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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

7. Federal Labour Law in the USA and Professional Sport

verfasst von : Leanne O’Leary

Erschienen in: Employment and Labour Relations Law in the Premier League, NBA and International Rugby Union

Verlag: T.M.C. Asser Press

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Abstract

The regulation of industrial relations in the United States of America (USA) has shaped the terms and conditions of employment for National Basketball Association (NBA) players. This chapter describes the main provisions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and outlines the federal labour relations regime that applies to the employment of professional athletes in a unionized work environment such as the NBA. It discusses the conflict between federal labour relations law and federal antitrust law which in the USA has been resolved through the enactment of a statutory labour exemption and the development of the non-statutory labour exemption in the Supreme Court case law. The economic characteristics of a professional sports competition give rise to industrial relations practices that are unique to the professional sports industry and which the courts take into account when considering cases involving the employment of professional athletes in the USA.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Labour Relations Law at a European Level and Professional Sport

Nächstes Kapitel The Premier League

In professional sports in the United States of America (USA), the word team is used rather than club. The same approach will be adopted throughout this book.

In the USA the term “collective bargaining agreement” is used to refer to the agreement reached between a trade union and employer. Throughout this book the term “collective agreement” is preferred.

US Constitution, Article 1, § 8 (known as the Commerce Clause).

National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) 29 USC §151–169. See generally Gould 2013.

NLRA 29 USC §151.

NLRA 29 USC §160. See also the National Labor Relations Board website at www.nlrb.gov.

American League of Professional Baseball Teams 180 NLRB 190 (1969).

See re Northwestern University and College Athletes Players’ Association (Case 13-RC-121359, National Labor Relations Board, Decision on Review and Order, 17 August 2015), overturning a previous Decision and Direction for Election by the Regional Director for Region 13 (Chicago, Illinois) in College Athletes Players’ Association v Northwestern University (Case 13-RC-121359, 26 March 2014) which confirmed that football players receiving scholarships at Northwestern University are employees.

See, for example, Association des Joueurs de la Ligue Nationale de Hockey v Team de Hockey Canadien Inc [2005] QCCRT 354 and Orca Bay Hockey Ltd Partnership and National Hockey League [2008] BCWLD 5494.

NLRA 29 USC §158(a)(5).

NLRA 29 USC §158(d).

NLRA 29 USC §158(d). See Atlas Mills Inc (1937) 3 NLRB 10 and NLRB v Montgomery Ward & Co 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).

NLRA 29 USC §158(a)(5) and (b)(3). See for example NLRB v General Electric Co 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir 1969).

NLRA 29 USC §158(d).

First National Maintenance Corporation v National Labor Relations Board 452 US 666 (1981).

See National Labor Relations Board v Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation 356 US 342 (1958) and Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local Union No 1 v Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co 404 US 157 (1971).

National Labor Relations Board v Katz 369 US 736 (1962).

Murphy Diesel Co v NLRB 454 F.2d 303 (7th Cir 1971).

Clarett v NFL 369 F.3d 124 (CA 2 (NY) 2004), p. 140.

Ibid.

369 F.3d 124 (CA 2 (NY) 2004).

Ibid., p. 139–140.

Mackey v National Football League 543 F. 2d 606 (C Minn. 1976).

Wood v National Basketball Association 602 F.Supp. 525 (DCNY 1984).

See the trilogy of cases brought by the United Steelworkers of America which confirmed, amongst other things the enforceability of a provision in a collective agreement requiring disputes to be submitted to arbitration: United Steelworkers of America v American Manufacturing Co 363 US 564 (1960), United Steelworkers of America v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company 363 US 574 (1960) and United Steelworkers of America v Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp 363 US 593 (1960).

Wood v NBA 809 F.2d 954 (CA 2 1987), p. 960.

Taft Broadcasting Company v American Federation of Television and Radio Artists 163 NLRB 475 (1967).

La Porte Transit Company Inc v National Labor Relations Board 888 F. 2d 1182 (7th Cir 1989).

Brown v Pro Football Inc 518 US 231 (1996); see also National Labor Relations Board v Katz 369 US 736 (1962).

Brown v Pro Football Inc 518 US 231 (1996).

Ibid.

For further information about the process, see the National Labor Relations Board website at www.nlrb.gov.

See Sect. 7.3, infra.

NLRA 29 USC §158(a).

NLRA 29 USC §158(b).

NLRA 29 USC §§160–161. See National Football League Players’ Association v National Labour Relations Board and National Football League Management Council 503 F.2d 12 (8th Cir 1974), which related to an unfair labour practice complaint arising from the unilateral implementation of a rule in the NFL that imposed an automatic fine if a player left the bench during a fight or altercation.

NLRA 29 USC §157 and NLRA 29 USC §163.

See Feldman 2012a, pp. 837–843.

Ibid.

Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 9 USC §10.

See National Football League Management Council and Anor v National Football Players’ Association and Anor Unreported, United States Court of Appeal 2nd Cir, Nos 15-2801 (L) and 15-2805 (CON), 25 April 2016.

Clayton Act of 1914 15 USC §17, § 52 and Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 29 USC §101.

For a succinct summary see Van Rompuy 2012, para 2.02(A)(1).

Clayton Act of 1914 15 US §17.

Clayton Act of 1932 29 USC § 52.

Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 29 USC § 101.

Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 29 USC § 104.

Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 29 USC § 113.

United States of America v Hutcheson 312 US 219 (1941).

312 US 219 (1941).

381 US 676 (1965).

381 US 657 (1965).

421 US 616 (1975).

518 US 231 (1996).

930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir 1989).

543 F. 2d 606 (8th Cir 1976).

644 F.3d 661 (C.A.8 (Minn) 2011).

381 US 676 (1965).

Ibid., pp. 689–690.

Jewel Tea, supra n 58, p. 691. “[E]xemption for union-employer agreements is very much a matter of accommodating the coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy of the labor laws. Employers and unions are required to bargain about wages, hours and working conditions, and this fact weighs heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects”—Jewel Tea, supra n 58, p. 689.

Jewel Tea, supra n 58, p. 690.

381 US 657 (1965).

Ibid., p. 664.

Pennington, supra n 62, pp. 665–666.

Pennington, supra n 62, p. 669.

421 US 616 (1975).

Ibid., pp. 622–623.

Ibid.

518 US 231 (1996).

Ibid., p. 250.

Ibid.

See Sect. 7.2.1, supra.

Brown, supra n 70, pp. 241–242.

Brown, supra n 70, p. 250.

Brown, supra n 70, p. 249–250.

Feldman 2012b, p. 1247.

644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir 2011). See Feldman 2012b. See also McNeil v NFL (D. Minn 1992) unreported, 10 September 1992, a case that was decided by a lower court before Brown, in which a group of players succeeded with an antitrust challenge against restrictions on free agency that were imposed by the NFL. The case was successfully brought after the players disbanded the NFLPA.

NBA v NBPA (USDC SD New York No 11CV05369, 2 August 2011) [2011 WL3274242 (S.D.N.Y.)].

The League’s arguments have been criticized as misguided and inconsistent with Brown on the basis that extending the non-statutory labour exemption after a union has been decertified, would interfere with an employee’s fundamental right to choose whether to form a union or not; the labour exemption applies only when there is a conflict between labour law and antitrust law, which ceases after dissolution of the union: Feldman 2012b, p. 1253.

644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir 2011), pp. 680–681. The majority construed the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 as removing from the jurisdiction of a federal court, the capacity to issue an injunction against an employer-initiated lockout. The decision is surprising because of the legislative history of the Act as being a statute enacted to protect labour: see the dissenting judgment of Circuit Judge Bye, commencing at 682; see also Tyman 2014.

The agreement came into effect on 4 August 2011 and expires on the last day of the 2020 League Year: NFL CBA, Article 69(1).

NBA v NBPA (USDC SD New York No 11CV05369, 2 August 2011) [2011 WL3274242 (S.D.N.Y.)], para 9.

Anthony v National Basketball Association [Complaint No. 11-05525 (N.D. Cal. 15 November 2011)] and Butler v National Basketball Association [Complaint, No. 11-03352 (D. Minn. 15 November 2011)]. See also Grow 2013.

The agreement came into effect on 8 December 2011 and expires on 30 June 2021: NBA CBA, Article XXXIX, s1. Each party has an option to terminate the agreement on 30 June 2017 by providing notice on or before 15 December 2016: NBA CBA, Article XXXIX, s 2.

Feldman 2012a, 857. See also Feldman 2012b, Harper 1997 and Siler 2013. According to Siler, extending the non-statutory exemption for a reasonable period of time following a disclaimer of interest would avoid compromising the bargaining process, enable the NLRB to consider the effectiveness of the disclaimer and allow economic pressures to resolve the issues between the owners and the players rather than the litigation process: Siler 2013, pp. 318–319. Siler suggests one year or one business cycle as a reasonable period of time: ibid.

15 USC §§ 1 et seq.

15 USC §§12 et seq. The Act prohibits price discrimination that substantially lessens competition, certain exclusive dealing and tying arrangements and certain mergers and acquisitions.

15 USC §§ 41 et seq. The Act created the Federal Trade Commission, which enforces antitrust law.

See, for example, the Supreme Court’s statement in Northern Pacific Railway Company v United States of America 356 US 1 (1958): “The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition”—ibid., p. 4.

Sherman Act of 1890 15 USC §1, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 15 USC §6(a) and Hartford Fire Insurance Co et al. v California et al. 509 US 764 (1993).

15 USC § 1.

Clayton Act of 1914 15 USC §15.

15 USC § 2.

Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp 467 US 752 (1984), p. 771.

See for example: Levin v National Basketball Association 385 F.Supp. 149 (SDNY 1974); NFL v National American Soccer League 459 US 1074 (1982); and Chicago Professional Sports Ltd v National Basketball Association 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir 1996); cf San Francisco Seals Ltd v NHL 379 F.Supp. 966 (CD Cal 1974). See also Roberts 1984 and Goldman 1989.

Fraser v Major League Soccer LLC 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (2000) (D Mass); appeal decision at Fraser v Major League Soccer 284 F.3d 47 (2002) (CA1 Mass).

Fraser v Major League Soccer 284 F.3d 47 (2002) (CA1 Mass), p. 58.

Ibid.

560 US 183 (2010).

Ibid., p. 188.

American Needle, supra n 101, p. 195.

104

Ibid.

105

American Needle, supra n 101, pp. 196–197.

106

American Needle, supra n 101, p. 197. NFLP decisions constituted concerted action also because the teams were “separately controlled potential competitors with economic interests distinct from NFLP’s financial well-being”: American Needle, supra n 101, p. 201.

107

American Needle, supra n 101, pp. 198–203.

108

The New York Times, 18 February 2015 Belson K NFL and American Needle Agree to Settle Lawsuit. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/sports/football/nfl-and-american-needle-agree-to-settle-lawsuit.html?_r=0. Accessed 30 July 2016.

109

See Gorkin 2014 in which the author suggests that the American Needle decision was wrong and that agreements between teams in a professional sports league do not deprive the marketplace of independent decision-making centres.

110

NYNEX Corp v Discon Inc 525 US 128 (1998), p. 133.

111

See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co 310 US 150 (1940) (horizontal price fixing) and United States v. Topco Association 405 US 596 (1972) (horizontal market allocation).

112

The classic statement of the rule of reason test is outlined in the seminal case of Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States 246 US 231 (1918): “The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect actual or probable”—ibid., p. 238.

113

State Oil v Khan 522 US 3 (1997), p. 10.

114

McKeown 2011, p. 530.

115

See FTC v Superior Trial Court Lawyers Association 493 US 411 (1990) and FTC v Indiana Federation of Dentists 476 US 447 (1986).

116

See NCAA v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma 568 US 85 (1984), FTC v Indiana Federation of Dentists 476 US 447 (1986) and California Dental Association v FTC 526 US 756 (1999).

117

California Dental Association v FTC 526 US 756 (1999), p. 770.

118

McKeown 2011, p. 531.

119

National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma 468 US 85 (1984).

120

Ibid., p. 101.

121

NCAA, supra n 119, p. 107.

122

NCAA, supra n 119, p. 119.

123

Ibid.

124

NCAA, supra n 119, p. 120.

125

FTC v Indiana Federation of Dentists 476 US 447 (1986).

126

Gorkin 2014, p. 11 (and accompanying footnote 112).

127

259 US 200 (1922).

128

See United States v International Boxing Team 348 US 236 (1955) and Radovich v National Football League 352 US 445 (1957) which confirms that the exemption established for baseball does not apply to other sports.

129

Federal Baseball Team of Baltimore Inc, supra n 127, p. 208–209.

130

Toolson v New York Yankees Inc 346 US 356 (1953), p. 357 and Flood v Kuhn 92 S Ct 2099 (1972) pp. 287–288.

See Miller 2004.

See Abrams 1999.

15 USC §26 (b).

National Football League v North American Soccer League 459 US 1074 (1982): “The NFL owners are joint ventures who produce a product, professional football, which competes with other sports and other forms of entertainment in the entertainment market”—ibid., p. 1077 (Justice Rehnquist dissenting).

135

543 F. 2d 606 (CA Minn. 1976).

136

Ibid., p. 612.

137

Mackey, supra n 135, p. 616.

138

Mackey, supra n 135, p. 621.

139

Mackey, supra n 135, p. 620.

140

Mackey, supra n 135, p. 621.

141

Mackey, supra n 135, p. 622.

142

Ibid.

143

See Sect. 9.4, infra.

144

See Sect. 9.5, infra.

145

See Sect. 9.6, infra.

146

See Sect. 7.2.1, supra.

147

29 USC § 158.

148

Wilson 2010, pp. 54–55.

149

Showalter 2007, pp. 210–211.

150

Ibid.

151

Ibid.

152

See, for example, Morris v New York Football Giants Inc 575 NY S.2d 1013 (N Y Sup 1991) in which the Supreme Court of New York confirmed that the Commissioner’s position, together with his “past advocacy of a position in opposition to the plaintiff’s position deprive him of the necessary neutrality to arbitrate the claims”—ibid., p. 1016; and Giamatti v Rose unreported, No A8905178, Ohio Com Pl 19 June 1989, Westlaw Ref 111386, in which a temporary injunction was granted disqualifying the Commissioner in baseball from deciding allegations that a baseball manager bet on games, because of the Commissioner’s actions prior to the hearing.

In 2015 NFL quarterback Tom Brady was suspended without pay for four games for allegedly deflating match balls during the 2014/2015 playing season. The sanction was challenged in court on the grounds of impartiality, amongst other things: National Football League Management Council and Anor v National Football Players’ Association and Anor unreported, United States Court of Appeal 2nd Cir, Nos 15-2801 (L) and 15-2805 (CON), 25 April 2016.

153

See, for example Morris v New York Football Giants Inc 575 NY S.2d 1013 (N Y Sup 1991) which confirmed that the Court’s authority to select a neutral arbitrator is “inherent when the potential bias of a designated arbitrator would make arbitration proceedings simply a prelude to later judicial proceedings challenging the arbitration award”—ibid., p. 1017.

154

Milwaukee American Association v Landis 49 F.2d 298 (1931)(D.Ill) and Charles O Finlay & Co Inc v Bowie K Kuhn et al. 569 F.2d 527 (C.A.7 Ill. 1978).

155

49 F.2d 298 (1931)(D.Ill).

156

The Major League Agreement is the contract between the baseball teams that participate in Major League Baseball and is the basic charter under which Major League Baseball operates.

157

Milwaukee American Association, supra n 154, p. 303.

158

Ibid.

159

569 F.2d 527 (C.A.7 Ill. 1978).

160

See Miller 2004, Chap. 13.

161

Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation v Major League Baseball Players’ Association 532 F. 2d 615 (CA Mo 1976) (8th Cir).

162

Charles O Finlay, a supra n 159, p. 539.

163

Charles O Finlay, supra n 159, p. 544.

164

357 F. Supp. 521 (DCNY 1973).

165

See Sect. 9.6.1, infra.

166

Supra n 164, p. 525.

167

Riko, supra n 164, p. 526.

168

432 F. Supp. 1213 (ND GA 1977).

169

Ibid., p. 1226.

Abrams RI (1999) Before the flood: The history of baseball’s antitrust exemption. Marquette Sports Law J 9(2):307–313

Feldman G (2012a) Brady v NFL and Anthony v NBA: the shifting dynamics in labour-management relations in professional sports. Tulane Law Rev 86(4):831–858

Feldman G (2012b) Antitrust law versus labor law in professional sports: balancing the scales after Brady v NFL and Anthony v NBA. Univ Calif Davis Law Rev 45:1221–1300

Goldman L (1989) Sports Antitrust and the Single Entity Theory. Tulane Law Rev 63(4):751–797

Gorkin R (2014) Sports-league player restraints, Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Federal Labor Law in the context of the National Football League. Harv J Sports Entertain Law 5:1–90

Gould W (2013) A primer on American Labor Law, 5th edn. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRef

Grow N (2013) Decertifying Players’ Unions: lessons from the NFL and NBA lockouts of 2011. Vanderbilt J Entertain Technol Law 15(3):473–506

Harper M (1997) Multiemployer bargaining, antitrust law and team sports: the contingent choice of a broad exemption. William Mary Law Rev 3(5):1663–1728

McKeown J (2011) The economics of competitive balance: sports antitrust claims after American Needle. Marquette Sports Law Rev 21(2):517–550

Miller M (2004) A whole different ballgame: the story of the baseball revolution. Ivan R Dee, Chicago

Roberts G (1984) Sports leagues and the Sherman Act: the use and abuse of Section 1 to regulate restraints on intraleague rivalry. UCLA Law Rev 32:219–301

Showalter B (2007) Technical foul: David Stern’s excessive use of rule-making authority. Marquette Sports Law Rev 18(1):205–224

Siler R (2013) The lesson of the NFL and NBA lock-outs: why courts should not immediately recognize Players’ Union disclaimers of representation. Wash Law Rev 88(1):281–319

Tyman M (2014) Locked out without a key: how the Eighth Circuit wielded a pro-labor statute as a sword against labor. Cornell Law Rev 99:953–979

Van Rompuy B (2012) Economic efficiency: the sole concern of modern antitrust policy: non-efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU. Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands

Wilson MR (2010) Why so Stern?: The growing power of the NBA Commissioner. DePaul J Sports Law Contemp Probl 7(1):45–62

Titel: Federal Labour Law in the USA and Professional Sport
verfasst von: Leanne O’Leary
Verlag: T.M.C. Asser Press
Buch: Employment and Labour Relations Law in the Premier League, NBA and International Rugby Union
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-158-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-94-6265-159-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-159-3_7

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