Abstract
When collective violence occurs, a management and decision-making crisis exists for governmental authorities. We examine this situation with an economic model of governability within states. Political decision-makers wish to minimize two goals that enter as components of the government's performance function: political violence and revolutionary change of regime. We further assume that authorities have only a scarce supply of two policy instruments available with which to respond to violence: the accommodation and repression of the demands of their oppositions. Moreover, these elites confront a number of structural determinants of violence and revolution. After laying out these basic components of the model, we propose several theorems about the causes of political performance and about the regime's decision-calculus. These are then proven through a comparative static analysis of the model and by optimizing the performance function. The deductions indicate that the regime's policy instruments produce contradictory effects on the targetted levels of violence and revolution. In general, both accommodation and repression of opponents will, up to some point, reduce violence (an intended consequence) but increase revolution (an unintended consequence). Thus, upon close examination the goals of political decision-makers, to simultaneously minimize both violence and revolution, turn out to be inconsistent. Authorities therefore select an optimal level of performance by balancing the costs and benefits that come from accommodating and repressing their opponents.
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I am grateful for the comments of Lee Dutter, Robin Gillies, Dorothy Nygren, Nick Strinkowski, Gerald Strom, Gordon Tullock, Michael Ward, and Ulrich Widmaier on an earlier draft.
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Lichbach, M. An economic theory of governability: Choosing policy and optimizing performance. Public Choice 44, 307–337 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118766
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118766