Abstract
A troubling challenge to the basic principles of Bayesian decision theory is analyzed as a case where irrationality is no intellectual flaw but a characterological one, i.e., not stupidity but funk.
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Jeffrey, R. Biting the Bayesian bullet: Zeckhauser's problem. Theor Decis 25, 117–122 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134155
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134155