Abstract
In this paper we report results of an initial attempt to test the theory of expressive voting. Our experiment involves requiring subjects to vote between receiving $A in cash or having $B donated to charity on their behalf. Across subjects we vary the probability that their vote will decide which disbursement is made. As the probability of being decisive is lowered, the opportunity cost of giving expression to charitable sentiment decreases; hence, the likelihood of voting in accordance with such sentiment is expected to increase. We find weak support for the hypothesis, but the results do not replicate when we alter the parameter settings. Limitations of our design are discussed.
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This research was supported by the College of the Holy Cross and by a Procter & Gamble grant to the Department of Economics. We gratefully acknowledge the comments and contributions of James Andreoni, Geoffrey Brennan, George Kosicki, Michael Peddle, Tom Rietz, David Schap, James Shepperd, Royce Singleton, Todd Vladyka, Arlington Williams, an anonymous referee, and colleagues in our department research workshop.
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Carter, J.R., Guerette, S.D. An experimental study of expressive voting. Public Choice 73, 251–260 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140921
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140921