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Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bar-Ilan University, 52100, Ramat Gan, Israel

    Arye L. Hillman

  2. University of California, Los Angeles, 90024, Los Angeles, CA, USA

    Arye L. Hillman

  3. Bar-Ilan University, 52100, Ramat Gan, Israel

    Dov Samet

  4. Northwestern University, 60201, Evanston, IL, USA

    Dov Samet

Authors
  1. Arye L. Hillman
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  2. Dov Samet
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Additional information

We thank without implicating Harold Demsetz, Franklin Fisher, Jack Hirshleifer, John Riley, Al Roth and Gordon Tullock for comments on a previous draft of this paper.

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Hillman, A.L., Samet, D. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice 54, 63–82 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123805

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