 29–30, 2012): 7, SSRN (ATT2165245), Swiss law (Weber, supra n. 12 p. 121; Franz Werro, “The Right to Inform v. the Right to be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash,” in Liability in the Third Millennium, ed. Aurelia ColombiCiacchi, Christine Godt, Peter Rott and Leslie Jane Smith (Baden-Baden, F.R.G.: Nomos, 2009), 290–1) and some US State laws (Werro, p. 297 and Robert Kirk Walker, “The Right to Be Forgotten”, Hastings Law Journal, 61 (2012): 272.

  56. 56.

    LIBE has removed the relevant reference from Article 17(1) of the Draft Regulation, something that should be welcomed.

  57. 57.

    Supra n. 4 p. 232 emphasis added.

  58. 58.

    Koops, supra n. 4 p. 244.

  59. 59.

    Infra p. 15.

  60. 60.

    Hans Graux, JefAusloos and Peggy Valcke, supra n. 7 p. 14; Bernal, supra n. 13 p. 12.

  61. 61.

    De Andrade, supra n. 49 p. 125.

  62. 62.

    Ibid at p. 127. American scholars seem to share this view despite the fact that they consider the right as sitting uneasily with American values such as the freedom of expression, see Karen Eltis, “Breaking Through the ―Tower of Babel‖: A ―Right to be Forgotten‖1 and How Trans-Systemic2 Thinking Can Help Re-Conceptualize Privacy Harm in the Age of Analytics”, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal, 22 (2011): 91: “…control over personal information is the power to control a measure of one‘s identity. This is indispensable to the ―free unfolding of personality. It is also a right to a ―rightful portrayal of self, crucial in the digital age…”.

  63. 63.

    Xanthoulis, supra n. 24 p. 21, emphasis added.

  64. 64.

    Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos and Peggy Valcke (supra n. 7 p. 14) also speak of ‘under-inclusiveness’ but in relation to the content of Article 17(2) and therefore, under a different light.

  65. 65.

    Again Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos and Peggy Valcke (supra n. 7 p. 14) also speak of ‘over-inclusiveness’ but in relation to the content of Article 17(2).

  66. 66.

    Bernal, supra n. 13 p. 2.

  67. 67.

    For a discussion of these exceptions and how they protect historical records and free speech, see Bernal, supra n. 13 pp. 10–12. For a critique of these exceptions see Fazlioglu, spura n. 13 pp. 153–155.

  68. 68.

    A prominent American law professor has stated the following: “So that’s the American line: sexual surveillance by camera or possibly in blogs is possibly actionable, but very little else is, and I think that’s a very good legal line to draw that respects free-speech values”, Rosen, supra n. 2 p. 351.

  69. 69.

    European Commission, “Myth-busting: what Commission proposals on data protection do and don’t mean”, Data Protection Newsroom, accessed October 9, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/121207_en.htm .

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Bernal, supra n. 13 p. 4.

  73. 73.

    Rosen, supra n. 2 p. 345.

  74. 74.

    Rosen, supra n. 6.

  75. 75.

    Riefa and Markou, supra n. 30.

  76. 76.

    Bannon, supra n. 8 p. 9.

  77. 77.

    Weber, supra n. 12 p. 120.

  78. 78.

    Kendra Cherry, supra n. 50.

  79. 79.

    Ibid.

  80. 80.

    Leah A. Lievrouw, “The Next Decade in Internet Time: Ways ahead for new media studies”, Information, Communication and Society, 15(5) (2012): 629.

  81. 81.

    Ibid at pp. 629–630.

  82. 82.

    Meg Leta Ambrose, “It is All About Time: Privacy, Information Cycles and the Right to be Forgotten”, Stanford Technology Law Review, 16(2) (2013): 372–373.

  83. 83.

    Ibid 371–372.

  84. 84.

    For such examples, see Castellano, supra n. 3 p. 10.

  85. 85.

    Case C-131/12, Google Spain, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Opinion) 25 June 2013, para 138.

  86. 86.

    For the Spanish approach, see Castellano supra n. 3 pp. 10–14.

  87. 87.

    Google already allows for requests for deletion of certain information such as data exposing an individual to identity theft or sexually-explicit content, “Removal Policies”, Google Inc., accessed October 9, 2013, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324.

  88. 88.

    “Remove Information from Google”, Google Inc, accessed February 26, 2014, https://support.google.com/websearch/troubleshooter/3111061?hl=en#ts=2889054,2889060.

  89. 89.

    Article 12(b), DPD and Article 17(1), PDPR, emphasis added.

  90. 90.

    Supra n. 85.

  91. 91.

    Supra n. 15.

  92. 92.

    See relevant definition in Article 2(f), DPD.

  93. 93.

    See supra p. 4.

  94. 94.

    Case C-131/12, Google Spain, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González,13 May 2014, paras 32–41, 97, 98.

  95. 95.

    Associated Press, “European Court of Justice lawyer sides with Google in ‘right to be forgotten’ case”, Fox News, June 25, 2013, accessed January 11, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2013/06/25/google-not-responsible-for-web-privacy/.

  96. 96.

    Cedric Burton and Anna Pateraki, “Status of the Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation: Where Do We Stand?”, Privacy and Security Law Report, 12 (2013): 1470, accessed January 11, 2014, http://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/burton-090213.pdf, p. 3. On business resistance to the right, see also supra p. 12.

  97. 97.

    Blanchette and Johnson, supra n. 7, p. 34.

  98. 98.

    Bannon supra n. 8, p. 9.

  99. 99.

    Richard H. Robbins, The Belief Machine (SUNY Plattsburgh, 1985), Chapter 2, accessed October 9, 2013, http://faculty.plattsburgh.edu/richard.robbins/belief/chapter_two.htm .

  100. 100.

    Giovanni Sartor, “Cognitive Automata and the Law”, EUI Working Papers 2006/35, SSRN (ATT963760), 67, 76.

  101. 101.

    Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Making Sense of Metaphors”, Cardozo Law Review, 16 (1994), accessed October 9, 2013, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p1.htm.

  102. 102.

    Sartor, supra n. 100, p. 67.

  103. 103.

    Bernal, supra n. 13, p. 9.

  104. 104.

    Fazlioglu, supra n. 13 p. 152.

  105. 105.

    Information Commissioner’s Office, “The Information Commissioner’s (United Kingdom) response to ‘A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union’”, January 14, 2011, accessed October 10, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/contributions/public_authorities/ico_infocommoffice_en.pdf, p. 6.

  106. 106.

    Supra n. 12 p. 128.

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

  108. 108.

    Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos and Peggy Valcke, supra n. 7 p. 16.

  109. 109.

    Xanthoulis, supra n. 24 p. 9.

  110. 110.

    Bernal, supra n. 13 p. 10.

  111. 111.

    O’Hara supra n. 31 p. 3.

  112. 112.

    PDPR, Article 17(1) emphasis added.

  113. 113.

    PDPR, Article 17(3) emphasis added.

  114. 114.

    UK Information Commissioner, supra n. 104: “The ICUK can see some situations where the ‘right to be forgotten’ could work well in practice, such as where an individual wishes to delete their record from a social network, but these situations are limited”.

  115. 115.

    Hermstrüwer and Dickert supra n. 33 p. 20.

  116. 116.

    Ibid p. 23.

  117. 117.

    The revised text of the Proposed Regulation publicized by the Council two months after the LIBE compromise amendments in the form of a Note from Presidency to the Working Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection is apparently based on the text prior to the LIBE amendments and still contains the ‘right to be forgotten’ label, see Council of the European Union, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2017831%202013%20INIT&r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F13%2Fst17%2Fst17831.en13.pdf, accessed February 26, 2014.

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Markou, C. (2015). The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten. In: Gutwirth, S., Leenes, R., de Hert, P. (eds) Reforming European Data Protection Law. Law, Governance and Technology Series(), vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9385-8_8

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