Abstract
The representative voter is an individual whose strict preference for any alternative x over any alternative y implies 1) x strictly defeats y by majority rule, if there are an odd number of voters, and 2) x weakly defeats y otherwise. This result holds for the median voter if x is his ideal point or if preferences satisfy a generalized symmetry property, but not in general. We examine a formal condition that guarantees the existence of a representative voter and an economic model in which this condition holds. We also indicate a method for estimating representative voting behavior that is justified when a representative voter exists, and compare this with a method for deriving median voting behavior from an estimated demand curve.
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I thank Bob Anderson, Ed Greenberg, Mel Hinich, Mike Munger, Wilhelm Neuefeind, Bob Parks, and Dan Slesnick for their comments. I am solely responsible for any errors.
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Rothstein, P. Representative voter theorems. Public Choice 72, 193–212 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123744
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123744